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La nueva estrategia de ciberseguridad; las dificultades prácticas para implementar la Agenda 2030; el acuerdo UE-Mercosur; la experiencia española en el Parlamento Europeo; qué es la digitalización; y las rutas para la transición energética española son algunas de las cuestiones recogidas en el apartado de **Publicaciones**, junto a la influencia española en el ecosistema europeo de energía y clima; el regreso de los yihadistas a España; y los retos legales y la viabilidad de crear centros de inmigrantes ilegales fuera de la Unión Europea.

Entre las **Actividades** organizadas en este cuatrimestre cabe señalar el Consejo Científico y el Patronato del Real Instituto Elcano, ambos presididos por Su Majestad el Rey Felipe VI; los seminarios *"Adapting the counterterrorism toolbox to the post-Caliphate context"*, "El nuevo Parlamento Europeo y el futuro de la influencia de España en Europa", "La financiación del desarrollo en el marco financiero plurianual de la UE, 2021-27"; las mesas redondas "El futuro de la alianza transatlántica. La OTAN en los próximos 70 años", "Transición energética y nuevo ciclo europeo" y *"Algeria: facing the moment of truth"*; los debates Elcano "Las elecciones europeas de 2019: ¿hacia un futuro común europeo?" y "El papel de la Unión Europea en la guerra tecnológica y comercial"; además de la presentación del *policy paper* "Hacia un ecosistema español de inteligencia artificial: una propuesta". El Instituto recibió, entre otros, a David Parker, ministro de Comercio y Crecimiento de las Exportaciones de Nueva Zelanda; Juan González-Barba, embajador de España en Turquía; y Hajime Hayashi, embajador de Japón ante la OTAN.

En la sección **Conectados** se recoge la presencia del Real Instituto Elcano en las redes sociales, principalmente en Twitter, a través de los *tuits* más destacados.

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La nueva Estrategia de Ciberseguridad de 2019

Félix Arteaga

El Consejo de Seguridad Nacional ha aprobado en abril de 2019 una nueva Estrategia de Ciberseguridad que actualiza la de 2013. En conjunto, representa un avance sobre la anterior, aunque su desarrollo dependerá del respaldo político y presupuestario del futuro Gobierno.

Summary

El Consejo de Seguridad Nacional ha aprobado el 26 de abril de 2019 una nueva Estrategia de Ciberseguridad que actualiza la de 2013. Elaborada por el Consejo de Ciberseguridad Nacional, la nueva Estrategia presenta notables avances sobre la anterior, aunque su aportación final dependerá del respaldo político y presupuestario del futuro

Gobierno para desarrollarla. En este ARI se analiza su contenido y se compara con las recomendaciones propuestas desde el sector privado.

Análisis

El Consejo Nacional de Ciberseguridad ha elaborado una nueva Estrategia que actualiza la Estrategia de Ciberseguridad Nacional de 2013[1]. En su diseño y redacción sólo han intervenido representantes gubernamentales del mencionado Consejo a partir de otoño de 2018 y su borrador final quedó listo en febrero de 2019[2]. El sector privado no ha participado en el proceso de elaboración, aunque su borrador final se dio a conocer a expertos a título individual y restringido antes de su publicación. Para dar a conocer la opinión del sector sobre el proceso de revisión en curso, el Grupo de Trabajo de Ciberpolítica del Real Instituto

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1 Orden PCI/487/2019, de 26 de abril, por la que se publica la Estrategia Nacional de Ciberseguridad 2019, aprobada por el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional. BOE nº 103 de 30 de abril de 2019, https://boe.es/boe/dias/2019/04/30/pdfs/BOE-A-2019-6347.pdf

2 En su comparecencia ante la Comisión Mixta de Seguridad Nacional, el secretario de estado y director del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, confirmó que: "La estrategia, si Dios quiere, en la próxima reunión del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional se presentará para su aprobación porque está ya escrita. No tiene muchos cambios". Diario de Sesiones del 14 de abril de 2019, p. 20, http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CORT/DS/CM/DSCG-12-CM-131.PDF

Elcano elaboró unas propuestas para que se incluyeran en la futura redacción.[3]

Como se verá en la comparación que se va a realizar a continuación, la Estrategia recoge bastantes de esas recomendaciones, lo que refleja la gran coincidencia de perspectivas e intereses entre los sectores público y privado. Las divergencias obedecen a que los representantes del Consejo Nacional de Ciberseguridad (el Sistema de ahora en adelante) están más preocupados por los riesgos y la inseguridad del ciberespacio que por el impacto que puedan tener sobre la actividad económica e industrial del sector privado. Esta preferencia es lógica, dada la competencia exclusiva del sector público en cuestiones de seguridad nacional. Sin embargo, esa reserva competencial se quiebra cuando las decisiones adoptadas abandonan el ámbito restringido de la seguridad nacional y entran el más amplio de seguridad económica.

La Estrategia sólo se limita a emitir unas directrices generales y técnicas a las que tendrán que seguir decisiones políticas concretas para ejecutar las líneas de actuación recogidas en ella. Corresponde al Gobierno respaldar o no al Consejo Nacional de Ciberseguridad en la ejecución de esas medidas, aportando el respaldo político y presupuestario que precisan. Por eso, y desde el sector privado, se proponía que la nueva estrategia anticipara las medidas a desarrollar como la regulación de la participación privada,

la necesidad de contar con una memoria económica o la defensa activa, entre otras. La nueva Estrategia recoge alguna de esas propuestas, pero el Gobierno tendrá que definir otras, como su contribución presupuestaria, para que el Plan de Acción con el que se desarrolle la Estrategia cuente con objetivos y recursos concretos y no sólo con buenos propósitos.

Entre las orientaciones a desarrollar sobresale la de regular la cooperación público-privada. La articulación de un foro de Ciberseguridad Nacional (el Foro de ahora en adelante) representa una directriz importante en la nueva Estrategia y responde a la demanda del sector privado. La cooperación entre ambos sectores ha funcionado bien en relación con la protección de las infraestructuras críticas y debería hacerlo a medida que la ciberseguridad se expande por el ámbito de la seguridad económica, la seguridad industrial, los servicios no esenciales y la educación. Para mejorar la colaboración público-privada, se debe mejorar la cooperación pública-publica, reduciendo el número de interlocutores gubernamentales, y se debe articular -la inexistente- cooperación privada-privada, para que el sector gubernamental cuente con una interlocución única e integrada.

La corresponsabilidad como principio
La nueva Estrategia entiende que el ciudadano es "corresponsable" de la ciberseguridad nacional. Su parte de

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3 "Propuestas desde el sector privado para la revisión de la Estrategia de Ciberseguridad Nacional", DT 472019, Real Instituto Elcano, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/dt4-2019-alonsolecuit-propuestas-sector-privado-revision-estrategia-ciberseguridad-nacional.

La nueva Estrategia entiende que el ciudadano es "corresponsable" de la ciberseguridad nacional.

la responsabilidad obedece a que su comportamiento puede influir en la seguridad del ciberespacio, por lo que se le pide que tome conciencia de los riesgos que corre (cultura de ciberseguridad) y se comprometa en la tarea común de proteger a la sociedad, impulsando aquellas medidas que conduzcan a la "necesaria" cooperación para la seguridad común. La necesidad de esta cooperación impuesta puede ser excesiva si, por ejemplo, la carga de la ciberseguridad recae exclusiva o mayoritariamente sobre el sector privado. Incluso si fuera equitativa, la movilización de los ciudadanos ante un peligro colectivo no puede seguir el patrón del extinto servicio militar obligatorio, en el que los ciudadanos sólo tenían el deber de contribuir, sino en el moderno de corresponsabilidad de las sociedades avanzadas donde actores públicos y privados comparten decisiones, obligaciones y derechos.

Si la responsabilidad es compartida, la cooperación no puede funcionar sólo en apoyo del sector público. El reparto de responsabilidades, lo que corresponde al sector público y al privado no puede ser igual sino asimétrico: mayor peso del sector público en las decisiones que afectan a la seguridad nacional y mayor peso del sector privado en las que afectan a su seguridad económica, la continuidad de sus negocios o la competitividad. La Estrategia apela reiteradamente a la colaboración público-privada para atender las obligaciones de la seguridad nacional, pero no recoge expresamente el derecho a participar -ser corresponsable- en aquellas decisiones que afecten sus intereses económicos e industriales especialmente de las empresas que son sujetos principales de las obligaciones regulatorias[4]. Sí que se reconoce la necesidad de incrementar la colaboración con el sector privado en relación con la gestión de crisis, una cooperación que desde el sector privado se entiende de doble vía, porque las crisis también afectan a la imagen y continuidad de su negocio.

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4 No deja de resultar paradójico que se reconozca la necesidad de participación del sector privado en la regulación multilateral de la ciberseguridad y no se le reconozca esa misma necesidad en la regulación nacional, salvo que la regulación futura del Foro lo establezca.

Algunas de las propuestas pendientes se pueden subsanar cuando se regule el Foro. Su creación (Línea de actuación, L.A. 3.9), da satisfacción a una exigencia recogida en la Ley de Seguridad Nacional, atiende una demanda reiterada del sector privado y representa un avance respecto a la Estrategia anterior. Su regulación queda pendiente, pero puede ayudar a construir una corresponsabilidad más equitativa, si las sinergias que se pretenden crear se orientan al desarrollo de las oportunidades económicas de la digitalización y no sólo, como hasta ahora, a desarrollar medidas de seguridad. Por eso, nuestras propuestas reivindicaban no sólo su creación sino, también, su participación en el nivel estratégico de las decisiones que afecten al sector. Un Foro marginal, sin presencia y capacidad de influencia en los centros donde se deciden las cuestiones que afecten al sector privado y a la sociedad, no tendría sentido en una política como la de ciberseguridad cuyo objetivo último es asegurar la prosperidad y el disfrute de la economía digital.

