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La reforma del sistema iberoamericano

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Carlos Malamud

Towards a common external representation for the eurozone?

Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the external representation of the eurozone has been incrementally developed, but no formal amendments have been made. This Policy Paper discusses the case for a consolidated representation of the eurozone in international economic fora, analyses the obstacles to achieving it, and puts forward proposals to solve some of the existing obstacles.

Daniela Schwarzer, Federico Steinberg and Diego Valiante

Promoting low-carbon energies in Mediterranean partner countries

Renewable energies remain marginal in the European neighbourhood, and their contribution to economic and human development is still largely unexplored. Directive 2009/28 contemplates green electricity imports from third countries, and the Mediterranean Solar Plan offers an economic and institutional framework for its deployment in the Southern neighbourhood.

Gonzalo Escribano

Número 107, abril de 2013

www.realinstitutoelcano.org

Real Instituto Elcano

Editor:
Real Instituto Elcano

Colaboran en este número:
Ignacio Molina
Carlos Malamud
Daniela Schwarzer
Federico Steinberg
Diego Valiante
Gonzalo Escribano

Coordinadora:
Mª Dolores de Azategui

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Real Instituto Elcano
C/ Príncipe de Vergara, 51
28006 Madrid
Teléfono: 91 781 67 70
Fax: 91 426 21 57
info@rielcano.org
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal

ISSN 1696-3466
Depósito Legal: M.23.689- 2003

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Ignacio Molina

Theme[1]

After a decade of de-Europeanisation (2001-10), Spain has put the EU back at the centre of its national project but it must now also aspire to co-lead the integration process.

Summary

If Spain ever punched above its weight in Brussels, it now does the very opposite. It has genuinely lost influence and the crisis is not the only explanation. After a decade of growing distance between the European integration process and Spain's national political and economic project, the latest governments have certainly put the EU back at the centre of their agenda since 2010. This re-Europeanisation, however, should not be limited to a greater willingness to adapt to decisions taken at supranational level. Rather, it must also include a new strategy to bolster Spain's capacity to shape such decisions. To this effect, and in light of Spain's strengths and weaknesses, we propose here 10 recommendations to improve the country's influence. Given its privileged position as a medium-to-large state, Spain's potential weight could substantially increase if it is clear about what type of progress in integration it is interested in, and if it strengthens the internal mechanisms for drawing up its European policy. Similarly, it must prove capable of devising attractive proposals and forming alliances with the EU institutions and with other member states.

Analysis

In early 2013 three apparently unrelated pieces of news served to illustrate how far removed Spain is today from the engines driving the European integration process.

The first was the election of Jeroen Dijsselbloem as the new president of the Eurozone finance ministers, whom Spain decided not to support. The government knew it was acting alone and, moreover, it did not have fundamental objections to the Dutchman's suitability. Yet it preferred to make a symbolic protest by abstaining since it had been left without any Spaniard among the relevant posts involved in managing a crisis where the country's future is literally at stake: be it the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the various financial supervisors.

Days later, the European Council on Foreign Relations published its annual scorecard of the different states' contributions to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Spain again featured among the group of countries –together with Greece, Lithuania and Romania– lagging a long way behind the stronger leaders such as the 'big three', Germany, France and the UK, or even other middling members with significantly lower diplomatic and military capacities, such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland.

Poland was in fact the origin of the third of the crucial pieces of news which increased the sense of Spain's irrelevance in a matter of days. Its hyperactive Foreign Affairs Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, following David Cameron's speech on reconsidering Britain's EU membership, declared Warsaw was ready and willing to replace London as the third great European capital following Berlin and Paris. This desire is clearly rather bold, and yet it is less laughable than it would have been coming from Madrid right now.

The problem is not only a question of perception. Spain's loss of authority in Europe is objective and officially acknowledged as worrying. Recently, the Economy Minister, Luis de Guindos, admitted that Spain had hit rock bottom in terms of its presence in the common institutions. Despite the many limitations to measuring relevance by the number of nationals holding office, it is striking that the government was unable to secure any appointments at all once it had decided to consider these a priority. More serious still are the ever increasing complaints from high-ranking civil servants about the little attention –and even little respect– that other states grant to the Spanish position in decision-making. Last summer, to give a painful example, the Spanish negotiators debating the bank bailout details had to bear Finland's demands for tangible collateral guarantees. Such disregard would have been unthinkable only a short while ago and is unfair to a country which, despite its poor economic situation, has so far contributed a very significant share –around 12% of the total– of the Greek, Portuguese and Irish bailouts and the ESM.

The dominant explanation for this flagrant decline in influence naturally points to Spain's long recession, financing problems, very high unemployment and the effects of this on social and political stability. In other words, Spain is not that different to Greece and other countries experiencing a

[1] This analysis was published in Spanish as an article in the magazine Política Exterior, nº 152, March/April 2013 (www.politicaexterior.com/articulo?id=5112).
[2] I. Molina (2011), '¿Década perdida? La política europea de España 2002-11', Política Exterior, nº 144, November.

similar ordeal. In fact, nobody denies that in today's EU there is an economic divide between creditors and debtors which has served to consolidate the power of the former. Therefore, for Spain to regain the centrality it ought to have as the fifth-largest member, it must just overcome the current abysmal economic conditions and return to the path of successful growth or international weight that it used to enjoy, for example, 10 years ago. Under this interpretation, Spain would not need any specific European policy other than to choose the right path to economic recovery. Once the country achieves economic growth, the size it benefits from in institutions as a medium-to-large state would provide its lost influence.

This is the reasoning we contest here. The afore-mentioned examples themselves show that a member state's economic situation and diplomatic or institutional weight alone are not enough to explain its capacity for influence in Brussels. Sweden and the Netherlands are clearly beneath Spain in terms of votes in the Council, number of MEPs and foreign deployment, but they surpass it in leadership on many dossiers. Attributing this advantage to the fact that they are richer countries is insufficient. Ultimately, Poland and Italy –which are good for comparison given their similarities in GDP and starting political position, and their parallels with Spain in its risk premium trajectory– are listened to more attentively in Brussels, Berlin and Frankfurt. Even two small states that have received bailouts seem more adept at playing their cards, at least to get compatriots into key positions: the Portuguese hold the Commission presidency and the ECB vice-presidency, while the daily administration of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission is in the hands of the Irish.

If Spain ever punched above its weight in Brussels, it now punches considerably below it. Moreover, this feeling of irrelevance cannot be mitigated –or at least not entirely– by blaming it on the country's current vulnerability in the crisis. The theory upheld here is that the deterioration in Spain's position goes beyond the stigmatisation it suffers for the poor situation it shares with other peripheral states. There are specific reasons for Spain's loss of influence which cannot be attributed to adverse economic and political circumstances as much as to excessive self-complacency during the supposedly brilliant decade from 2001 to 2010. Explaining the primary origin of the current weakness could help the much-needed design of a new European policy for Spain, one which might allow it to better manage the current bitter situation and then guide its action in the medium and long term following several years of disorientation.

Spain's loss of authority in Europe is objective and officially acknowledged as worrying

Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation, and re-Europeanisation?

As shown in a previous study,[2] three different phases in the development of EU-Spain relations should be distinguished: (1) the first 15 years from joining to full convergence with Europe; (2) the first decade of the 21st century, when Spain continued to reap dividends from its success but ceased to invest in the integration process; and (3) the current phase initiated in 2010, in which Spain has re-acknowledged the crucial importance of the European factor but without overcoming its previous strategic confusion.

In the golden period of Europeanisation (1986-2000), Spain behaved like a virtuous pupil in receiving the various European policies. From the 1990s, it started to reap benefits for its good behaviour with significant gains in funds for cohesion, citizenship and external action in the Mediterranean and Latin America. To use Tanja Börzel's terminology, Europeanisation in the sphere of adaptation ('downloading') was also reflected in the sphere of influence ('uploading'). As a corollary, many Spaniards ended up in important positions: the presidency of the European Parliament on various occasions, the first CFSP high representative post and an undisputed presence in the ECB executive committee. In 2001 this first phase reached its height: the Nice Treaty was signed, whose voting system encouraged Spain to think it had achieved the status of a large country; the September 11 attacks occurred, which contributed to fostering the illusion that Spain's new power meant it could aspire even to a special relationship with Washington; and on the final day of that year the peseta disappeared.

The following decade (2001-10), in contrast, was marked by a slow but clear process of de-Europeanisation. Spain had achieved the goal of political, economic, social and diplomatic convergence with the heart of the continent that it had set itself during the transition (or perhaps since the days of the philosopher Ortega y Gasset). And it was not to renew its already completed, and thus exhausted, European strategy. On the contrary, it entered into a spiral of disorientation which affected the three main dimensions of European integration: economic, institutional and foreign policy. In the economic sphere, the improvement in competitiveness which had guided the previous period now ceased to be so important and the government scarcely paid rhetorical attention to the Lisbon Agenda of structural reforms. Access to easy credit and the property bubble –which was paradoxically encouraged after the introduction of the euro, despite this being meant in theory to foster an economy at a deeper European level– redirected growth towards strong internal demand and a sector of little added value. This opened an ever increasing gap in productivity and the balance of payments.

Spain has also lost its way in the institutional sphere: both Aznar and Rodríguez Zapatero failed to understand the resilience of the Franco-German axis or the effects of the Eastern enlargement. While Aznar's last government unpleasantly blocked the European Constitution, Rodríguez Zapatero in his first government –rushing to make amends and showing too much enthusiasm for a treaty which never came to light– always travelled to the European Councils with ill-advised reluctance. Finally, this gradual cooling of interest was also seen in foreign policy: neither the troops on Perejil Island or in Iraq, nor the 'Alliance of Civilisations' or the Kosovo boycott brought Spanish diplomacy closer to Brussels.