Los compromisos del sector público
Otra de las propuestas del sector privado, tenía que ver con la mayor asunción de compromisos por parte del sector público. Por un lado, se pedía que la Estrategia incluyera mecanismos de evaluación para verificar el cumplimiento de las medidas de seguridad acordadas para proteger los sistemas públicos y privados con el fin de asegurar que ambos sectores cumplen sus compromisos. En un sistema en las que el sector público establece obligaciones

públicas y privadas, no parecía lógico que sólo se exigiera el cumplimiento de estas al sector privado, mientras que el sector público podría retrasar la ejecución de las obligaciones contempladas en los planes de acción o sectoriales por motivos políticos o presupuestarios. En la Estrategia, el Sistema se compromete a elaborar un informe anual de evaluación donde figurará el grado de ejecución y el cumplimiento de sus objetivos. Una autoevaluación es siempre mejor que ningún método de evaluación, como ocurría con la anterior Estrategia, y dará mucho juego y relevancia a la Comisión Mixta de Seguridad Nacional.

Las recomendaciones iban más allá de la exigencia al sector público y pedían reforzar la exigencia de cumplimiento de las obligaciones privadas, abarcando toda la cadena de suministro e implantando nuevas obligaciones como la de que cada empresa disponga de un CISO, un plan de riesgos, la obligación legal de presentar un informe a los consejos de administración de las sociedades que cotizan o a las presidencias de las agencias públicas. La Estrategia no ha entrado en la regulación obligatoria de estas materias, con los que se mantiene el margen de vulnerabilidad que se señala en las cadenas de suministro. Si que se ha comprometido a fomentar la normalización y la exigencia de requisitos en los productos y servicios de tecnologías de la información y de las comunicaciones, promoviendo la evaluación de la conformidad y la certificación. También se compromete a desarrollar mecanismos e indicadores agregados de riesgo adecuados a las

> *La Estrategia ha aceptado comprometer al sector público y al privado en la gestión de los riesgos de la cadena de suministro.*

condiciones de ciberseguridad, en lugar de vincularlo a las condiciones genéricas de riesgo como el nivel de alerta terrorista u otros como ocurría hasta ahora (L.A. 3.4 y 3.6), así como a crear mecanismos ágiles y seguros de denuncia para el sector privado como se le venía solicitando.

Finalmente, y ante el incremento imparable de los ciberataques, se le pedía al sector público que elevara su nivel de disuasión regulando la defensa activa y consolidando instrumentos de ciberdiplomacia y ciberdefensa en situaciones de particular gravedad. La Estrategia ha aceptado comprometer al sector público y al privado en la gestión de los riesgos de la cadena de suministro, especialmente en aquellas certificaciones críticas que afecten a la provisión de servicios esenciales, pero sólo propone recurrir a medidas de ciberdefensa activa para proteger ciudadanos y pymes (L.A. 3.5). De esta forma sigue pendiente la cuestión de si el sector público llevaría a cabo medidas de defensa activa en apoyo de las empresas e industrias principales o si las cogestionaría con estas. En todo caso, el reconocimiento del derecho a la defensa activa como se le pedía representa un avance en esa dirección.

La cuestión industrial

La cuestión industrial es una parte de la seguridad económica que sigue pendiente de la necesaria atención. La ciberseguridad, además de riesgos, también genera oportunidades para las empresas e industrias que se preparan para aprovechar el creciente mercado global de la ciberseguridad. La nueva Estrategia, a diferencia de la anterior, se muestra mucho más ambiciosa en este ámbito, aunque las posibilidades de que esa ambición se convierta en políticas industriales, de investigación y desarrollo, exceden a las capacidades propias del Sistema[5].

Por ejemplo, la Estrategia se muestra dispuesta a apoyar aquellas necesidades específicas que sustenten necesidades

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5 El desarrollo de las tecnologías asociadas con la digitalización (ciberseguridad, inteligencia artificial, robótica, automatización, computación cuántica y otras) carece todavía de un marco industrial integrado. Para su necesidad, ver "La cuarta revolución industrial. Un enfoque de seguridad nacional", DT 12/2018, Real Instituto Elcano, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/dt12-2018-arteaga-cuarta-revolucion-industrial-enfoque-seguridad-nacional.

> *La identificación de las tecnologías críticas favorecería la protección de la compra pública por razones de seguridad nacional en el marco de la Unión Europea, y facilitaría la consolidación del sector tecnológico e industrial de la ciberseguridad.*

de interés nacional para fortalecer la autonomía digital, y la propiedad intelectual e industrial (L.A. 4.3), pero no identifica, como se le recomendaba desde el sector privado, aquellas tecnologías críticas para la ciberseguridad nacional que no deban depender de terceros ni se concreta la forma en la que se apoyarán esas necesidades. La identificación de las tecnologías críticas favorecería la protección de la compra pública por razones de seguridad nacional en el marco de la Unión Europea, y facilitaría la consolidación del sector tecnológico e industrial de la ciberseguridad.

También se solicitaba que el Estado fomentara, en su acción exterior, el desarrollo de asociaciones estratégicas bilaterales con empresas presas y estados líderes del sector para potenciar su base tecnológica e industrial y establecer acuerdos y alianzas estratégicas con los suministradores internacionales de referencia y confianza, de forma que permitieran desarrollar el tejido empresarial nacional y facilitar su acceso a la tecnología

y mercados (partenariados) pero el Objetivo IV de la Estrategia no menciona ninguna línea de actuación económica en ese sentido.

A pesar de lo anterior, no se puede negar a la nueva Estrategia que dedica mucha mayor atención a las cuestiones industriales que la anterior y que ha admitido bastantes de las propuestas que se le hacían desde el sector privado. Entre otras líneas de actuación que se propone desarrollar para impulsar la industria española de ciberseguridad figuran, las de compra pública innovadora (L.A. 4.1), medidas de apoyo a la innovación, a la inversión, a la internacionalización y a la transferencia tecnológica en especial en el caso de micropymes y pymes (L.A. 4.2), a la seguridad desde el diseño, (L.A. 4.3), identificar las necesidades de capacidades profesionales y educativas, impulsando la formación continua y promoviendo sistemas de acreditación y certificación profesional (L.A. 4.7). Todas estas líneas de acción están bien orientadas y coinciden con las

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recomendadas por el sector privado, pero carecen de garantías concretas de ejecución en términos de recursos, responsables y plazos, por lo que, nuevamente, la concreción de la forma en la que se llevarán a cabo se posterga para más adelante, cuando se formulen los planes de acción y sectoriales oportunos.

Conclusión

La revisión de la Estrategia de Ciberseguridad Nacional de 2013 se ha llevado a cabo de una forma rápida y solvente, lo que revela la madurez técnica del Sistema de Ciberseguridad Nacional. Bien es cierto que la Estrategia, como todas las estrategias técnicas, son más fáciles de elaborar cuanto menos se concretan en los detalles de su ejecución y menos actores intervienen en su elaboración.

La Estrategia contiene directrices transformacionales que apuntan en la buena dirección, pero no las acompaña de la identificación de los recursos, responsables y plazos que harían posible su desarrollo. Tampoco identifica los objetivos a lograr, por lo que no se puede medir -ni criticar- su

grado de progreso hacia ellos. Desarrollada desde dentro del Sistema, la Estrategia sigue siendo de Ciberseguridad Nacional, aunque ahora se denomina Nacional de Ciberseguridad, porque en su elaboración no ha participado el resto de los actores públicos y privados implicados, aunque se les haya a dado a conocer su texto ya escrito.

Corresponde ahora al futuro Gobierno concretar con prioridades, presupuestos y mandatos las directrices técnicas de la Estrategia. Desde el punto de vista del sector privado, la Estrategia codifica y abre la puerta a una mayor cooperación con el sector público, especialmente a través del Foro de Ciberseguridad Nacional. La responsabilidad para hacerlo no sólo depende del Gobierno y del Sistema, sino que comienza por el mismo sector privado, por su capacidad de articularse y organizarse para facilitar su interlocución e influencia con el sector público. Tras la Estrategia, y después de tanto solicitarlo, la "pelota" de la cooperación público-privada se encuentra ahora en el tejado del sector privado.

Legal challenges and the practicability of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU

Arndt Künnecke

This paper analyses the legal challenges and practicability of establishing of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory.

Summary
To ensure the EU does not again face a situation like the refugee crisis of 2015-16 various options are being discussed. One solution might be the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory. This paper analyses the legal challenges and practicability of such centres, taking into account the following: (1) the establishment of disembarkation centres outside the EU by international treaties; (2) the exercise of sovereign powers in these centres; (3) the establishment of a common mechanism of distribution and compensation for the admission of migrants; and (4) the readmission of refused migrants from these centres.

Analysis

Introduction
In the aftermath of the migration crisis of 2015 within the EU and its Member States, many ideas were discussed as to how to get the uncontrolled mass immigration into EU territory under control. All players, no matter whether officials from the EU or its Member States, agreed that there should be no repeat of the situation of 2015-16.

Although all relevant players, apart from some human-rights activists, shared the same goal, the way to reach it remained controversial. Some countries preferred a common European solution to the challenges of illegal mass migration, some relied on themselves, or on cooperation with other countries with similar political convictions, in order to stop incoming illegal migrants. The most prominent measure on the EU level was the conclusion of the so-called Refugee Deal with Turkey of 18 March 2016. On the national level, the closure of the Balkan

> *The heads of State or government of the EU Member States agreed on exploring ways to build new centres, probably in Africa, where migrants could be screened for asylum and from where only legitimate refugees might move on to the EU.*

route by the Eastern European countries of Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia on 9 March 2016 marked the most prominent measure against the uncontrolled flow of illegal migrants into the EU.