In May 2010 the final phase started. Now nearing the end of its third year, it can be deemed one of sudden re-Europeanisation. As in the previous period, which also saw a change in party in 2004, its main features have not been affected by the last government changeover in December 2011. The final year and a half of the PSOE government and the first and a half of the PP put the integration process back at the very centre of their agenda. The problem is that by then, Spain's political and economic position within the EU had weakened so much that it barely had any capacity left to shape European decision-making. Spain has therefore had to accept a line marked by certain specific interests –fundamentally German ones– which do not necessarily coincide with its own at the national level. In a highly vulnerable situation, the country has had to undertake reforms and painful adjustments which, in some cases, will be damaging not only in the short term.

Even the constitutional treatment of Spain-EU relations reflects this evolution in phases. In 1978, although membership was not yet guaranteed, the enthusiastic Europeanism of the Spanish political transition recommended the inclusion of article 93 which would allow a future transfer of sovereign competences. Later, in the golden phase of the 90s, the first constitutional reform was marked by a provision of the Maastricht Treaty on European citizenship which Spain –at that time able to contribute to shaping the agenda– had promoted. The attempt in 2005 to explicitly and solemnly codify Spain's EU membership in the country's Constitution was then thwarted, among other reasons, because this aim was subordinated to far more domestic questions which entertained the two main parties during the years of the bubble; this is an excellent illustration of the decade of de-Europeanisation. Finally, the hasty amendment of article 135 is the best metaphor of the current period in which Spain has again accepted the need to take up seriously the decisions adopted in Europe but has renounced having any influence. This reform exclusively associated the integration process with budgetary stability but not with the remaining values and aims that supranationalism implies for Spain.

How Brussels has a big impact at home, with Madrid barely affecting Europe

Europeanisation thus has two dimensions: a capacity for 'downloading' policies devised in Brussels to the domestic level, and skill at 'uploading' national preferences onto the EU decision-making process. In this respect, to use the play on words by Mendeltje van Keulen, the fact that Spain has been immersed since 2010 in a new phase of accepting how Europe hits home (ie, the impact of European priorities on Spain's political agenda) does not necessarily imply that it is also considering how home could hit Brussels (ie, how better to shape such priorities).

If the argument here is that Spain's loss of influence stems not so much from the current dire situation as from the progressive introspection between 2001 and 2010, then the re-Europeanisation process Spain has undertaken –albeit only as a decision-taker for the moment– could still show it the way to regain its capacity to shape decisions too. It is undoubtedly a step forward that the Foreign Affairs Minister now pays more attention to Berlin and Brussels than to Gaza and Baghdad, that the Economy Minister is more concerned with the fiscal union than with liberalising land and that the Prime Minister is aware that he is also going to be judged on his capabilities on the European scene.

But all this rests on a wholly insufficient premise. In fact, it is dangerous to confuse both spheres and make baseless claims –which also deepen the very damaging competition and discord between the two main parties– that Spain can return to the heart of Europe simply because the government wants to. There have certainly been some glimpses of success, such as the recent budgetary negotiation, and positive advances when the Spanish position has benefitted from alliances with other states (at the June 2012 European Council) or greater harmony with the Commission and the ECB (also since last summer). Spain is also taking part, albeit not very actively, in some collective initiatives to devise Europe's institutional future (such as the G-11 driven by Guido Westerwelle of Germany) and its role in the world (such as the European Global Strategy promoted by Sweden's Carl Bildt).

Yet Spain must venture to do a lot more –especially faced with the prospect of key negotiations to shape Europe following the crisis–. By all accounts Spain is not currently in a good position to shape the future economic and monetary union (EMU) or political union, as shown by the cutting short of the implementation of the banking union or the not so anecdotal question of the exclusion of Spaniards from posts of responsibility. It does not really seem capable of leading any developments in European foreign policy either.

Strategic elements to reinforce Spain's capacity to shape the EU

There is no structural reason why Spain should be condemned to irrelevance in Europe. Despite the impact of the North-South political dynamic on its loss of power, the crisis is not the only cause of erosion and there is also considerable room to reverse this. In reality, Spain in principle has significant comparative advantages which most member states long for. These not only include its institutional weight or its extensive international presence, reflecting its valuable status as the fifth-largest state in an EU split into some 30 members, but also the possibility of fruitfully combining this quantitative potential with qualitative enhancers. Examples of the latter are Spain's global projection thanks in part to its language, its relative institutional and administrative stability, its committed Europeanism –which is almost intact among its elites and not too badly impaired among its population– or the firm place of its two main parties in the two main ideological families of the European Parliament.

At the moment it is difficult to assert any of these elements, but they can all be understood as strengths if they are articulated well and integrated into a new strategy of European policy that might substitute the one which expired in 2001. Such a strategy, as the very word implies, must renounce tactical ploys, swings in agendas and a reactive approach. The following 10 elements, by way of a Decalogue, could help to shape it:

After years of slow de-Europeanisation Spain must not only put the integration process back at the heart of its national project, but it must also dare to co-lead it

1. Devise and defend a narrative specific to Spain: the spirit of regeneration is definitely better than self-indulgence, but that does not mean Spain should cease to have its own integration story. Especially if that helps balance the intellectual rigidity with which, for example, Germany is tackling EMU reform. Loss of competitiveness and indebtedness are certainly two main causes which have pushed the crisis to an extreme in Spain, but it is also true that poor functioning of the euro and the ECB between 2001 and 2012 provides the third factor which is essential to understanding the current drama. Brussels and in part Frankfurt have now adopted a more balanced view, but Spain should learn to educate others on the issue of blame allocation and unfair externalities which it also suffers due to the behaviour of some central actors. The latter, biased towards their own national concerns, can put the EU's general interest at risk as much as or even more than the periphery does.

2. Identify which Europe suits Spain: the crisis shows that not all integration paths are necessarily positive for Spain. It must define the one which is best for its national project –which by and large must be able to survive changes in government– in order to know which way to steer negotiations. In the 1990s an EU which was demanding on economic matters (the Single Market and convergence criteria) and ambitious with the genesis of the CFSP helped Spanish governments to apply their agenda to modernise and open up to the world. Now, for example, a more integrated Europe prepared to take competitiveness and the 2020 Strategy seriously could also strengthen the steering capacity of a state wanting to transform its productive model.

3. Accommodate Spanish interest within the EU's general interest: once Spain has defined its interest it must fit it into the general agenda. The shaping capacity of a country the size of Spain, which can make itself heard but is not strong enough to impose its proposals, depends on its harmony with the Commission and the Parliament. The issues deemed failures in recent years (such as the post-Nice voting system and the single patent) have happened because Spain has not known how to relate its vision to that of Europe.

4. Make the most of institutional strengths by pushing for federalisation: the majoritarian character of Spanish democracy (two main parties, single-colour governments and a weak parliament) undoubtedly has negative effects, but it also offers comparative advantages which Spain must know how to utilise. Spain, which is also a pro-European country prepared to share sovereignty, wins in relative terms when the European Council, the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission assume power. In contrast, it loses out in an integration process which rests on national veto points such as parliaments or constitutional courts.

5. Take care with the quality of Spanish representatives: the energy employed in promoting Spanish candidates to high-ranking European posts could be used, without risk of frustration, to improve the quality and skills of the Spanish representatives who negotiate in Brussels on a daily basis and could frankly be improved. Drawing up lists with better candidates for the 2014 European Parliament elections is a good starting point. Meanwhile, nothing prevents Spain from supporting its officials in the Council with more means and better instructions.

6. Coordinate, coordinate and coordinate again: the position that Spain defends in the EU must respond to a general project –one implicitly supported by the large majority of society– and the priorities therein must be transmitted to sector policies. This requires strengthening the horizontal actors and forums which elaborate and monitor European policy both within the government (inter-ministerial bodies, the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representation) and between it and the autonomous regions (the Spanish Conference for EU Affairs), and in the Congress and Senate (Joint Committee).

7. Indulge friendships: Spain must forge alliances with states as well as with the Commission, cultivating empathy, especially at difficult times. Aznar made a mistake in neglecting the Franco-German axis from 2001 onwards, Rodríguez Zapatero was also wrong to abandon Poland in 2004 and the failure to shape a strong axis with Italy and Portugal has been a permanent error since Spain shares their vision on 95% of dossiers. With so much potential for alliances, staying isolated is inexcusable.

8. Turn internal fragilities into strengths: when the state lacks resources or defends an awkward position on a particular issue, it can make a virtue of necessity with a Europeanist discourse. If, as is currently the case, it must make cuts to development aid or diplomatic expenditure, then rather than ducking beneath the parapet it should lead the debate on the Europeanisation of development policies or the deployment of an ambitious EEAS. To give another more concrete example, if Spain is in the minority on Kosovo due to concerns about its own centrifugal tensions, instead of entrenching itself in its position and frustrating everyone else, it should help to resolve the conflict by asserting that Spain knows how to manage inter-territorial tensions.

9. Dare to know: Spain's European policy suffers a conspicuous lack of perspective and shortage of its own ideas. It must venture to generate thinking in the sphere of economic governance, political-institutional dynamics and external action. In comparison with other states, the think tanks dedicated to integration are few and poorly equipped, they lack connection with universities, and there is hardly anything worthy of being called a policy unit in the government or the regions, or an advisory body for parliamentarians.