Echoing the discussions elsewhere in the developed world on how to outsource the contentious asylum process and how to cut down on the flow of arrivals of illegal migrants, the heads of State or government of the EU Member States discussed at the EU summit in Brussels on 28 June 2018 the possibility of establishing centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory. The heads of State or government of the EU Member States agreed on exploring ways to build new centres, probably in Africa, where migrants could be screened for asylum and from where only legitimate refugees might move on to the EU. Although they said that these centres in outside countries would operate in 'full respect of international law',[1]

the European Council addressed neither the question of the legal admissibility and practicability of their establishment nor the question of how and where refugees would be resettled. Exploring the legal and political practicability of the so-called concept of regional disembarkation platforms was left to the Council of the EU and the EU Commission. The answer to both open questions remains crucial to further EU asylum policy. In the event of non-conformity with international law, the EU's concept of regional disembarkation platforms will not serve as a possible resort for a common asylum strategy at all. But even if these regional disembarkation platforms outside the EU are in conformity with international law, it would continue to be difficult to establish them because some countries in the bloc have refused to accept them[2] and swift handling of asylum seekers is necessary to prevent a backlog.

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1 *European Council meeting (28 June 2018) – Conclusions*, EUCO 9/18, p. 2, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35936/28-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf (accessed 14/I/2019).

2 See Alfred Hackensberger & Christian Putsch (2019), "Asylzentren außerhalb der EU – das sagen die betroffenen Staaten", WELT Online, https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article178467814/Asylzentren-fuer-Migranten-in-Afrika-Das-sagen-die-Laender.html (accessed 15/I/2019).

It is the aim of this paper to provide an analysis of the legal challenges and practicability of centres for illegal migrants outside the EU, or, in the words of the European Council: regional disembarkation platforms. This paper should serve as a solid legal basis for further discussion about whether these centres can be a possible option for a common asylum strategy within the EU to provide a more effective handling of illegal migration to EU countries. The paper does not aim to assess the political chances of success of the EU's concept of regional disembarkation platforms.

Our examination of the legal practicability of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU starts with the question of whether these centres for illegal migrants to the EU –for example in Africa– can be established by international treaties. Secondly, we examine if the EU can exercise sovereign powers in these centres, ie, apply asylum procedures on its own authority. Thirdly, we discuss the possibility of a common EU mechanism of distribution and compensation for the admission of migrants. Finally, we demonstrate how the re-admission of refused migrants from the centres can be carried out in compliance with international law.

Is the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU subject to international treaties?
As the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU

would concern the exercise of sovereign power outside EU territory, these proposed centres could only be legally created if created by an international treaty. An international treaty is an international agreement concluded between States or international legal personalities in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.[3] The basic rules for the signing of international treaties are laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969.

Accordingly, the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU would have to be an approvable subject of an international treaty between the EU and the host countries for the proposed centres. In general, States and other international legal personalities can freely determine the subject matter of their international treaty to be signed. However, according to Arts. 34 and 35 of the VCLT, such a treaty may not create any obligations for a third State without its consent, unless the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing. As a treaty on the establishment of a centre for illegal migrants outside the EU would be signed by the EU as one party to the treaty and the host State of the disembarkation centre as the other party, it would not create any obligation for a third State. As such, there is no problem with third States not being involved in the

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3 Art. 2 VCLT.

Furthermore, a treaty on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU must not violate public international law.

agreement. Therefore, these Articles do not serve as an obstacle to such a treaty.

Furthermore, a treaty on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU must not violate public international law. According to Art. 53 of the VCLT the treaty must not conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law. A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Consequently, a treaty on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU would have to be in conformity with a peremptory norm of general international law, the so-called *ius cogens.* Part of the internationally recognised *ius cogens* are first and foremost the minimum standards of human rights that can be derived from the core constituents of international documents on the protection of human rights. These include, for instance:

the prohibition of the use of violence (Art. 2 IV of the UN Charter); the prohibition of genocide and crimes against humanity (Art 3 of the Geneva Conventions); the right to life (Art. 6 of the ICCPR); the prohibition of race discrimination (Art. 4 of the ICCPR); and the prohibition of torture and of slavery (Arts. 7 and 8 of the ICCPR). As the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU does not imply the violation of any of these human rights, it is not in breach of any peremptory norm of general international law. There is currently no newly emerging peremptory norm of general international law that might lead to the nullification and termination of the treaty, as stated in Art. 64 of the VCLT.

In addition, Art. 42 I of the Geneva Convention must be taken into account. Due to that provision, in an international treaty on refugees no reservations to Articles 1, 3,4, 16 I, 33 and 36-46 may be made. These articles forbid the treaty to narrow the definition of the term 'refugee' as laid down in Art. 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Likewise, they prohibit the

treaty from violating the equal treatment of refugees (Art. 3), their right to practice their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children (Art. 4), and their free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting States of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Art. 16 I). Furthermore, and this is a crucial point for any international treaty on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU, the treaty cannot violate the *non-refoulement* principle. This principle is guaranteed in Art 33.1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and states that 'no Contracting State shall expel or return (*refouler*) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". Arts. 36-46 of the 1951 Refugee Convention are procedural final clauses with no relevance to the content of any international treaty on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU. Accordingly, any international treaty on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants

outside the EU has to guarantee the illegal migrants in these centres (ie, refugees and asylum seekers) equal treatment, freedom of religion, free access to courts of the EU and *non-refoulement* in the event of their lives or freedom being threatened in another territory. Complying with these requirements, an international treaty establishing disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU could be signed if in line with the aforementioned requirements of international law.

The next question is if the EU, as an international governmental organisation, has the competence for signing such an international treaty with a possible host country. Article 47 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) explicitly recognises the legal personality of the EU, making it an independent entity in its own right. Accordingly, as laid out in Art. 216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU has the ability to negotiate and sign international agreements 'with one or more third countries or international organisations where the

Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties'. As opposed to individual Member States, the EU is not a State party to the Geneva Convention of 1951. To date, the EU's formal accession to the Convention has not been realised. Therefore, the EU itself is not bound by the Convention as a matter of public international law. Nevertheless, Art. 78 I of the TFEU states that the EU's 'common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection… must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties'. These other relevant treaties include the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In line with the general principles of EU law, this also encompasses other potential treaties that might be signed in future by all EU Member States.[4] Accordingly, any EU asylum acquis must be in compliance with the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

Non-compliance constitutes an infringement of Art. 78 I of the TFEU. As an integral part of EU law, the Geneva Convention of 1951 remains a subject to the interpretative principles of public international law.

Article 78 of the TFEU (signed in Lisbon in 2007) raised the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), first introduced by the European Council in Tampere in 1999, to a legally-binding objective of the EU's primary law. According to Art. 78 II of the TFEU, the EU legislation on asylum is part of the shared competences between the EU and its Member States. This requires that any EU legislation in this area must comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. A shared competence consequently limits EU action to initiatives that cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national level and remain limited in terms of regulatory intensity to what is necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives. However, as the far-reaching Common European Asylum System is a specific objective of the Lisbon Treaty, the application of these principles of subsidiarity and proportionality requires a certain generosity.[5] In other words: in this case, the principles cannot be applied strictly, because otherwise the Treaty objective could not be reached at all. Article 78 II (a) of the TFEU explicitly allows the agreement on a 'uniform status of asylum'. Consequently, the objective of a uniform asylum status implies that the

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4 See Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym (2016), 'Constitutional framework and principles for interpretation', in Kay Hailbronner & Daniel Thym (Eds.), *EU Immigration and Asylum Law*, 2nd edition, München, MN 55.

5 See Steve Peers (2016), EU Justice and Home Affairs Law: EU Immigration and Asylum Law, 4th edition, Oxford, p. 393; and Matthias Rossi (2016), 'Article 78 TFEU', in Christian Calliess & Mattias Ruffert (Eds.), *EUV/AEUV,* 5th edition, München, para. 11

> *The decisions on granting asylum to an individual are still taken at the national level by the Member States.*

principles of subsidiarity and proportionality do not prevent EU action in normal circumstances. As the drafting history and the general scheme of the EU Treaties argue in support of a substantive congruence of the EU's asylum status and the refugee status of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Common European Asylum System is, therefore, founded on the Convention.[6] This is confirmed by the reference in Art. 78 I of the TFEU. Thus, EU legislation on the basis of Art. 78 II (a) of the TFEU must specify the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention. EU secondary legislation concerning asylum, such as the Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU, the Asylum Procedure Directive 2013/32/EU, the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU, the Dublin III Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 and the Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 establishing the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in Malta must be interpreted in the light of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

The TFEU does not restrict the geographical scope of the provision on asylum procedures. In particular, it does not specify whether common 'procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status' should necessarily apply within the territories of the Member States. Specifically, the drafting history of Art. 78 II (d) of the TFEU shows that the exterritorial processing of asylum applications is also covered by the TFEU, always taking into account that these procedures, wherever they take place, must comply with international refugee law and human rights.[7] However, in accordance with the EU's supranational structure, the EU is only authorised to legislative harmonisation and administrative support in cases of asylum. The decisions on granting asylum to an individual are still taken at the national level by the Member States. At present, Art. 78 of the TFEU does not provide a sufficient legal basis for examining asylum applications by EU authorities, such as

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6 Hailbronner & Thym (2016), *op. cit.*, p. 1032, FN 54.

7 *Ibid*, p. 1037.

EASO, instead of national authorities of each Member State. Establishing a specific EU authority to decide upon asylum applications replacing the Member States' asylum bureaucracy, would require a Treaty change in accordance with Art. 48 of the TFEU. However, on the basis of the existing Art. 78 II (d) of the TFEU, the EU can support transnational cooperation between the Member States.