10. Don't lose sight of the citizens: in the current situation of general discrediting of politics and loss of confidence in Europe due to austerity, it is very dangerous to exploit the image of Brussels imposing cuts. Whether it be to shift blame or to suggest that adjustments would be avoided outside the EU, populist discourses do not help. The government and the opposition must ask questions of citizens treating them as adults, explaining sincerely and transparently the viable options, and anticipating the consequences of taking one or another. Despite everything, there is room for manoeuvre and Spain can acquire a greater role by being more active in Europe, not by being more resentful.

These 10 elements, like the Ten Commandments, can be summarised into two principles or greatest commands: think more Spanish but act more European. Although Spain has not defined a global model of integration adjusted to its national strategic preferences and it generates few ideas of its own accord, curiously it still behaves in a tactical and short-term way in many specific areas where it lacks a European attitude. It should do the very opposite: it should not be uncritical in accepting the big ideas produced by others, yet it should then behave selflessly in actively pursuing goals once they have been defined as European.

Conclusions

After years of slow de-Europeanisation –and the attendant loss of influence in Brussels– Spain must not only put the integration process back at the heart of its national project, but it must also dare to co-lead it. Despite appearances to the contrary, the extreme difficulty the country currently faces is not the only cause, and perhaps not even the main one, preventing it from exercising the leading role it ought to have as a medium-to-large country. A role which, to some extent, it enjoyed during the 1990s. Rather, it was the self-complacency generated by the years of growth which led Spain progressively to neglect the EU as a reference for its political, economic and external action agenda from the turn of the century onwards.

The debt crisis has served to make Spain bitterly realise the crucial significance that the European factor still has for its destiny. But although it has started to become a decision-taker again since 2010, it has not yet learnt how to become a decision-maker and position itself at the forefront of debates on the new governance of the euro or efforts to turn the EU into a global actor. The example provided by other countries with less objective weight (such as the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) or which have also been heavily hit by the crisis (such as Monti's Italy and even Ireland) shows that the authority of each member is in reality measured by its capacity to devise attractive proposals for the whole of Europe and to form alliances with other states and the common institutions.

The good news is that if Spain were to venture to dedicate more intelligence and political will to the integration process, it has various comparative advantages which would soon enable it to reposition itself as an influential member. But the bad news is that for now, Spain shows no clear signs of intending to abandon its low profile and design a proactive strategy for the coming years. If there is anything worse than hitting bottom, it is not knowing how to rise up again.

Ignacio Molina
Senior Analyst for Europe at the Elcano Royal Institute and Lecturer in Political Science at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

There is no structural reason why Spain should be condemned to irrelevance in Europe

La reforma del sistema iberoamericano

En la Cumbre Iberoamericana de Cádiz se decidió la reforma en profundidad del sistema iberoamericano. Este análisis formula algunas propuestas concretas en esa dirección.

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Tema

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Resumen

Tras la celebración ininterrumpida de 22 Cumbres Iberoamericanas anuales se ha detectado la necesidad de una reforma en profundidad de todo el sistema iberoamericano, con el fin de adaptarlo al conjunto de cambios que se han producido en América Latina, en la UE y en el entorno internacional desde 1991. A tal efecto, en la última Cumbre Iberoamericana, celebrada en Cádiz en noviembre de 2012, se ha designado una comisión de alto nivel para formular las propuestas correspondientes. Este trabajo se centra en analizar las condiciones que llevaron a tal conclusión y en la propuesta de algunos de los pasos a dar para un eficaz cumplimiento de estos objetivos.

Análisis

En la Cumbre Iberoamericana de Cádiz, celebrada en noviembre de 2012, los países participantes decidieron que había llegado el momento de reformar en profundidad el sistema iberoamericano. Para ello promovieron la creación de una comisión de alto nivel integrada por Ricardo Lagos, ex presidente de Chile, Patricia Espinosa, ex secretaria (ministra) de Exteriores de México, y Enrique Iglesias, secretario general iberoamericano. La comisión deberá presentar sus propuestas antes de la XXIII Cumbre Iberoamericana, que sesionará en Panamá entre el 18 y 19 de octubre de 2013.

En la misma Cumbre de Panamá también se abordará la sucesión de Enrique Iglesias, que llega al final de su segundo y último mandato. La elección del sucesor del actual secretario general es un tema delicado, ya que su impecable labor al frente de la SEGIB (Secretaría General Iberoamericana) en todos estos años dotó a la organización de su actual e inequívoco perfil. Por tanto, las líneas de la reforma y la elección del nuevo secretario general marcarán el futuro inmediato de todo el sistema iberoamericano, entendiendo por él no sólo a las Cumbres Iberoamericanas y la SEGIB, sino también el conjunto de reuniones ministeriales, la suma de los programas de cooperación y la totalidad de las organizaciones iberoamericanas que trabajan en colaboración con la SEGIB: la OEI (Organización de la Educación Iberoamericana), la OIJ (Organización Iberoamericana de la Juventud), la OISS (Organización Iberoamericana de la Seguridad Social) y la COMJIB (Conferencia de Ministros de Justicia Iberoamericanos). Estos cinco organismos, bajo la presidencia de la SEGIB, conforman el COIB (Consejo de Organismos Iberoamericanos).

A esto hay que agregar la necesidad de aumentar la coordinación entre las Cumbres Iberoamericanas y las de la UE-CELAC, dada la coincidencia de muchos de los participantes en ambas reuniones. Éste no es el caso de los países miembros no ibéricos de la UE ni de los países del Caribe no español, que no integran el sistema iberoamericano. La mayor coordinación entre las partes redundaría en ventajas evidentes para todos.

La necesidad de la reforma

El sistema iberoamericano requiere una renovación en profundidad, especialmente si se tiene en cuenta que la primera Cumbre de este tipo, celebrada en 1991 en Guadalajara, México, expresaba un mundo muy diferente al de nuestros días. Desde entonces, anualmente y de forma ininterrumpida se han celebrado 22 Cumbres Iberoamericanas. Si bien es cierto que en su momento el Informe Cardoso sentó las bases para una serie de cambios importantes, comenzando por la creación de la SEGIB (Secretaría General Iberoamericana) en lugar de la SECIB (Secretaría de Cooperación Iberoamericana), es mucho lo que queda por avanzar, especialmente si se quiere dar un fuerte impulso al entramado iberoamericano. Esto lleva necesariamente a plantear que la reforma de todo el sistema (Cumbres, SEGIB y COIB) se debe realizar teniendo en cuenta esta realidad y partiendo de una evaluación precisa de lo que éste ha supuesto para el conjunto y para cada una de las partes y de los logros alcanzados desde entonces.

Para reforzar la idea de la necesidad de las reformas se suele incidir en lo mucho que ha cambiado el mundo desde comienzos de la década de 1990, poniendo especial énfasis en las grandes transformaciones conocidas por América Latina durante la primera década del siglo XXI. Pero también España y Portugal, a partir de la crisis financiera internacional de 2008 que tanto y de forma tan profunda ha afectado al sur de Europa. Sin embargo, este ejercicio de propuestas de nuevas reformas se debe hacer teniendo en cuenta el estado excepcional y no permanente de la actual coyuntura, con una crisis importante a un lado del Atlántico y una situación bastante diferente en el otro, una crisis que de cualquier modo no puede ser considerada como permanente. Las reformas deben pensarse a partir de analizar las dificultades de la situación a la que hoy nos enfrentamos, pero al mismo tiempo deben incorporar escenarios post crisis, de forma de poder estar mejor situados frente a un posible cambio de coyuntura.

Por eso, una pregunta recurrente que se hacen todos aquellos implicados de una u otra manera en este proceso es cuál era el sentido de lo iberoamericano a comienzos de la década de 1990 y cuál es su sentido hoy. Las respuestas que se den no sólo deben atender a las especificidades de lo iberoamericano, sino también al contexto internacional. Desde esta última perspectiva habría que insistir en que las Cumbres Iberoamericanas surgieron en un escenario claramente influido por la caída del Muro de Berlín. En América Latina esto coincidió con la última fase de las transiciones a las democracias, impulsándolas y reforzándolas allí donde todavía no se habían impuesto totalmente. De ahí la valorización que se hacía de la democracia como un bien público a ser reforzado y también la necesidad de favorecer e impulsar la democratización de Cuba, tras la caída de la mayor parte de los regímenes comunistas del resto del mundo. Sin embargo, y pese a las grandes expectativas puestas en este objetivo, es muy poco lo que se ha avanzado en este sentido.

La presencia de Cuba en el sistema iberoamericano le confirió al mismo un grado de originalidad inigualable, especialmente cuando su ausencia era la norma dominante en el contexto de las instituciones multilaterales del hemisferio americano. La exclusión del gobierno de La Habana comenzaba por la OEA (Organización de Estados Americanos), de la que había sido expulsada a comienzos de la década de 1960, y la Cumbre de las Américas, y continuaba en otros organismos más específicamente latinoamericanos, como el Grupo de Río. Por eso es necesario incorporar la presencia cubana en las Cumbres Iberoamericanas, con todo su significado simbólico, a la evaluación que se haga de los logros del sistema iberoamericano a lo largo de toda su existencia.

En la Cumbre Iberoamericana de Cádiz los países participantes decidieron que había llegado el momento de reformar en profundidad el sistema iberoamericano.