Article 78 II (g) of the TFEU established an explicit legal basis for 'partnership and cooperation with third countries'. This offers the EU the possibility of cooperating with third countries even in situations in which the adaption of secondary legislation does not result in an exclusive external treaty-making competence. However, Art. 78 II (g) of the TFEU itself does not provide sufficient legal basis for the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU on the territory of third countries. It only serves as a legal basis for cooperation with third countries on the level of EU competences. As mentioned above, the EU does not have the competence to run asylum procedures on its own instead of the Member States' authorities. Therefore, only in combination with Art. 78 II (d) of the TFEU could the EU justify future EU legislation providing for external asylum processing centres that would have to be run by the Member States. Art. 78 II (g) of the TFEU could be used to guarantee a favourable political and administrative context by cooperation with the possible host States of the disembarkation centres for illegal migrants, to enable its Member States to run the centres outside the EU themselves with the financial and operative support by the EU. For that purpose, the EU would have the competence to sign an international treaty with a possible host country on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory.

Fulfilling all the aforementioned requirements of an international treaty, the signing of a treaty on the establishment of centres for illegal migrants outside the EU would be in accordance with international law and would be binding to its parties, according to Art. 26 of the VCLT. None of the parties, ie, neither the EU nor the country hosting the disembarkation centre, could, according to Art. 27 of the VCLT, invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to execute a treaty. The binding effect for the EU and its Member States is explicitly guaranteed in Art. 216 II of the TFEU that states that 'agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member State'.

Can the EU exercise sovereign powers in these centres?

In its international treaty with a possible host country on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory, the EU could receive the permission of the host State to exercise its own sovereign powers in these disembarkation centres. Within the freedom of contract, the host State is entitled to assign this power to the EU. However, as the EU –on the basis of the existing TEU and TFEU– currently does not have the

> *Exercising their sovereign rights in these disembarkation centres, the EU Member States would be responsible for the organisational and institutional framework.*

competence to run asylum procedures on its own instead of the Member States' authorities, it could only provide its Member States with the financial and operative support to establish and run these external asylum processing centres. Within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the EU could only function as contract party to the host State for the establishment of such disembarkation centres, which would be run by the Member States and its asylum authorities. The sovereignty in these disembarkation centres for illegal migrants would, in fact, be exercised by the Member States as long as there is no Treaty change in accordance with Art. 48 of the TEU replacing the Member States' asylum bureaucracy and giving the authority to decide upon asylum applications to the EU.

Exercising their sovereign rights in these disembarkation centres, the EU Member States would be responsible for the organisational and institutional framework. In accordance with their national asylum law, they could either operate the centres on their own using their national administrative staff or they could licence Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) like the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) with the operation. Crucial for the operation of these disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the territory of the EU is that they are run in accordance with the obligations of fundamental and human rights laid down in international human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Geneva Convention, as well as in the national constitutions of the Member States.

The EU Member States that run these disembarkation centres outside the EU would have to decide for themselves if the extra-territorial asylum procedure carried out in these centres should complement, or replace, their national asylum procedure. This decision is crucial as regards the legal consequences of the asylum decisions being made in the disembarkation centres outside the Member State's own territory.

The first option is a complementary extra-territorial asylum procedure. This could serve either as an additional offer, or as a freely selectable alternative to the existing national asylum procedure. If the services of the Member States in the disembarkation centres are not only offering help or advice, it means that the services performed are acts of sovereignty. In this case, as acts of sovereignty, they must be in accordance with the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution of that Member State. Making use of this complementary extra-territorial asylum procedure, the asylum applicant's domestic position in the Member State must not deteriorate. It may only be applied to give the applicant an additional option strengthening his legal position. The complementary extra-territorial asylum procedure could be operated in analogy to the airport procedure of asylum cases (Art. 43 of Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection), where the asylum procedure is conducted in a transit zone before the asylum seeker is allowed to enter the country in which he or she applies for asylum. According to Chapter II of Directive 2013/32/EU, in this transit zone the asylum seeker has to be given free access to effective legal remedies, such as independent consulting and advisory services in the national asylum law (Art. 8, 12 I (c), Arts. 20-23). Accordingly, in the extra-territorial disembarkation centres each EU Member State would have to guarantee the asylum seekers the same amount and quality of legal remedies as on its own State territory. The complementary extra-territorial asylum

procedure would have to be in compliance with the minimum procedural requirements laid down in Chapter II of Directive 2013/32/EU, such as free access to interpreters, legal consultancy and official hearings. All legal remedies being offered in the Member State's asylum law must be guaranteed, including the access to the appropriate administrative courts. In addition, the disembarkation centres would have to offer the asylum seeker accommodation and services (eg, food and healthcare) for the duration of the entire asylum procedure.

The second option is a replacing extra-territorial asylum procedure. This option would relocate the entire asylum procedure from the territory of the EU Member State to the territory of a third country. Consequently, all asylum seekers who seek asylum in a specific Member State would be expelled, or deported, from that Member State's territory to the disembarkation centre abroad where they could only apply for asylum and where their asylum procedure would be executed. As no asylum procedures would be carried out on the Member State's own territory anymore, each EU Member State would have to establish an entry ban for newly incoming asylum seekers to its own State territory and an obligation to leave the State territory for the duration of the asylum procedure in the event of the asylum seeker having already entered the country. This would also apply in the complementary extra-territorial asylum procedure. In replacing the extra-territorial asylum procedure the disembarkation centres in third countries would have to be operated in compliance with the Member

A disembarkation centre in a safe third country is not a country in the formal sense of the term, because it does not fulfil any of the legal requirements of a State (State territory, State population and government authority).

State's national asylum laws, guaranteeing the asylum seeker an asylum procedure in accordance with the rule of law, including free access to interpretation services, legal consultancy and official hearings, as well as offering him or her accommodation and services for the duration of the entire asylum procedure.

However, there would be no need for the protection of the EU and its Member States in the event of the asylum seeker entering from a safe third country, or in the event he or she enjoys sufficient protection in a third country from where they enter the EU.

It could be argued that disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the territory of the EU fulfil the requirements of safe third countries, with the consequence that no EU Member State would have to grant asylum to asylum seekers who apply for it in these centres. According to Art. 3 III of the Dublin III Regulation 'any Member State shall retain the right to send an applicant to a safe third country, subject to the rules and safeguards laid down in

Directive 2013/32/EU'. However, the concept of a safe third country in Art. 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU explicitly mentions only a 'safe third country'. A disembarkation centre in a safe third country is not a country in the formal sense of the term, because it does not fulfil any of the legal requirements of a State (State territory, State population and government authority). Therefore, a disembarkation centre outside the EU cannot be considered as being covered under the term 'safe third country' in Art. 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU. This interpretation would go beyond the wording of the Article.

Not falling under the concept of safe third country of Art. 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU, disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the territory of the EU could be considered a 'flight alternative' in the sense of the Directive. In that case, EU Member States could consider an asylum seeker's application for asylum inadmissible if he or she comes from 'a country which is not a Member State [and which] is considered as a first country of asylum for the applicant'. According to the concept of safe third

country in Art. 35 (b) of Directive 2013/32/EU, 'a country can be considered to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant if he or she enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of *non-refoulement'*. An asylum seeker in a disembarkation centre run by an EU Member State would definitely enjoy sufficient protection in that centre. However, under Art. 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU, the disembarkation centre does not fulfil the legal requirements of a country. Therefore, a disembarkation centre outside the EU, where EU Member States run extra-territorial asylum procedures, cannot be considered a country providing the asylum applicant with sufficient protection. Consequently, the EU Member States would be obliged to proceed with any asylum application being made in these centres as if the application had been received on their own national territory.

How can the EU legally establish a common mechanism of distribution and compensation for the admission of migrants?

To prevent 'forum shopping' and the phenomenon of 'refugees in orbit',[8] where asylum seekers are referred from one Member State to another by claiming it is not responsible for them, the EU was in need of determining which Member State is responsible for examining asylum applications. Article 78 II (e) of the TFEU gives the EU legislator (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) the competence to set up 'criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum or subsidiary protection'. On these legal grounds the so-called Dublin III Regulation was enacted. Using the terms 'criteria' and 'mechanisms', and Art. 78 II (e) of the TFEU itself, does not set narrow confines for modifying existing rules. For instance, it enables the EU legislator in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure to establish a quota system allocating asylum seekers among Member States on the basis of a specific distribution key, or certain relocation mechanisms.

Therefore, parallel to the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU, an appropriate common EU mechanism for the distribution of the incoming legal migrants could be created, taking into account the factual burden of each Member State in terms of asylum applicants in the disembarkation centres. In realisation of the purpose of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) such a mechanism would be subject to EU secondary legislation in accordance with Art. 78 II (e) of the TFEU. On the initiative of the EU Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU could adopt appropriate measures in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. The EU legislator would have to agree on a specific distribution or relocation mechanism, including a distribution/relocation key among the EU Member States that participate in the

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8 Hailbronner & Thym (2016), *op. cit.*, p. 1024.

> *In the event that not all EU Member States participate in running these disembarkation centres and allow recognised asylum seekers to enter their territory, the EU could oblige the non-participating Member States to contribute to handling the asylum issue.*

disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the territory of the EU.

In the event that not all EU Member States participate in running these disembarkation centres and allow recognised asylum seekers to enter their territory, the EU could oblige the non-participating Member States to contribute to handling the asylum issue. In this respect, the EU could refer to the principle of solidarity laid down in Art. 80 of the TFEU, which generally obliges other Member States to support those that take more responsibilities upon themselves in managing the Common European Asylum System. Art. 80 of the TFEU refers to the policies of the EU laid down in Arts. 77-79 and states that 'their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States'. The implementation of this obligation can be effected in various ways, for instance, by financial or operational support. Accordingly, the EU could agree

on a certain compensation mechanism for the Member States that do not participate in running the disembarkation centres. They could be obliged by the EU legislator in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure to pay financial compensation for not taking part in the asylum procedure run in the disembarkation centres, or to provide operational or logistical support for the participating Member States.

How can readmission of refused migrants from the centres legally take place?

At the end of each asylum procedure being conducted by the EU Member States in the disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory EU according to their national asylum law, there will be a final decision: either the asylum seeker is granted asylum or the application is rejected. In cases of asylum being granted, the asylum seeker is entitled to enter the country that granted him or her asylum status and he or she is given residence status. In the other cases, when the asylum seeker's application

> *An agreement on repatriating rejected asylum seekers to their transit countries, or countries of origin, must be a subject in any international treaty regarding centres outside the EU.*

is rejected in a legally binding way, he or she would have to leave the disembarkation centre. In these cases, the EU Member States must have ways of deporting the rejected applicants.

An agreement on repatriating rejected asylum seekers to their transit countries, or countries of origin, must be a subject in any international treaty regarding centres outside the EU. As with the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside the EU, the agreement would have to be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the VCLT of 1969. As the rejected asylum seekers' transit countries, or countries of origin, would sign the readmission agreement voluntarily and as it would create obligations only between the signatory States, the agreement would be in accordance with Art. 34 & Art. 35 of the VCLT, according to which a treaty may not create any obligations for a third State without its consent unless the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing. According to Art. 53 VCLT, a readmission agreement may not conflict with

a peremptory norm of general international law. As the readmission of rejected asylum seekers does generally not imply the violation of any of the human rights mentioned above, it is not in breach of any peremptory norm of general international law. However, since the principle of non-refoulement is not only part of international customary law but also laid down in Art. 33 I of the 1951 Refugee Convention, in EU primary law in Art. 19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in Art. 78 I of the TFEU and as in EU secondary law in Art. 5 of the EU Repatriation Directive 2008/115/EC, these laws have to be adhered to in the text and implementation of any readmission agreement. Accordingly, such an agreement would not violate any norm of international law and could, therefore, be signed effectively into law. Due to Art. 26 of the VCLT, it would be binding to its parties and none of the signatories could, according to Art. 27 of the VCLT, invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

As the signing of readmission agreements with rejected asylum-seekers' transit

countries, or countries of origin, is in accordance with international law, it is questionable who is competent to conclude these agreements: essentially, whether it is within the competence of the Member States who run the disembarkation centres or within the competence of the EU? Due to Art. 79 III of the TFEU, 'the [European] Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory of one of the Member States'. Accordingly, the EU has the competence to sign readmission agreements with third countries in order to return rejected asylum seekers from the disembarkation centres abroad to either their countries of origin or their transit countries. According to Art. 4 I (j) of the TFEU, this competence to sign readmission agreements with third countries is part of the shared competence between the EU and its Member States. That means that the Member States can conclude their own readmission agreements with third countries in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as long as the EU does not negotiate, or sign, a readmission agreement with the same country. EU agreements precede the agreements of Member States in this area.

The EU has already negotiated and signed readmission agreements with several countries of origin and transit with a view to returning illegal migrants and cooperating in the fight against trafficking in human beings.[9] Usually, these agreements are linked to visa facilitation agreements, which aim to provide the necessary incentive for readmission negotiations in the third country concerned, without increasing illegal migration. In practice, for its readmission agreements with third countries the EU Commission uses an unpublished model readmission agreement which is constantly adapted and developed further in coordination with the Member States.[10] In its eight chapters, these EU readmission agreements with third countries deal with procedural and technical arrangements concerning readmission, the obligation of receiving, the means of providing proof and furnishing *prima facie* evidence, deadlines and time targets, as well as the distribution of costs in the readmission procedure.

Conclusions

As result of the legal analysis presented in this paper, it can be stated that the EU, as an international governmental organisation with its own legal personality, has the competence for signing an international treaty with a possible host country on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory. This

9 So far the EU has signed readmission agreements with the following States, all being now in force: Albania (1/V/2006), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1/I/2008), Georgia (1/III/2011), Hong Kong (1/III/2004), Macao (1/VI/2004), Macedonia (1/I/2008), Moldova (1/I/2008), Montenegro (1/I/2008), Pakistan (1/XII/2010), Russian Federation (1/VI/2007), Serbia (1/I/2008), Sri Lanka (1/V/2005), Ukraine (1/I/2008), Armenia (1/I/2014), Azerbaijan (1/IX/2014), Turkey (1/X/2014) and Cape Verde (1/XII/2014). The readmission agreement with Kazakhstan was signed on 10/XII/2009 but has not yet entered into force.

10 Nils Coleman (2009), *European Readmission Policy*, Leiden, p. 88.

treaty would be in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969, and its content would have to be in compliance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the 1967 Protocol. However, in accordance with the status quo of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), where –on the basis of the existing TEWU and TFEU– the EU currently does not have the competence to run asylum procedures on its own instead of the Member-State authorities, it can only sign a treaty with a third country on the establishment of disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory. As long as there is no Treaty change replacing the Member States' asylum bureaucracy and giving the authority to decide upon asylum applications to the EU, the EU can only function as a contract party to the host state for the establishment of such centres. The disembarkation centres themselves would have to be run by the EU Member States and their asylum authorities. As such, only the EU Member States can exercise their sovereignty in asylum issues in these disembarkation centres for illegal migrants. The Member States –no matter if they opt for a complementary or replacing extra-territorial asylum procedure– would have to provide the asylum applicant with sufficient rights and protection during the entire asylum procedure and they would be obliged to proceed with any asylum application being made in these centres as if the application had been received on their own national

territory. The EU can only financially and operatively support the Member States in this procedure but is not entitled to interfere in their asylum procedures. However, the EU legislator can agree on a specific distribution, or relocation mechanism, including a distribution/relocation key among the EU Member States that participate in the disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory. The Member States that do not participate in running the disembarkation centres can be obliged by the EU legislator to pay a financial compensation for not taking part in the asylum procedure run in the disembarkation centres or to provide operational or logistical support for the participating Member States. For cases where, in accordance with the Member State's national asylum law, the asylum seeker's application in the disembarkation centres is rejected in a legally binding way, the EU has the competence to sign readmission agreements with third countries in order to return the rejected asylum seekers from the disembarkation centres abroad to either their countries of origin or their transit countries. In conclusion, from the legal point of view, there are no obstacles to the European Council's plan of establishing disembarkation centres for illegal migrants outside EU territory. However, whether the plan is also politically practicable and can find the necessary support among EU institutions, the Member States and the possible contractual partners, remains unclear.

Literalidad coránica a medida: las aleyas incompletas de al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico

Sergio Altuna

Más de la mitad de las citas coránicas utilizadas por al-Qaeda en el Magreb (AQMI) en su propaganda son literales pero incompletas o truncadas.

Resumen

Un corpus digitalizado compuesto de más de 200 documentos oficiales difundidos por al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico (AQMI) entre 2004 –cuando todavía se denominaba Grupo Salafista para la Predicación y el Combate (GSPC)– y 2017 permite dar una respuesta fundamentada a la pregunta de cuán religioso es realmente su discurso. Asimismo, a través del cotejo sistemático de la totalidad de las citas coránicas mapeadas –más de 1.200– se constata que, aunque la organización en ningún caso modifica o altera el Corán, lo que permite desechar por completo las tesis que apuntan hacia la manipulación de los textos sagrados, sí se caracteriza por utilizar una literalidad a medida. No enfrentando constricción alguna ni en tiempo ni en espacio, en más de la mitad de las ocasiones en las que, a lo largo de 14 años, AQMI cita el Corán en su propaganda –un 52,42% del total– lo hace evocando citas incompletas o truncadas.

Análisis

Es de sobra conocida la lectura literal y descontextualizada que las diferentes organizaciones terroristas cuya ideología común es la del salafismo yihadista hacen de los textos sagrados del islam, pero ¿qué tanto de su discurso es puramente religioso? Asimismo, con el objetivo de desautorizar y erosionar la legitimación de estas organizaciones, sigue arguyéndose con cierta recurrencia que manipulan y distorsionan el hecho religioso. ¿Puede contrastarse tal afirmación? De ser así, teniendo en cuenta la naturaleza del consenso respecto de la sacralidad de las principales fuentes de la revelación, resultaría relativamente sencillo articular estrategias orientadas a explotar tales adulteraciones.

Mediante el mapeo sistemático de más de 1.200 citas coránicas empleadas por

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al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico (AQMI) entre 2004 –todavía como Grupo Salafista por la Predicación y el Combate (GSPC)–[1] y 2017, el presente análisis pretende arrojar luz sobre algunos aspectos ligados al uso de los textos sagrados por parte de la organización terrorista. Para ello se ha construido un extenso corpus monolingüe, diacrónico y digitalizado que cubre un total de 203 documentos oficiales publicados por el grupo.[2] Entre estos hay 179 documentos audiovisuales (más de 65 horas de audio y vídeo), 20 documentos de texto entre revistas, libros y artículos o ensayos (aproximadamente 800 páginas de texto) y las transcripciones íntegras de cuatro entrevistas a individuos destacados en la organización (véase la Figura 1). La muestra compilada incluye todos aquellos documentos audiovisuales oficiales[3] publicados por la organización terrorista en la horquilla de tiempo mencionada, así como otros documentos oficiales escritos cuyo contenido ha sido juzgado como pertinente por el autor.[4] No se incluyen en la muestra compilada aquellos comunicados breves utilizados, principalmente, para reivindicar operaciones terroristas exitosas, así como tampoco panegíricos, artículos de opinión y otros contenidos secundarios publicados a través de plataformas como *Ifriqīyā al-Muslima*.

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1 Se ha fijado 2004 como punto de partida del muestreo precisamente para descartar que la integración del Grupo Salafista por la Predicación y el Combate supusiera cambios sustanciales en el uso de citas coránicas. 2004 supone, asimismo, el comienzo de la etapa de Abdelmalek Droukdel al frente de la organización, desde enero de 2017, tras haberse fusionado con al-Qaeda, denominada al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico, pero que continúa liderando.