Entre lo mucho que ha cambiado América Latina en los casi 25 años que van de 1989 a 2013 está la valoración de la democracia, prueba evidente de su incorporación al conjunto de creencias aceptadas por las sociedades latinoamericanas. Tras la retirada de las dictaduras militares en los años 80 del siglo pasado, la democracia y las libertades eran unos valores importantes que debían ser conservados, mientras que hoy son parte de una realidad que puede ser esquivada si los requisitos de algunos liderazgos fuertes así lo imponen. A esto se suma la plena incorporación de Cuba a las instancias diplomáticas latinoamericanas, bien como miembro de pleno derecho, bien como observador, como prueba la presidencia pro témpore del gobierno de La Habana de la CELAC (Comunidad de Estados de América Latina y el Caribe). El paso de la presidencia pro témpore de manos del gobierno de Chile (Sebastián Piñera) al de Cuba (Raúl Castro) es un claro símbolo de cuánto ha cambiado la política en América Latina y en las relaciones interestatales, así como la maduración de ciertas instituciones regionales.

En los orígenes del proceso iberoamericano estábamos frente a una América Latina mucho más cohesionada que en la actualidad, aunque tampoco entonces el continente hablaba hacia afuera con una sola voz. Hoy América Latina es una región políticamente fragmentada, con grandes diferencias entre los países, que superan incluso la pertenencia a algunos bloques emergentes, como el ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos de Nuestra América). Esta realidad dificulta la toma de decisiones en algunas cuestiones importantes, aunque esto no ha sido un obstáculo para el desarrollo de instituciones como UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas) y la propia CELAC. Sin embargo, esto no implica que América Latina no tenga una mayor presencia en la política internacional, o que la creación de algunas instituciones regionales (UNASUR, CELAC o la Alianza del Pacífico) no haya supuesto un cierto avance.

Lo reforma de lo iberoamericano

Definir la iberoamericano se ha mostrado una tarea bastante complicada en función de sus límites difusos, pero necesaria para afrontar la reforma del sistema. Lo primero que habría que hacer es dotar al concepto iberoamericano de un carácter unívoco, dada la duplicidad actualmente existente. Por un lado se utiliza Iberoamérica e iberoamericano como sinónimo de América Latina y latinoamericano. Por el otro, como definición de la agregación de América Latina más España y Portugal. Sería conveniente, especialmente en España, erradicar el primer uso que dificulta la consolidación de lo específicamente iberoamericano y también tratar de hacerlo, simultáneamente, a ambos lados del Atlántico. Por eso, en este texto todas las referencias a Iberoamérica y a lo iberoamericano implican la suma de los países de América Latina más España, Portugal y Andorra.

Al carácter geográfico de lo iberoamericano, bicontinental, hay que agregar un componente cultural de una importancia decisiva. Iberoamérica, en el sentido aquí definido, no se entiende sin la pertenencia a una cultura común, lo que implica la dimensión lingüística a través del español y portugués, la dimensión histórica y la existencia de numerosos valores compartidos. Hoy por hoy lo cultural es el principal componente de la identidad iberoamericana y el refuerzo del proyecto pasa necesariamente por su consolidación. En un momento como el actual, con la fuerte fragmentación política existente en América Latina, la aproximación cultural tiene mayores garantías de éxito que la política. Sin embargo, dado el rechazo que en algunos países y en algunos círculos políticos regionales partidarios de una reivindicación a ultranza del indigenismo genera la cultura occidental, tampoco el componente cultural, fuertemente politizado, está exento de problemas.

A la hora de considerar el componente cultural y, también, la posibilidad de expansión de lo iberoamericano en EEUU es cuando suelen aparecer los millones de emigrantes latinoamericanos en aquel país, un importante mercado potencial para las industrias culturales, incluyendo las del entretenimiento, en español. Son muchos los analistas y especialistas que señalan que los hispanos, o latinos, son una excelente herramienta para incidir en la sociedad y la política de EEUU. Siendo cierto el potencial creciente de la minoría hispana, que cada vez tiene un papel más decisorio en los procesos electorales estadounidenses, conviene no perder de vista las complejas peculiaridades del gigante norteamericano, que podrían convertir en totalmente contraproducentes políticas expansivas de este tipo. Una cosa es que las empresas privadas iberoamericanas se lancen a la conquista de unos mercados cada vez más importantes, y otra muy distinta una acción concertada de uno o varios gobiernos con el propósito de atraer a la colonia hispana, algo que no sería demasiado bien visto por ciertas elites locales, imbuidas de un fuerte nacionalismo y con altas dosis de proteccionismo.

Ahora bien, una concentración excesiva de lo iberoamericano en lo estrictamente cultural podría quitar relevancia a las cumbres presidenciales, que tienen una alta carga política. No hay que olvidar el fuerte peso que tienen en la región los presidencialismos latinoamericanos, lo que lleva obligatoriamente a pensar en una clara dimensión política de las reuniones de jefes de Estado y de gobierno. Para ello hay que reforzar los contactos directos entre mandatarios, a través de los “encierros” celebrados en las Cumbres Iberoamericanas, ya que en ellos, sin prensa ni asesores, pueden hablar de temas sustantivos. En la búsqueda de contenidos habría que pensar en otros elementos decisivos y de impacto, como la cooperación sur-sur y las políticas sociales, especialmente en los campos de educación y sanidad, sin olvidar algunas cuestiones candentes como las drogas y el narcotráfico, un tema cada vez más presente en ciertas agendas presidenciales.

Hay un tema que pese a su carácter polémico no se puede olvidar y es el migratorio. Una de sus principales características es su carácter cíclico. Si durante los años iniciales del siglo XXI los flujos migratorios iberoamericanos se canalizaron claramente hacia España y Portugal, desde 2008, y en tanto se profundizaba la recesión en estos últimos países, las migraciones cambiaron de sentido. En estos momentos se impone la demanda de mano de obra cualificada en los países emergentes de América Latina, especialmente aquellos con economías más dinámicas. A esto hay que agregar las fuertes migraciones entre los propios países latinoamericanos que en numerosas ocasiones son igualmente causa de conflictos. Sin embargo, los flujos pueden volver a cambiar de sentido una y otra vez en función de la evolución de la coyuntura económica, lo que no implica dejar de tratar en profundidad los problemas generados por las migraciones.

La energía sin duda alguna irá aumentando su importancia en los años venideros. A esto se suma, según algunos estudios, la revalorización de la cuenca atlántica como área de un potencial crecimiento en la materia. En el continente americano el potencial de crecimiento va de los yacimientos de gas y petróleos no convencionales de Canadá, EEUU y Argentina a las considerables reservas de la Cuenca del Orinoco, de la cuenca de Guayana y del presal de Brasil. En tanto Iberoamérica cuenta con países miembros a ambas orillas del Atlántico, está en una posición ideal para impulsar una renovación y profundización de las relaciones transatlánticas, englobando en ellas a todo el continente americano (incluyendo EEUU y Canadá) y Europa, pero también a África, lo cual reforzaría el valor estratégico de Iberoamérica.

En la búsqueda de la renovación de lo iberoamericano, la mejor respuesta posible frente a la situación actual, a los cambios operados en Europa y América Latina, y a la creciente fragmentación en esta última región, son el recurso a una mayor simetría y equilibrio entre las partes y los países miembros. Esto implica latinoamericanizar lo iberoamericano si se quiere que sea un proyecto sostenible. Sólo en la medida en que los latinoamericanos hagan suyo este proyecto se podrá garantizar su futuro. Esto nos lleva a la necesidad de conocer más y mejor la percepción de las opiniones públicas iberoamericanas en torno al proyecto común y a la existencia y labor de la SEGIB. Si bien sería importante contar con mediciones de este tipo, bien a través del Latinobarómetro u otras herramientas semejantes, la premura de tiempo en función de los plazos establecidos para que el grupo formado por Enrique Iglesias, Ricardo Lagos y Patricia Espinosa dé a conocer su informe, hará prácticamente imposible contar con resultados fiables en esta ocasión.

A lo largo de los últimos años ha ido creciendo el consenso en torno a la necesidad de espaciar las cumbres. Frente a las actuales reuniones anuales se ha impuesto la preferencia por la bienalidad. Esto descargaría a los mandatarios de una agenda cada vez más complicada por reuniones de alto nivel. Las cumbres bienales también permitirían una mayor y mejor coordinación con las cumbres CELAC–UE, de modo de tender, en la medida de lo posible, a una alternancia entre ellas y las iberoamericanas. Pero ya que estamos pensando en profundizar en las reformas quizá no sea mala idea analizar los pros y los contras de reunirse cada tres años, siguiendo el modelo de las Cumbres de las Américas. Sean bienales o trienales lo cierto es que en los años en que no hay cumbres presidenciales debería haber otras de alto nivel, como por ejemplo de ministros de Relaciones Exteriores. Ahora bien, pensando otra vez en el peso del presidencialismo latinoamericano, éstas últimas deben estar bien estructuradas y programadas si se las quiere convertir en una herramienta de éxito.

La financiación de la SEGIB va a ser, sin lugar a dudas, un punto muy controvertido. Hasta ahora España ha cubierto una parte mayoritaria del presupuesto, seguida de México y Portugal. Es obvio que en las actuales circunstancias España tiene problemas para seguir sosteniendo el proyecto, pero siendo ésta una causa importante no es la principal. En la búsqueda de una mayor latinoamericanización del proyecto, las cuestiones presupuestarias no son secundarias. Un reparto más igualitario de las cargas entre los distintos actores hablaría de un mayor compromiso de todos y cada uno de ellos.

Para que esto ocurra es necesaria una mayor descentralización de la SEGIB y de lo iberoamericano, apostando de modo claro por trasladar dependencias y responsabilidades a más países de América Latina. Para comenzar habría que impulsar la creación de más delegaciones de la SEGIB, aparte de las actualmente existentes (México, Panamá, Brasilia y Montevideo). Pero de un modo más ambicioso se podría pensar en trasladar algunas organizaciones como la OEI (Organización de la Educación Iberoamericana) a Brasil o de la OIJ (Organización Iberoamericana de la Juventud) a México, por poner sólo dos ejemplos.

En este último terreno es necesario potenciar el peso del COIB a la vez que lograr una mayor coordinación de sus actividades. Esto implica subordinar el conjunto de las actividades de todos los organismos que lo componen a una estrategia común. Si cada una de las instituciones (SEGIB, OEI, OIJ, OISS y COMJIB) hace la guerra por su cuenta será muy difícil avanzar en la consecución de los objetivos deseados por todos los países miembros.

Conclusión

Resulta innegable que tras más de dos décadas de funcionamiento ha llegado el momento de afrontar profundas reformas de todo el sistema iberoamericano. Pero también es obvio que éstas no se pueden quedar en cuestiones cosméticas, como la periodicidad de las Cumbres. Tras largos años de debate se ha instalado

Las Cumbres Iberoamericanas surgieron en un escenario claramente influido por la caída del Muro de Berlín.

Resulta innegable que tras más de dos décadas de funcionamiento ha llegado el momento de afrontar profundas reformas de todo el sistema iberoamericano.

el consenso de la conveniencia de alargar los plazos, sean éstos bienales o trienales. Por eso, se deben dar pasos ambiciosos, que afrontan cuestiones vitales como la mayor coordinación de las instituciones que conforman el COIB, la descentralización de la SEGIB o su financiación, aspirando a un reparto mucho más igualitario entre los países miembros.

En definitiva, todo esto implica la latinoamericanización, o una mayor latinoamericanización, del proyecto iberoamericano. Un elemento positivo en este sentido es que el notable crecimiento económico latinoamericano de la última década y la crisis que golpea al sur de Europa han permitido un tratamiento más simétrico y equilibrado de los problemas entre los distintos países iberoamericanos. A esta altura del siglo XXI el liderazgo y el protagonismo español deben dar un paso al costado. La única manera de que el proyecto iberoamericano tenga un largo y brillante futuro es que los países de América Latina lo hagan suyo. En caso contrario, la idea iberoamericana subsistirá como tantas otras, sin pena ni gloria.

Carlos Malamud
Investigador principal de América Latina,
Real Instituto Elcano

Towards a common external representation for the eurozone?

Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the external representation of the eurozone has been incrementally developed, but no formal amendments have been made.

Daniela Schwarzer, Federico Steinberg and Diego Valiante

Summary

Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the external representation of the eurozone has been incrementally developed, but no formal amendments have been made. This Policy Paper discusses the case for a consolidated representation of the eurozone in international economic fora, analyses the obstacles to achieving it, and puts forward proposals to solve some of the existing obstacles. It argues that there is a strong case for creating a single voice for the euro in the world in general and in the IMF in particular, especially after the global financial crisis and the emergence of the G20 as the main forum for global economic governance. However, some eurozone countries are unwilling to give up sovereignty and transfer more power to Brussels. In addition, the functioning of the IMF, which is based on high majority voting, may induce major eurozone countries not to give up their individual influence over IMF decisions. Nevertheless, the recently created European Stability Mechanism could act as a catalyst for solving some of these problems.

Introduction

Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the external representation of the eurozone has been incrementally developed, but no formal amendments have been made. The Maastricht Treaty sketched the general framework, but key questions on the representation of the eurozone in international economic organisations and its relationships with major strategic partners were left open. While the European Central Bank (ECB) represents the eurozone in monetary affairs, external representation with regard to macroeconomic and financial matters remains fragmented between the Member States and the European Commission. The Treaty of Nice (2001) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) left the provisions for the external representation of the eurozone unchanged. Article 138 of the TFEU[1] maintains the legal base for a consolidation of the eurozone's external representation that has existed since its launch. This suggests that, although the currency union was primarily created for internal reasons, the EU's architects also had in mind that the single currency could become an important instrument in the Union's foreign economic policy.

This Policy Paper discusses the case for a consolidated representation of the eurozone in international economic fora and analyses the obstacles on the way there. After a brief description of the changing global economic environment, it examines the potential benefits of establishing a single voice for the euro in the international arena and its main obstacles. The conclusion presents some specific proposals.

1. A changing global environment

Two recent changes in global economic and financial governance have emphasised the decline of European power in global economic and financial governance. In 2009, the G20 summit was launched to discuss the sources and consequences of the global crisis and potential international coordination efforts. In comparison to the previous top economic and financial summits, the G7 and later the G8, the EU's (just like the US's) relative weight is far inferior. In the G8, four out of eight members, or 50%, were European. In the G20, they number four out of 20 and hence only 20% of the membership. Moreover, the EU's presence in the IMF has been relatively reduced. According to the decision of October 2010, European governments had to give up two of their eight seats on the Executive Board. In both reform events, the growing economic weight of new players on the global scene was a root cause for the change. The recent crisis has accelerated the loss of relative economic weight and weakened the EU politically, as several Member States have become recipient countries of IMF aid, accelerating the decline of Europe's normative power.

As the debt crisis has unfolded in the eurozone, the discussion about a common representation in key international organisations with direct powers on global financial flows and the economy, such as the IMF, has intensified. The goal is to improve coordination and influence over decisions affecting the eurozone as a whole, or, single Member States. For instance, IMF programmes currently run in three eurozone Member States: Greece, Portugal and Ireland, with the application of conditions that affect national policies. The unification of eurozone Member States' representation within international organisations

This policy paper is a contribution to the project "Think Global – Act European (TGAE). Thinking strategically about the EU's external action" directed by Notre Europe – *Jacques Delors Institute* and involving 16 European think tanks: Carnegie Europe, CCEIA, CER, CEPS, demosEUROPA, ECFR, EGMONT, EPC, Real Instituto Elcano, Eliamep, Europeum, FRIDE, IAI, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, SIEPS, SWP.

The final report presenting the key recommendations of the think tanks will be published in March 2013, under the direction of Elvire Fabry, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, Paris.

can have strong economic, legal and political implications, in particular in terms of internal redistribution of powers among eurozone Member States. However, as we will see below, some key players to date remain sceptical.

2. The eurozone in the IMF

Only three eurozone members are top 10 IMF countries and none of them are the top three (according to their voting share). The US has the biggest quota and voting share, resulting in a single concentrated power, able to influence the entire activity of the Fund. A different balance of powers would emerge if the voting shares of eurozone countries were combined. The sum of their voting shares is roughly 21% of the IMF total quotas (see Figure 1 below), well above the US (around 16%). Some coordination among eurozone members does already take place, but it rarely results in effective representation of the eurozone.

Figure 1: Overall eurozone voting share in the IMF compared to other members



Source: Giovannini, Valiante (2012) from IMF.
Note: after full implementation of 2010 quota reform.

3. Obstacles to unifying eurozone external representation

There are essentially two reasons why governments are hesitant to opt for unified representation. Internal distrust among Member States emerges due to the absence of common rules on the political governance of the eurozone, emphasised by the absence of common democratic institutions able to take this role and coordinate the common seat. Member States do not want to lose political control over their foreign and economic policies. The second factor that contributes to political distrust in a common representation is an exogenous one: the governance of the IMF. In effect, the organisation's voting system mainly relies on high majority voting (mostly 70% and 85%). As a result, every decision would require a consensus among all major countries. Due to its fragmentation in eight single memberships and 16 coalitions (188 members), a relatively medium-size country may also influence the outcome of a decision; in effect, decisions are rarely taken without consensus. By holding the power to stop important initiatives, a country may not be interested in merging quotas simply because doing so may only reduce its control over the organisation's decision-making process. Therefore, this voting structure may persuade major eurozone countries not to give up their individual influence over IMF decisions. Moreover, some countries argue that the eurozone is actually more powerful with the status quo because eurozone countries are over-represented on the Executive Board. In order to maximise influence, they must simply coordinate their positions.

Besides IMF decisions, on which eurozone countries mostly vote together in the end, there are more conflicting issues. For instance, EU Member States do not have a common position in debates about the international monetary system, the euro's role as a reserve currency or global macroeconomic imbalances. Coordination is hence more difficult. Important tensions exist, for instance, between France and Germany. While the former prefers a lower exchange rate for the single currency, to promote exports, and ultimately wants the euro to challenge the dollar's hegemony, the latter sees exchange rate developments not as a matter of political choice but a result of competitiveness. It generally favours a strong currency to help control inflation and sees less benefits in the euro's internationalisation (international currencies tend to have more volatile exchange rates and their central banks can be forced act as international lenders of last resort in situations of panic).

In sum, there are domestic political aspects and external factors that complicate the assessment of benefits and costs of a unified representation. However, digging more into the details, this initial analysis may prove wrong for two reasons. We will explore these in the following section.

4. Arguments for consolidated representation

Firstly, the concentration of quotas among eurozone Member States would increase the direct quotas of control and officially harmonise the actions of these countries at the IMF, thus reducing coordination problems that may clash with the need to support eurozone-wide decisions.[2] Second, the merging of quotas would reduce the total number of coalitions. Fewer coalitions means the possibility of exercising more influence over other coalitions or attracting a high number of satellite countries into a coalition led by the eurozone – countries which are already in different coalitions with individual eurozone countries. A merged quota would then provide fertile ground for new initiatives and formal power to block any decision without eurozone approval.