2 Puede definirse un corpus como una base de datos, una extensa colección de textos auténticos que se han recopilado y digitalizado de acuerdo con un conjunto específico de criterios para poder ser utilizado como muestra representativa de una realidad lingüística. Véase T. McEnery, R. Xiao y Y. Tono (2006), *Corpus-Based Language Studies. An Advanced Resource Book*, Routledge, Londres y Nueva York.

3 Todos los documentos audiovisuales publicados por el Comité de medios del Grupo Salafista para la Predicación y el Combate (اللجنة الإعلامية للجماعة السلفية للدعوة والقتال), el Comité de medios de al-Qaeda en el Magreb Islámico (اللجنة الإعلامية لتنظيم القاعدة ببلاد المغرب الإسلامي) y la Fundación al-Andalus.

4 Los documentos escritos cuya inclusión en el corpus ha sido juzgada como pertinente son todos aquellos documentos oficiales que incluyen un mínimo componente ideológico y doctrinal.

Figura 1. Distribución anual de los materiales utilizados para la creación del corpus de citas coránicas halladas en la propaganda de AQMI, 2004-2017

Año	Audios y vídeos	Revistas	Libros y ensayos	Entrevistas
2004	1	2	–	–
2005	1	3	–	–
2006	2	3	–	–
2007	12	–	1	–
2008	10	–	–	1
2009	12	–	1	–
2010	16	–	–	–
2011	15	–	–	1
2012	11	–	2	1
2013	12	–	1	–
2014	10	–	–	–
2015	21 (37)	–	2	–
2016	14	–	2	1
2017	10 (26)	–	3	–

Notas: (1) la diferencia en la cifra de documentos de 2015 viene dada por la inclusión entre paréntesis de todos los documentos asociados a la serie "غزوة أحد في القرآن", un compendio de lecciones impartida por Abu Hassan Rashid al-Bulaydi; (2) la diferencia en la cifra de documentos de 2017 viene dada por la inclusión entre paréntesis de todos los documentos asociados a la serie "شرح كتاب الصيام من بلوغ المرام", un compendio de lecciones impartida por Abu Hassan Rashid al-Bulaydi.

Fuente: elaboración propia..

Los corpus especializados, como es el caso del que nos ocupa, se centran en una variedad particular o registro del idioma, en este caso el discurso salafista yihadista de AQMI. Hasta el momento, las escasas tentativas de analizar el discurso salafista yihadista utilizando para ello un enfoque cuantitativo se han encontrado con un muro difícil de franquear, los desafíos técnicos que presenta la lengua árabe. Los diferentes estudios y análisis cualitativos son más numerosos, principalmente desde que lenguas otras que el árabe comenzaron a ganar presencia en la propaganda de Estado Islámico. Sin embargo, aún sin ánimo de profundizar en el debate, el árabe continúa siendo no sólo la lengua vehicular de la mayor parte de la propaganda yihadista, sino también, por supuesto, el pilar sobre el que se fundamenta y se construye

todo debate ideológico y doctrinal de esta corriente de pensamiento.

La mayor parte de los estudios que abordan de una u otra manera el análisis del discurso o la narrativa yihadista lo hacen a partir de publicaciones como *Dābiq*, *Rumiyah* o *Inspire*. Estos documentos, si bien tienen mayor impacto en Occidente, tienen un público meta específico, lo cual, aun sin desviarse de los principios básicos de la ideología salafista yihadista, define su naturaleza y condiciona el lenguaje utilizado. Asimismo, las traducciones de documentos originales en árabe, incluso aquellas realizadas *in house* por las propias organizaciones terroristas, comportan un mayor sesgo ya que el proceso de traducción de propaganda yihadista no es sistemático.

De otra parte, existen un buen número de estudios que desde diferentes prismas se han centrado en el funcionamiento y las relaciones de la militancia –principalmente *munāṣirūn*, *fanboys* y plataformas oficiales de difusión– en redes sociales como Twitter o Facebook. Este tipo de investigaciones –como las realizadas por J.M. Berger o Charlie Winter, entre otros–[5] han arrojado luz sobre el funcionamiento del aparato propagandístico de difusión y la amplificación de su mensaje en las redes, así como del volumen de la militancia activa en Internet o la temática central de cada producto audiovisual individualizado.

El presente análisis, sin embargo, se centra principalmente a través de un enfoque cuantitativo, en el uso que AQMI hace del Corán.

Cuando AQMI cita el Corán

Ofrecer una respuesta fundamentada a la pregunta cuán religioso es el discurso yihadista supone todo un desafío. El corpus compilado a efectos del presente análisis se eleva hasta las más de 810.000 palabras; éste ha sido codificado de tal forma que posible extraer todas las citas coránicas del texto para su posterior clasificación atendiendo a los criterios que se desee. Así pues, en los 203 documentos inventariados encuentran cabida exactamente 1.219 citas coránicas, 932 si sólo tenemos en cuenta aquellas citas extraídas de documentos publicados antes de que la organización comenzase a firmar sus publicaciones bajo su denominación actual de AQMI. Aunque quizá no sea la forma más exacta de realizar el cálculo, dichas 1.219 citas equivalen a un total de 27.367 palabras, es decir, el 3,37% del total del corpus. Si, además, aunque su estudio no forme parte del presente documento, incorporamos a nuestros cálculos las citas de hadices –7.014 palabras del total del corpus– obtenemos un total de 34.381 palabras. Es decir, un 4,24% del total del discurso de AQMI son estrictamente citas del Corán y la Sunna, las dos principales fuentes de la revelación y pilar fundamental de la religión musulmana.

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5 Véase J.M. Berger y J. Morgan (2015), *The ISIS Twitter Census Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter*, The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, The Brookings Institution; y C. Winter (2015), The Virtual "*Caliphate": Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy*, Quilliam International.

Figura 2. Representación gráfica del discurso puramente religioso respecto del total (en %)

3,37 %   0,87 %

■ Citas coránicas   ■ Hadices (aḥādīth)   ■ Resto del corpus

Ahora bien, el discurso puramente religioso no puede reducirse solamente a las citas coránicas. Aunque en ocasiones se introduzcan citas coránicas para conferir al discurso cierta pátina de religiosidad que permita justificar una acción o posicionamiento en particular, dependiendo del documento, es habitual que las citas coránicas vengan acompañadas de una explicación religiosa contextualizada.

Este ejercicio, a veces exegético, a veces simplemente didáctico o aclaratorio, constituye un pilar fundamental de la comunicación de AQMI. Utilizando el sistema de codificación anteriormente descrito, se han creado mapas de calor como el que sucede a estas líneas para representar de la manera más fidedigna posible el calado del discurso estrictamente religioso del grupo.

Figura 3. Mapa de calor de un documento del corpus creado con el software MAXQDA

Nota: en verde, las citas coránicas; en azul, su contextualización o exégesis en la propaganda de AQMI.
Fuente: elaboración propia.

Los resultados del mapeo de todos los documentos del corpus ofrecen resultados dispares dependiendo del tipo de documento en cuestión, pero permiten constatar que el discurso estrictamente religioso de AQMI representa efectivamente una fracción elevada del total. Los resultados oscilan entre un 2% y un 4% de media en aquellos documentos orientados a proyectar capacidades militares –como por ejemplo buena parte de la serie "الظلال السيوف"– y hasta más del 50% en documentos de carácter doctrinal e ideológico. Reduciéndolo todo puramente

a cifras y porcentajes, AQMI cita el Corán una vez cada 665 palabras, esto es, cada poco más de una página de texto corrido, y, aunque la distribución dista bastante de ser uniforme, cada documento mapeado tiene de media seis citas coránicas.

Las aleyas incompletas de AQMI
Un hecho llama poderosamente la atención tras confrontar exhaustivamente todas las citas invocadas por AQMI en su producción mediática con el Corán.[6] Más de la mitad de las citas coránicas a las que hace referencia AQMI en los documentos

mapeados son citas parciales o incompletas, concretamente el 52,42% del total. Mediante el cotejo sistemático de la muestra de 1.219 citas coránicas recopiladas en el corpus con el Corán se ha constatado que 639 citas son incompletas. Esto no quiere decir que el contenido de estas haya sido manipulado (*taḥrīf*), sino únicamente que la cita, ya fuese de una aleya o de un conjunto, no es completa.

Como puede apreciarse en la Figura 4, que ilustra la distribución de las citas coránicas mapeadas por año, la tendencia de citar aleyas incompletas constituye la norma general, siendo 64,07% el porcentaje de citas incompletas utilizadas más elevado, en 2004, y 35,96% el más bajo, en 2010. Cabe destacar también que sólo en tres años –2007, 2010 y 2016– el porcentaje de citas incompletas es inferior al 50% del total.

Figura 4. Distribución anual de citas coránicas en el discurso de AQMI, 2004-2017

Recitar aleyas o versículos del Corán incompletos es una práctica habitual en el islam. Dado que la prohibición de tal ejercicio no encuentra respaldo ni el Corán ni en la Sunna, el principio básico aceptado por las diferentes escuelas de

jurisprudencia indica que está permitido citar aleyas incompletas siempre que el significado sea completo. Muchas aleyas, especialmente aquellas más largas como 2:282 –la más larga del Corán– comprenden varios significados o ideas completas e

independientes; no es infrecuente, por lo tanto, encontrarse con citas incompletas. De hecho, dicha práctica encuentra respaldo, por ejemplo, en el siguiente hadiz:

"Abdullah ibn Masa'ud relató: el Mensajero de Alá, □, dijo: 'Aquel que recite una letra del Libro de Alá será recompensado y su recompensa será multiplicada por diez. No digo que *Alif-Lām-Mīm*[7] sea una letra, sino que Alif es una letra, *Lām* es una letra y *Mīm* es otra letra'." Hadiz clasificado como *ṣaḥīḥ* o auténtico, *Sunan al-Tirmidhī* 2910.[8]

Asimismo, el debate sobre cuánto y cómo debe citarse el Corán, ya fuese en el marco de la oración o simplemente como argumento de autoridad en el discurso argumentativo encuentra reflejo en la literatura hermenéutica islámica, como se muestra en el siguiente extracto:

"Por lo que respecta a la lectura del Corán más allá de las oraciones preceptivas, según Abu Hanifa, debe comenzar al menos con una aleya, incluso si fuese corta. De la misma opinión es Ibn Abbas, quien dijo: 'recita aquello que puedas del Corán, pues nada en el Corán es insignificante'. De otra parte, Abu Yussuf dijo: 'la recitación no debe ser menor que una aleya larga, como la Aleya del Trono [Corán 02:255], o al menos tres aleyas cortas pues menos que eso sería contrario a la costumbre y no demostraría lo milagroso del Corán'."[9]

El Corán, palabra que podría traducirse como recitación, es un libro complejo y es primordial comprender su naturaleza. No se trata una recopilación cronológica destinada a contar una historia, como podría ser el Génesis, y por lo tanto no debe ser observado como una narrativa secuencial. Sus versículos o aleyas no son estándar ni longitud ni en metro y tanto el principio como el final de cada uno no responde, según la tradición musulmana, a la decisión arbitraria del hombre, sino al dictado de Dios. Así pues, por norma general, cada aleya –o en ocasiones conjunto de estas– trata un tema en particular; dividirlas, puede, por lo tanto, acarrear la modificación del significado completo y limitar o distorsionar el contexto de la revelación literal.

Respondiendo a si está permitido romper una aleya en varias partes, el erudito salafista saudí (nacido en Alepo) Muhammad Salah Al-Munajjid afirmaba que es posible a menos que tal ejercicio condujese a un significado inapropiado, pero estipulaba que resulta preferible completar la cita.[10] El ulema,[11] actualmente en prisión en Arabia Saudí cimentaba su respuesta en el hecho de que las primeras generaciones

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7 Corán 02:01

8 سنن الترمذي، كتاب فضائل القرآن، حديث رقم 2910

9 المحيط البرهاني في فقه النعماني، كتاب الطهارات ـ الصلاة، ص. 298. دار الكتاب العلمية 2004

10 Islam Q&A, رقم السؤال 206946. Disponible en: https://bit.ly/2Tl2YD2

11 Lo correcto sería utilizar ´*Alīm*, pero en castellano el uso de ulema como singular constituye la forma aceptada.

de creyentes observaban como *mustaḥab*[12] recitar una azora completa, sin detenerse, por lo que sería apropiado extender tal práctica también a las aleyas. Fundamentaba su conclusión en el siguiente hadiz:

> "Jabir ibn Abdullah relató: procedimos en compañía del Mensajero de Alá, □, hacia la batalla de Dhat ar-Riqa. Un musulmán había matado a la esposa de idólatra. Él (el marido de la mujer asesinada) juró de la siguiente manera: 'No descansaré hasta que mate a uno de los compañeros de Muhammad'. Y salió siguiendo los pasos del Profeta, □. El Profeta, □, acampado en cierto lugar, dijo: '¿quién se encargará de la guardia?'. Uno de entre los *muhājirūn* y otro de entre los *anṣār* respondieron. El Profeta, □, les dijo: 'posicionaos en la entrada del valle'. Cuando llegaron al lugar, el *anṣārī* comenzó a orar, de pie, mientras que el *muhājir* se tumbó a su lado. El idólatra, al verlos a lo lejos, se percató de que eran el puesto de vigilancia de los musulmanes. Disparó una flecha y dio en el blanco (*al anṣārī* que rezaba de pie). El *anṣārī* extrajo la flecha de su cuerpo y la tiró. El idólatra continuó disparando y la escena se repitió hasta tres veces. El *anṣārī* continuó rezando hasta que su compañero se despertó y se dio cuenta de lo ocurrido. Cuando el idólatra se dio cuenta de que había sido descubierto huyó. Cuando el *muhājir* vio a su compañero sangrando exclamó: '¡*Subḥān Allāh*! ¿Por qué no me has despertado tras el primer disparo?'. A lo que el *anṣārī* respondió: 'estaba ocupado recitando una azora y no quería interrumpir la oración'." Hadiz clasificado como *ḥasan*, Sunan Abu Dawud.[13]

Asimismo, en su obra *Al-Itqān fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'ān*, considerada una herramienta lingüística y estilística fundamental para comprender los significados del Corán, Jalal ad-Din al-Suyuti, profundizando en la correcta pronunciación a la hora de recitar el Corán, referencia la obra de Uthman al-Dani, lingüista y exégeta andalusí. Éste, citaba un hadiz de al-Hakim[14] quien ponía en boca de Zayd ibn Thabit, escriba del Profeta según la tradición y uno de los *anṣār*, las siguientes palabras: "el Corán fue revelado para ser recitado en plenitud".[15]

De sobra conocido es el uso sesgado y tendencioso que del hecho religioso hacen las organizaciones salafistas yihadistas y, si bien no es el objetivo del presente documento profundizar en la exégesis de los textos sagrados, sí pretende abrir una puerta a la construcción de contranarrativas. A diferencia de otros colectivos como imames, telepredicadores, etc., AQMI –al igual que otras organizaciones terroristas– no enfrenta constricción alguna ni en tiempo ni en espacio a la hora de crear su mensaje, sino

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12 Recomendado, favorecido.

13 سنن أبي داود، كتاب الطهارة، حديث 198

14 Abu Abd-Allah Muhammad ibn Abd-Allah al-Hakim al-Nishapuri, ulema persa y respetado compilador de hadices.

15 جلال الدين السيوطي، الإتقان في علوم القرآن، ص. 129.

> *El Corán, palabra que podría traducirse como recitación, es un libro complejo y es primordial comprender su naturaleza.*

que dispone de las herramientas necesarias para diseñar su estrategia comunicativa y el contenido de su mensaje como considere. No comunica en directo y por lo tanto no se expone al escrutinio ni al debate con terceros en tiempo real. Y, sin embargo, aun sin restricciones a la hora de transmitir su mensaje, opta por utilizar citas parciales en más de la mitad de las ocasiones que invoca el Corán.

Sirvan como ejemplo de lo anteriormente descrito las dos aleyas más utilizadas por AQMI: [Corán 02:217] y [Corán 08:36]. Se trata de dos aleyas sobre las que no existe especial controversia y sobre cuyo significado existe consenso mayoritario (*ijmāʿ*) en el seno de la umma. La aleya 217 de la azora de la Vaca es la más utilizada por AQMI, un total de 22 veces según los datos extraídos del corpus, todas de ellas de forma incompleta. La parte subrayada en la traducción que se presenta a continuación no forma parte de ninguna de las 22 citas utilizadas por AQMI en los documentos compilados para el corpus. Además, aun sin profundizar en ello, resulta conveniente mencionar que la aleya 36 de la azora del

Arrepentimiento [Corán 09:36], versículo que en opinión de no pocos *mufassirūn* abroga la aleya que nos ocupa y cuyo contenido limita las posibilidades de combatir a los infieles durante los meses sagrados solo si los musulmanes son atacados primero, solo aparece en tres ocasiones en el discurso de AQMI, ninguna de ellas de manera íntegra.

> [Corán 02:217]: "Cuando te pregunten si está permitido combatir durante los meses sagrados diles: 'Combatir en ese mes es (un pecado) grave, pero apartar del sendero de Alá –y negar su verdad– y de la Mezquita Sagrada y expulsar de ella a la gente es un sacrilegio mayor a los ojos de Alá, así como la *fitna* es más grave que matar'. Sabed que (los incrédulos) no dejarán de combatiros hasta conseguir apartaros de vuestra fe si les es posible. Aquellos de entre vosotros que apostaten de su fe y mueran como infieles verán sus obras malogradas en esta vida y en la Otra y se verán abocados al fuego eterno."[16]

La aleya 39 de la azora del Botín es la segunda aleya más utilizada por AQMI,

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16 [Corán 02:217], traducción del autor.

un total de 21 veces según los datos del corpus, 19 de ellas de forma incompleta. La parte subrayada en la traducción que se presenta a continuación sólo forma parte de las dos citas completas de esta aleya que encuentran respaldo documental en el corpus.

[Corán 08:39]: "Combatidlos hasta que no quede (rastro de) *fitna* y Alá pueda ser adorado en toda su gloria. Y si desisten (de combatiros), Alá ciertamente ve lo que hacen".[17]

Figura 5. Ilustración de los diferentes formatos de las citas incompletas de las dos aleyas más utilizadas por AQMI [Corán 02:217] y [Corán 08:39]

Mediante el cotejo sistemático de las citas coránicas utilizadas por AQMI a lo largo de 14 años puede afirmarse que no incurre en ningún momento en la manipulación del Corán o la alteración de su contenido (*taḥrīf*).

Por el contrario, y aunque en contadas ocasiones, sí se han constatado errores involuntarios, inobservancias –principalmente en la vocalización de algunos términos si nos atenemos a las

17 [Corán 08:39], traducción del autor.

reglas de *tajwīd*–[18] y elipsis menores, errores estos propios del discurso oral.

Sin embargo, tal como se detalla al comienzo de este epígrafe, dicho cotejo sistemático sí permite la cuantificación del número de citas incompletas, indiscutiblemente elevado para una organización cuya actividad, según su propia interpretación, encuentra su razón de ser en la palabra de Dios. Literalidad textual estricta, sí, pero a medida. Esta constatación, unida a las enormes posibilidades que el estudio contextualizado de cada cita coránica y la evolución de su uso en el tiempo plantean, debería suponer un paso importante para seguir profundizando en el análisis del discurso religioso en manos del salafismo yihadista.