There are also more general reasons that would justify a common seat at IMF level. Firstly, common representation in international organisations would promote greater internal coordination on political governance of the whole region (EU). Secondly, it may stimulate international cooperation (e.g. trade agreements) which would benefit the whole region, because it reduces coordination issues and provides one access point for non-eurozone countries. Thirdly, it makes representation at the global level more effective in terms of cumulative votes that can be exercised in the decision-making process. Fourthly, common representation in international financial organisations can provide a springboard for developing coordination in other important areas such as foreign policy.

[1] Article 138.1 states that "In order to secure the euro's place in the international monetary system, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt a decision establishing common positions on matters of particular interest for economic and monetary union within the competent international financial institutions and conferences".
[2] Differences of interest will remain among Member States, for instance dealing with global imbalances or certain aspects of the financial regulation debate in the G20 context, but the eurozone will be forced to achieve a common position.
[3] Olivier J. Blanchard and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, "Global Imbalances: In Midstream?", CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7693, 2010.
[4] Eric Helleiner, "Understanding the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy," in: Annual Review of Political Science, 14, 2011, p. 67-87 (here: 77).

A decline in economic weight, diminishing financial resources and the loss of normative power will weaken the EU's capacity to influence global governance and regulatory efforts. Europe will only be able to secure its place among the major players if it combines a sound economic base with an effective representation of its interests on a global scale. It will also have to retain stable alliances, in particular with the US, which itself wants the EU to improve the coherence of its external representation.

If all this is not followed through and if internal divergences grow further and increase political tensions, the eurozone is likely to sell itself short. From a macroeconomic perspective, it is technically one economy as long as the single currency and the single market exist. But it will only be perceived and treated as such if it manages to overcome internal economic and political tensions and translate internal economic unity into unified external political representation. Recent economic trends increase the pressure on European governments to pool their strength and both informally and formally improve the external representation of the EU in international economic and financial fora.

The EU's architects anticipated that the euro could become an important tool of foreign economic policy

5. The internal dimension of external representation

As a result of the current crisis, the EU has started reforming its internal economic governance mechanisms. A so far unexplored question is the extent to which internal governance reform holds consequences or opens up opportuni-ties for a better external representation of interests.

Sketched in very broad terms, the EU's reaction to the financial and economic crisis has created a new impetus in five policy areas. First, EU financial market regulation is undergoing changes, with more supervisory power for the eurozone and an attempt to create a single rule book. Second, budgetary policy coordination is being further strengthened with tougher rules and quicker sanctions at the European level, while national fiscal policy should underpin the jointly agreed objectives. Third, a new mechanism for macroeconomic policy coordination has been introduced, including the "Euro Plus Pact", a top-level attempt to get binding commitments from eurozone heads of state and government to an annually-defined reform catalogue intended to help improve European competitiveness and prevent persistent current account imbalances within the eurozone. Lastly, the eurozone has equipped itself with a new permanent crisis resolution mechanism (the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)) to facilitate a joint intervention with the IMF in the event of a sovereign debt crises in the eurozone.

An increased degree of internal policy coordination may, in the long run, harmonise economic developments and policy preferences to a certain extent. This could mean that Member State positions on global economic and finance issues are at least partially aligned. Recently, however, internal divergences have actually translated into contradictory positions on global governance issues.

Common representation in international organisations would promote greater internal coordination of EU political governance

Macroeconomic imbalances between eurozone Member States are, for example, a pressing issue to tackle within the currency union, just as they are at the global level.[3] Over the past few years, for instance, China, Germany and oil and gas exporting countries in the Middle East have accumulated large trade surpluses while the US has experienced growing deficits. Such systemic macroeconomic imbalances can cause a misallocation of capital and financial bubbles, as they did in the eurozone. This danger was revealed by the recent crisis, when large capital flows into the U.S. drove down the cost of loans and thus contributed to the bubble in the housing sector.[4] There is hence a need, both at the European and global level, to promote policy changes which address domestic and international distortions that are a key cause of imbalances.

While the current account of the European Union is more or less balanced, several EU member countries run large surpluses or deficits. Aside from creating differences between EU representatives in the G20 debates, it also hinders European governments from effectively leading negotiations to set up macroeconomic surveillance and coordina-tion procedures in the EU.

In the G20, there seems to be agreement that the deficit countries cannot resolve their imbalances alone. The partners differ, however, on how to reduce global macroeconomic imbalances. In Pittsburgh, leaders agreed on a new "Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth" under which they would review each other's national economic policies, supervised by the IMF. Numerical targets as well as enforcement mechanisms, such as penalties or sanctions, were left out of the agreement.[5] The two largest Member States of the EU, France and Germany, disagreed over the proposal to include targets and sanctions. Paris first warmly greeted the idea of defining a limit for trade imbalances to GDP,[6] which appeared in the debate before the Seoul summit. Meanwhile, Germany, shoulder-to-shoulder with China, wiped this idea off the table. The EU has managed to formulate a joint position. At the G20 summit in Seoul in late 2010, leaders agreed to work on indicators to measure the sustainability of imbalances. In February 2011, G20 ministers developed a set of indicators in order to focus on persistently large imbalances require policy actions. A goal has been set to establish indicative guidelines by the next meeting in April, against which each of these indicators will be assessed.[7] Such progress on the question of how to fight imbalances, however, does not eliminate the divergent views that exist concerning why imbalances should be fought at all.

6. How to move forward

As we have seen, there is a strong case for creating a single voice for the euro in the world, but some eurozone countries are unwilling to give up sovereignty and transfer more power to Brussels.

Increasing coordination among Member States for the representation of the eurozone within international organisa-tions such as the IMF may be potentially pursued through two sets of actions.

The first option may not require any major institutional reform at the EU or IMF level; basically, it would improve coordination in the use of voting rights currently allocated to eurozone members and split into two individual memberships and six different coalitions (with very limited coordination at EU level). It can be implemented in the form of a eurozone committee, established within the current EU institutional framework (preferably the Eurogroup) , which would coordinate the set of voting rights within the IMF and perhaps change the current set of coalitions into one or few. Memorandums of Understanding among Member States may need to be drafted to make sure that a clear set of rules is defined ex ante on how votes should be exercised. This option, in practice, would not require any IMF reform, but it would require strong political support within the eurozone and perhaps the reshuffle of the current six coalitions within the IMF Executive Board.

The second option would involve the creation of a single membership for eurozone countries. Membership would need to be officially handled by an institution that has control over budget and fiscal policies, since the voting rights are immediately linked to the effective quota held within the Fund. This institution could be represented by the European Stability Mechanism, which may increase its role in future economic governance in the eurozone if it becomes central in the coordination of fiscal policies. An alternative would be a eurozone economic government, if the EU embarks on a major treaty change. Regardless of which institution becomes central, this option may face two significant impediments. First, it requires a reform or at least a reinterpretation of IMF Articles of Agreement, since officially only "countries" can be part of the IMF. A clear, international-level agreement would be needed to determine whether these countries can be federated into one institution representing them. The second impediment to such a proposal concerns the re-calculation of the formula. By removing intra-EU flows from the calculation of the quota, the eurozone total quota may fall well below 21%, making the first option more attractive if no major reform of the formula is planned in the coming years. However, this option would make more sense (for the benefit of having an integrated framework of external representation) if the IMF modifies this formula and reduce the weight of eurozone countries that are currently overrepresented.

Daniela Schwarzer
Head of Research Division EU Integration, SWP

Federico Steinberg
Senior Analyst for Economy and International Trade, Real Instituto Elcano

Diego Valiante
Reserch Fellow, CEPS

[5] "G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit", 24-25 September 2009.
[6] "G20: EU Split over US Offensive against Global Imbalances", European Information Service, 25 October 2010.
[7] "Communiqué", Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Paris 18-19 February 2011.

Promoting low-carbon energies in Mediterranean partner countries

Renewable energies remain marginal in the European neighbourhood, and their contribution to economic and human development is still largely unexplored

Gonzalo Escribano

Summary

Renewable energies remain marginal in the European neighbourhood, and their contribution to economic and human development is still largely unexplored. Directive 2009/28 on renewable energies explicitly contemplates green electricity imports from third countries, and the Mediterranean Solar Plan offers an economic and institutional framework for its deployment in the Southern neighbourhood. This Policy Paper addresses the question of whether these initiatives have the potential to become a driver for the development of the Southern neighbourhood or should instead be better considered as an EU-centric project to support European renewable industries and engineering firms. This Policy Paper argues that, in order to become a driver of economic development for the region, those initiatives should consider accompanying measures to foster investment, training, industrial delocalisation, and technology transfers.

Introduction

Renewable energy sources (RES) have become a hallmark of the EU's energy policy. The emphasis placed on renew-able energies by the European Commission was supported by several Member States and their industries, helping to position the EU as a world leader in the sector. The European RES industry has positioned itself on the technological frontier, European utilities and grid operators are among the most experienced in integrating renewable sources into energy systems, and Member States' regulatory frameworks usually serve as international benchmarks. However, apart from exceptions in some countries, the deployment of renewables has remained marginal in the European neighbour-hood and its contribution to economic and human development in those countries remains largely unexplored. European RES investments have been concentrated in developed or emerging markets (mainly the EU itself and the US). RES imports to the EU are mostly limited to biofuels and RES-generated electricity from Norway and, occasionally, from Morocco.

This picture started to change with new technological developments. New transmission and solar technologies opened the way for an integrated Euro-Mediterranean RES market which will allow countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean to export RES-generated 'green electricity'. Industrial initiatives such as Desertec and the European-led Mediterranean Solar Plan tried to offer an industrial, economic and institutional ground for its development. Finally, Article 9 of the Directive 2009/28 on renewable energies explicitly contemplates green electricity imports from third countries.

This Policy Paper analyses these two energy policy instruments, Directive 2009/28 and the Mediterranean Solar Plan, focusing on their development implications for Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). The first section offers a brief overview of both instruments. The second section argues that RES promotion offers the opportunity to become a driver of development in MPCs, briefly discussing under which conditions its impact would be maximised. The last section concludes with some policy recommendations regarding RES deployment patterns in MPCs.

1. Europeanising renewables in the Mediterranean

The challenge of integrating RES, particularly 'green electricity', in the Euro-Mediterranean energy space seems to follow the outward Europeanisation path so beloved to the EU in its relations with neighbours. The idea is that Europe's neighbours would get differentiated access to its RES market based on compliance with EU norms. This market-access incentive would anchor RES-related policies and promote its deployment in the European neighbourhood.

Transnational RES deployment is a complex issue because renewables require support schemes that are difficult to implement, particularly across national borders. Member States only support locally-produced RES, and one of the goals of Directive 2009/28 is the facilitation of cross-border RES support without necessarily affecting national sup-port systems. In order to do so, it introduces cooperation mechanisms among Member States. The flexibility measures contemplated by the Directive include statistical transfers, joint projects and, also, joint support mechanisms. Statistical transfers refer to the exchange of green certificates: for instance, the green certificates generated by solar or wind

This policy paper is a contribution to the project "Think Global – Act European (TGAE). Thinking strategically about the EU's external action" directed by Notre Europe – *Jacques Delors Institute* and involving 16 European think tanks: Carnegie Europe, CCEIA, CER, CEPS, demosEUROPA, ECFR, EGMONT, EPC, Real Instituto Elcano, Eliamep, Europeum, FRIDE, IAI, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, SIEPS, SWP.

The final report presenting the key recommendations of the think tanks will be published in March 2013, under the direction of Elvire Fabry, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, Paris.

energy in Southern Europe (if they exceed the respective national objectives) can be accounted for in the objectives of a Northern EU Member State.

For 'green electricity' (electricity that is green certified) imported from third countries, the conditions are not so flexible. First, they do not include statistical transfers: only physical electricity transfers can be accounted for in Member States' RES targets. Member States can implement joint projects with third countries, including in their national objectives the green electricity imported from the third country and consumed in the EU. In the absence of existing (but projected) operative interconnections, the Member State can include in its national objectives the green electricity transfers that have been agreed to that end with the third country until the needed infrastructure is in place. There is no obstacle to implementing joint support systems for joint projects with third countries. The only limitation, which also applies to intra-EU projects, is that in order to be included in the national objectives, the imported green electricity cannot benefit from support schemes in the third country, with the significant exception of investment support for the construction of installations.

In fact, even if statistical transfers with third countries are excluded by the Directive, de facto it offers the opportunity to such countries of including statistical transfers by joining the Energy Community Treaty (ECT). As the Directive clearly states, contracting parties of the Energy Community Treaty could benefit from the same flexibility measures as EU Member States, if it was so decided. This is an open possibility for MPCs to enter the club of statistical transfers, widen-ing the opportunities for RES deployment in the region to those countries which are Europeanising their energy norms. Few Mediterranean countries outside Europe are nowadays ready to adhere to the ECT, perhaps with the sole excep-tion of Turkey, Israel and Morocco. Joining the ECT implies adopting the EU energy acquis, a difficult move in a region characterised by lack of competition and state-owned energy companies, some of them with significant hydrocarbon reserves in countries like Algeria, Libya or Egypt. However, convergence towards RES-related EU acquis could be more easily compared with conventional energies, because RES are not a threat to significant vested interests, facilitating institutional innovation.

Under Directive 2009/28's institutional design for RES flows with third countries, the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) proposes a road map to catalyse investment, industrial development and regulatory innovation to foster RES deployment in the Southern neighbourhood. It is one of six projects considered by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Its goal is to deploy 20 Gigawatts of installed renewable energy capacity in the Mediterranean region by 2020 along with the necessary transmission capacities and cross-border interconnections, as well as fostering energy effi-ciency measures. The 2008 Paris Declaration that gave birth to the UfM stated that "market development as well as research and development of all alternative sources of energy are (…) a major priority in efforts towards assuring sus-tainable development." Despite the precision about the Solar Plan, the sense of the Declaration calls for the mobilisa-tion of all alternative energies, including wind.

Its inclusion in the UfM came out of the French-German bargaining that led to the Paris Declaration, but its origins can be traced back to the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation Network (TREC) – a partnership between the Club of Rome, the Hamburg Climate Protection Foundation and the National Energy Research Centre of Jordan created in 2003. Together with the German Aerospace Centre (DLR), the TREC developed the Desertec project, an EU-MENA initiative based on solar thermal energy. With the support of the Greens and German industry, the German government supported the Desertec initiative in its 2007 Presidency of the EU. A few months later, the Desertec White Book was presented at the European Parliament, and began to receive increasing support in Brussels. At that time, French President Nicolas Sarkozy was proposing his Mediterranean Union, facing strong opposition from Germany. Finally, the Union for the Mediterranean was watered down to the UfM, which included the MSP as its flagship pro-ject.

Tasked with the development of the projects, the UfM's Secretariat plays a central role in the MSP institutional frame-work. A delay in its operative constitution, followed by the resignation of its Secretary Generals, has not allowed it to invigorate the process thus far. This has been coupled with the financial crisis, which has dried up financial markets and decreased enthusiasm for renewables. But aside from financial and institutional problems (governance of the MSP, the role of the European Commission and the UfM Secretariat), the MSP has failed to provide a credible and recognisable framework mainly because it has been unable to take the preferences of MPCs into account. These preferences consist in profiting from their structural comparative advantages (insolation or wind, abundant space and labour force) and building dynamic ones like industrial clusters, innovative regulation and technical skills. The following section is devoted to the weaknesses of the current MSP approach as a driver for economic development in MPCs.

2. A driver for the development of whom?

Directive 2009/28 provides the framework for the integration of RES in the Euro-Mediterranean region and the func-tioning of the MSP. However, the MSP should also meet UfM objectives inherited from the Barcelona Process for achieving a shared space of peace and prosperity. This was reassessed by the Joint Communication from the Commis-sion and the High Representative, which includes RES deployment as a channel for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

While the MSP has generated a lot of literature, little has been said on its human development impact for the European neighbourhood. A well-designed MSP should be conceived as a driver for economic development for MPCs in at least five aspects:

- To provide part of the energy required by the economic growth of MPCs;
- To contribute to the supply of modern energy services required for economic development;
- To contribute to eradicate energy poverty;
- To use solar and wind energy resources to generate new economic activities, new jobs and new incomes;

[1] See Martin Kahanec and Klaus Zimmermann, "High Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe", Discussion Papers, DIW Berlin, January 2011.
[2] OECD, Economic Survey: European Union 2012, p. 63.
[3] OECD, International Migration Outlook 2011, SOPEMI.

• To provide technical cooperation, training and technology transfers in order for MPCs to reap the benefits of RES deployment.

Taken together, all these elements form a consistent cooperation programme for sustainable Euro-Mediterranean energy development. Energy development consists in increasing the provision and use of energy services, and is a key driver of economic development. Energy development also determines the manner in which energy is generated and used, and has a direct impact on sustainable development. It is important to point out that such a comprehensive programme would constitute the first occasion in which energy is conceived as an instrument of development in the Mediterranean. The question is whether the MSP has the potential to become a driver for the development of MPCs or should instead be better considered as an EU-centric project aimed at achieving its own environmental objectives together with the promotion of European industries and engineering firms. The answer to this question depends upon the conditions under which RES deployment is implemented.

A study on the impact of RES deployment in Morocco can help illustrate the complex policy choices involved in the process. The general conclusion is that RES deployment entails significant economic opportunities for Morocco in terms of GDP and employment. In the proposed scenarios, the figures for economic impact on GDP vary from +1.17% to +1.9% at the end of the period (2040), with employment figures showing the possible creation of between 267,000 and 482,000 full-time equivalent direct and indirect jobs. The article shows that policy decisions regarding exports and improving local capacities are crucial in maximising the opportunities RES offers to the country, a result that can be extrapolated to the rest of MPCs (with subtle differences from country to country). The best economic performance is attained with exports (virtual or physical) based upon improved local capacities. This is because in order to maximise economic gains, MPCs need to participate more fully in the industrial dimension of the initiative. This means improving its absorption capacity at the industrial level, integrating the RES sector into a comprehensive industrial policy, as well as upgrading infrastructures and regulation. For the EU, it is important to highlight the significance of supporting the country's absorption capacity through technical co-operation programs, including training, twinning, scientific exchanges, networking, etc. at every level related to RES deployment.

The blue card directive's limited applicability highlights the disparity between the EU and its main competitor, the US

The Moroccan case clearly illustrates the argument for approaching MSPs as a comprehensive sustainable development strategy. In designing regulatory, trading and financing schemes, the focus should be on MPC development. If the benefits are not captured by EU companies and EU Mediterranean partners, several accompanying measures should be adopted. One of them is to focus on alleviating energy poverty in rural households, for the positive impact this has on sustainability and human development. This calls for supporting individual, decentralised photo-voltaic systems, but also delivering modern energy services not necessarily related with renewable energies (e.g. GPL). Another prerequisite is supporting the training of Moroccan manpower to attract investment. However, training should not be exclusively provided for the purposes of maintenance, which is the activity that generates less jobs and added value. Meaningful participation in the industrial, engineering and operation stages should be attained in the medium term. At the same time, the EU should establish a long-term mechanism for promoting technology transfers and enhancing local innovation capabilities.

3. Final remarks

Without such prerequisites, the whole discussion on the Mediterranean Solar Plan may deviate from its main objective. As a project included in the UfM, it should aim to create a shared prosperity area in the Euro-Mediterranean region. This can only be achieved by accompanying MPC reform efforts and strengthening their economic opportunities, through green electricity exports, for example. Southern Mediterranean neighbours have shown their interest in renewable energies, but have also clearly pointed out the kind of European support they require: investment, training, gradual delocalisation of industrial stages, and technology transfers. Without the upgrading of MPC institutions, human capital and the rural energy poverty situation, the MSP may be reduced to an EU strategy to achieve the region's own environmental objectives together with promoting European renewable energy industries, energy companies and engineering firms. This scenario would contribute very little to MPC development. MPCs themselves should be aware that in order to reap the benefits of RES deployment, significant upgrading at the institutional and infrastructure levels is needed. They must signal their will to provide an attractive ecosystem for investment, training and technology transfers.

Regarding the consistency of EU policies in promoting RES, the MSP and Directive 2009/28 offer a coherent framework with complementary goals. The Directive establishes a viable institutional framework for cross-border RES flows, while the MSP should catalyse investment to advance specific projects. The problem seems to lie in the lack of traction of the UfM Secretariat, but the difficulties of the current financial crisis should not be forgotten. In any case, the MSP has not been able to translate into a comprehensive strategy to include MPC preferences such as job creation, economic growth and industrial development. The institutional structure is there, but the development component is not properly addressed. The Europeanisation strategy represented by the European Neighbourhood Policy and the ECT insists in regulatory aspects, without recognising the particularities of MPCs, some of which are important hydrocarbon producers for whom unbundling policies is very difficult to implement without compromising their traditional engine of growth. A differentiated RES-focused approach built upon the MSP and Directive 2009/28, together with specific provisions in ENP Advanced Status (for instance with Morocco and, in the future, Tunisia) could prove a better strategy in the short run.

Based on the arguments presented above, any agenda related to RES promotion in MPCs over the next 18 months would have to include:

1. A clear and comprehensive strategy that links RES deployment with economic development in MPCs;
2. Efforts to foster absorption capacities at both the industrial and regulatory levels;
3. Guarantees that some industrial processes will take place in MPCs and that RES deployment is increasingly accompanied by industrial delocalisation;
4. The fight against energy poverty on the MSP agenda;
5. A credible institutional framework for trans-Mediterranean green electricity flows that is attractive to both MPCs and European investors;
6. Clarification of the role of the UfM's Secretariat and the European Commission in advancing the MSP; the depoliticisation of the Secretariat for it to become an operational agency for RES projects.

Gonzalo Escribano

Director of the Energy Programme, Real Instituto Elcano

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

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8/04/2013
Fernando Reinares, investigador principal de Terrorismo Internacional, intervino con una ponencia sobre "AQIM Existing and Disrupted Plans in and from the Sahel", en la conferencia internacional "Political Change and Security in North Africa", celebrada en Westminster, Estados Unidos, y organizada por McDaniel College y CNA Analysis and Solutions.

9/04/2013
Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente, impartió la conferencia "Las imágenes de España: la importancia de la marca" en la XIX Semana de la Comunicación sobre "España: Comunicación, cultura y Marca", organizada por la Facultad de Artes y Comunicación de la Universidad Europea de Madrid.

9/04/2013
Con motivo de la ATLAS WEEK "Advocacy in a Globalized World: From the Classroom to the Frontline" organizada por la Sant Louis University, **Alicia Sorroza**, investigadora, impartió una conferencia titulada "Mali: why Europe and United States should care".

10/04/2013
Félix Arteaga, investigador principal de Seguridad y Defensa, participó en la conferencia sobre "La política española de seguridad exterior", organizada por el Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, y celebrada en Madrid.

11-12/04/2013
Carlos Malamud, investigador principal de América Latina, participó en el II Encontro "Triângulo Estratégico: América Latina - Europa - África", organizado por el Instituto para a Promoçâo e Desenvolvimento da América Latina (IPDAL), en Lisboa.

12/04/2013
Federico Steinberg, investigador principal de Economía y Comercio Internacional, fue ponente en el Seminario "Contributions of the European model of governance to global law and policies", organizado por la Universidad San Pablo CEU y la DG de Educación y Cultura de la Comisión Europea, en Madrid.

15/04/2013
En el marco del European Global Strategy Proyect, **Charles Powell**, director, y **Martín Ortega**, senior research fellow para la Estrategia Global Europea, participaron en el Workshop "Elements for a European Global Strategy", organizado por el EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) de París/Bruselas, celebrado en Bruselas.

15-16/04/2013
Emilio Lamo de Espinosa participó en el Foro Hispano-Alemán con la conferencia "Imagen recíproca entre España y Alemania", celebrado en Madrid.

16/04/2013
Félix Arteaga intervino en la mesa redonda sobre Egipto y Siria, organizada por el Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, Madrid.

18/04/2013
Haizam Amirah-Fernández, investigador principal de Mediterráneo y Mundo Árabe, participó en la conferencia titulada "Islam político y transiciones en el mundo árabe", dentro del curso organizado por la Escuela Diplomática y Casa Árabe.

22/04/2013
Haizam Amirah-Fernández, participó en la conferencia "Dos años de 'Primavera Árabe': Balance y perspectivas de futuro" en la sede de la Universidad de Alicante.

22/04/2013
Félix Arteaga participó en la conferencia sobre la "Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional", organizada por la Universidad de Valencia.

23/04/2013
Haizam Amirah-Fernández participó en la conferencia titulada "El Egipto post-Mubarak: el reto de los Hermanos Musulmanes" en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Alicante.

24-26/04/2013
Fernando Reinares intervino con una ponencia sobre "Complex Expressions of Terrorist Leadership in Attack Planning and Preparation" en la conferencia NATO ARW "The Perseverance of Terrorism: Focus on Leaders", organizada por el Polish Institute of International Affairs y celebrada en Belgrado, Serbia.

25/4/2013
Federico Steinberg presentó una ponencia sobre el sector exterior de la economía española en el seminario de Riesgo País organizado por Coface España que tuvo lugar en Murcia.

28-30/04/2013
Haizam Amirah-Fernández participó en el seminario "Promoting an EU-GCC Dialogue on Foreign Policy Issues", organizado por el Gulf Research Center y Qatar University, celebrado en Doha, Catar.

30/04/2013
Iliana Olivié, investigadora principal de Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo, compareció en la Comisión de Cooperación al Desarrollo del Senado.

Actividades

Realizadas en marzo

4/03/2013
Reunión con Juan Carlos Echeverry, exministro de Finanzas de Colombia, que habló sobre el “Presente y futuro de América Latina”.

5/03/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo “Proyecto Estrecho ampliado”

5/03/2013
Presentación del libro “Los españoles ante un mundo en cambio”, de Javier Noya, editado por Tecnos con el patrocinio del Real Instituto Elcano, GAD3, Edelman y GL Balanalysis. Contó con la participación de Rafael Estrella, vicepresidente del RIE, Félix Requena, presidente del CIS; Narciso Michavila, presidente de GAD3; Miguel Aguirre, director general de Edelman España; Manuel González, director de Tecnos; y Javier Noya.

5/03/213
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo sobre la metodología de un Índice Elcano de Presencia Global (IEPG) europeo.

6/03/2013
Reunión del grupo de Trabajo sobre “Estado de las relaciones bilaterales con Brasil”, con la intervención del Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, exembajador de España en Brasil.

6/03/2013
Reunión con Mohamed Bazoum, ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Cooperación, Integración Africana y Nigerinos en el Exterior de la República de Níger, quien habló sobre “Le contexte sécuritaire dans la région du Sahel et la crise du Mali”.

Actividades

Realizadas en marzo

12/03/2013
Seminario "EU-Russia: towards post-crisis agenda. Polish, Spanish and Russian points of view", en el que se debatió el estado actual de las relaciones UE-Rusia y se analizaron las diferentes propuestas de una cooperación constructiva en el futuro.Organizado por la Embajada de la República de Polonia en España, la Representación en España de la Comisión Europea y el Centre for Eastern Studies de Polonia, con la colaboración del Real Instituto Elcano.

13/03/2013
Debate en torno al *policy paper* "España en el mundo durante 2013: perspectivas y desafíos". Contó con la participación de Charles Powell, Félix Arteaga, Gonzalo Escribano, Carlos Malamud, Ignacio Molina e Iliana Olivié.

15/03/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Economía Internacional en la que intervinieron Santiago Fernández de Lis (BBVA) y Lara de Mesa (Banco Santander), que plantearon un debate sobre la unión bancaria europea.

19/03/2013
Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo de Marca España

20/03/2013
Elena Valenciano, vicesecretaria general del PSOE visitó el Instituto para mantener una reunión con el equipo directivo y con los investigadores.

Patronato

Consejo Asesor Empresarial

Consejo de Medios