Conclusiones

A pesar del creciente interés institucional en el desarrollo de herramientas de contranarrativa y el consiguiente esfuerzo académico en la misma dirección, los resultados cosechados, a la vista de la movilización militante de la que hemos sido testigos en los últimos años, no pueden ser descritos sino como insuficientes. Parte del problema reside en que para la creación de contranarrativas efectivas es necesario conocer en profundidad la narrativa salafista yihadista, y este es un campo en el que, si bien los estudios cualitativos son copiosos, apenas si se han realizado trabajos cuantitativos o de enfoque mixto, sobre todo si nos ceñimos al árabe como principal

lengua vehicular del mensaje salafista yihadista.

La sistematización del análisis del discurso religioso a través del uso de herramientas automatizadas no sólo permite la obtención de datos difícilmente refutables, sino que debería tanto facilitar la creación de estrategias y herramientas de contranarrativa de mayor efectividad como posibilitar la adaptación de aquellas ya existentes. La utilización de técnicas de análisis basadas en datos empíricos permite reflejar fielmente la realidad del discurso, contextualizar los resultados obtenidos y, consecuentemente, un estudio mucho más preciso de la evolución de la narrativa de las diferentes organizaciones en un determinado marco temporal.

El presente análisis, mediante el uso de datos extraídos de un corpus monolingüe y diacrónico representativo del discurso de AQMI –lo que asegura la consistencia resultados obtenidos–, permite, por un lado, desterrar por completo la idea de que la organización manipula o altera el contenido del Corán. Simple y llanamente, no es así; podremos convenir en que las interpretaciones extremadamente rigoristas a las que se acogen son sesgadas, torticeras, descontextualizadas o que no gozan de aceptación entre el común de los musulmanes, pero en ningún caso violan los límites exegéticos aceptados históricamente por el grueso del islam sunní. Por decirlo de alguna manera, juegan al

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18 Reglas por las que se rige la recitación del Corán o *tilāwa*.

límite del reglamento, pero dentro de éste. Huelga decir que las conclusiones extraídas no son necesariamente extrapolables a otras organizaciones yihadistas, aunque posibilitan futuros estudios comparativos.

Por otro lado, y lo que sin duda constituye la conclusión más importante del presente documento, se ha constatado que más de la mitad de las citas coránicas utilizadas por AQMI en su producción propagandística durante el período de estudio son incompletas. Ya se ha señalado que son bien conocidas la lectura y el uso sesgado que las organizaciones yihadistas hacen del hecho religioso, favoreciendo ciertos pasajes respecto del resto, distorsionando así la integridad del mensaje revelado. Ahora bien, más allá de la sobrerrepresentación de unas aleyas frente a otras o el amparo

en la exégesis más beligerante, un aspecto destaca tras analizar cuantitativamente cómo AQMI cita el Corán y cotejar los resultados con la fuente original. La organización terrorista cita el Corán de forma rigurosa, pero incompleta, truncando más de la mitad de las citas coránicas que utiliza, obviamente, según le conviene. Literalidad sí, pero a medida.

El futuro análisis contextualizado de la invocación de dichas citas incompletas, así como el estudio de la evolución de su uso en el tiempo, servirá sin duda para seguir profundizando no sólo en el conocimiento del discurso religioso del salafismo yihadista, sino también para seguir avanzando en la creación de nuevas estrategias de contranarrativa y en el refinamiento de las existentes.

Jihadists who left Spain for Syria as foreign terrorist fighters but have returned

Fernando Reinares

Around one fifth of the 230 to 235 jihadists who between 2012 and 2018 travelled from Spain to Syria and Iraq as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) have already returned. There are currently 40 to 50 of these returnees. Most of them travelled initially with the purpose of joining the ranks of Islamic State –also known as ISIL or ISIS– or, to a lesser extent, organisations related to al-Qaeda. But some travelled in order to settle within territories where these jihadist organisations had either managed to temporarily impose their control or at least to establish a notable and influential presence.

However, not all returnees received training in the use of weapons and explosives or engaged in acts of violence and terrorism while they were in Syria and Iraq. That is the case, for example, of several among the approximately 30 women who were part of the FTF contingent who left Spain for these two Middle-Eastern countries –around 13% of the total– but have returned. There are, for instance, women who came back, even as widows and with young children, after leaving Spain for reasons having to do more with their marital status or their early age than with a militant commitment.

However, among the Jihadist FTFs from Spain, there are men like Abdeluahid Sadik Mohamed who did not prove capable of dealing psychologically with the situation in which they found themselves immersed and returned. But there are also those who, like Ahmed Samsam, returned only to go back again onto the battlefield; and those who, like Benaissa Laghmouchi Baghdadi, returned to help send more FTFs recruited in Spain; or even those who, like Abdeljail Ait El Kaid, returned with the purpose of participating in the preparation and execution of attacks, including attacks on Spanish soil.

> *Criminalisation is the first response in Spain to the phenomenon of returnees, given that they have committed crimes as defined by the national Criminal Code.*

Some 20 of these returnees are now in prison, but only half of them are held in Spanish penitentiaries, where six were already serving sentences by the end of 2018, including all four of those mentioned above. The rest are imprisoned in Morocco, which is unsurprising because a majority of FTFs from Spain were Moroccan nationals. Moreover, only a few returnees imprisoned in Spain were arrested within the country. Most were apprehended in Turkey –the usual transit country for jihadists entering or exiting Syria–, but a few in Belgium, Bulgaria or Poland and then handed over to the Spanish authorities thanks to international arrest warrants.

Criminalisation is the first response in Spain to the phenomenon of returnees, given that they have committed crimes as defined by the national Criminal Code. Crimes such as, for instance, travelling to a foreign territory controlled by a terrorist organisation and settling in a foreign territory to receive training or to collaborate with a terrorist organisation. Yet enforcement of the law can be modulated according to the characteristics of returnees and the

circumstances under which they originally departed, as in the case of women who returned to Spain with children in need of very special attention.

Furthermore, the incrimination of returnees, usually involving incarceration, does not exclude rehabilitation. Since 2016, an intervention programme has been underway in Spanish prisons with the purpose of distancing radicalised prisoners from extremism and bringing them closer to democratic values so that, once freed, they pose no danger to society. These radicalised inmates include returning FTFs who nevertheless remain adhered to the attitudes and beliefs of Salafi Jihadism. The problem is that more than half of the returnees who initially travelled from Spain to Syria and Iraq are not in prison.

Indeed, some 20 to 30 of these returnees remain at large. This typically occurs when, even though security forces or intelligence services are aware of the trajectory of such individuals, investigation into their activity fails to produce sufficient incriminating evidence. Such a situation implies a potential

danger because returnees who maintain their jihadist ideas are likely to pose a terrorist threat in the short or medium term. It is known that the participation of foreign-fighter returnees tends to make the planning and preparation of attacks within western societies more effective and lethal.

Terrorists of these characteristics were among those making up the Jihadist network behind the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings. In any case, only around 10 of the returnees still at large are thought to be within Spain's national territory. Some 10 to 20 more are now located outside Spain, mainly –though not exclusively– in Morocco. This suggests the extent to which the Spanish authorities can manage the problem of returned FTFs taking into account the phenomenon's international

dimension, highlighting the importance of counterterrorism cooperation with other countries, in this case especially with Morocco.

Concerning its domestic dimension, the basic challenge is applying the law in an individualised and appropriate manner to foreign-fighter returnees whose offences can be proved. This must be done while, on the one hand, developing initiatives aimed at facilitating the de-radicalisation and social integration of returned FTFs who are imprisoned in Spain, and, on the other, continuing to track returnees who remain at large in the country but for whose criminal offences there is as yet insufficient evidence, and improving the state's ability to detect potential FTFs before they leave or, indeed, disrupt them in transit.

Spain's influence in the European Parliament: an historical survey and predictions for the new political cycle

Ilke Toygür & Carlos Carnicero Urabayen

The European parliamentary elections in May 2019 represent a major opportunity for Spain to increase its influence in the EU.

Summary

The EU's *modus operandi* over the last decade has seen it going through a series of existential crises. Given the threat represented by Brexit to the future of integration, the role of predominantly pro-European countries is even more important for moving the project forward. The European Parliament, as the only institution whose members are directly elected, provides a stage on which Spain can try to increase its influence in the decision-making process. This analysis reviews the role of the country in the European Parliament since it joined the Union on 1 January 1986 up to the present day and compares the positions of its political parties and their members with large EU countries. It concludes with some predictions for the May 2019 elections and sets out a roadmap for increasing Spain's influence. Finally, it should be noted that this paper is part of a wider project by the Elcano Royal Institute focusing on Spain's presence in the EU and by the working group set up by its office in Brussels to analyse how to improve the country's influence in the in the 2019-24 cycle.[1] This is the fifth paper in a

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1 The working group comprises Spanish players with a permanent or habitual presence in Brussels, including MEPs, Spanish civil servants at European institutions, business managers, members of other civil society entities, press correspondents and representatives of the Spanish government and administration, particularly staff at Spain's Permanent Representation at the EU (REPER). The identity of members is confidential in order to encourage a greater atmosphere of trust and understanding.

The European Parliament, as the only institution whose members are directly elected by European citizens, is an essential source of legitimacy for the Union.

series of publications based on the group's presentations and debates.[2]

Analysis
Introduction
Since the first European elections held in 1979, the European Parliament has been consolidating its essential role in the EU's decision-making process. Its powers increased significantly with the Lisbon Treaty. It now shares legislative powers with the Council of the EU, fulfils other major functions and is important player in the EU's power map. Moreover, as the only institution whose members are directly elected by European citizens, it is an essential source of legitimacy for the Union.

European elections have traditionally been viewed as secondary by many voters and turnouts have been lower than in national elections. Electorates often punish their national governments in European elections and there is more tactical voting for small parties.[3] In the elections scheduled for 23-26 May, a higher turnout is expected after years of politicisation and crisis on the continent. The repeated shocks that the EU has endured in the last decade (crises involving economics, migration and cohesion – the prime example being Brexit) will be evident in greater public interest during the campaign, the ballot and the new parliament. In Spain these elections come at a time when the country wishes and is striving to improve its influence in the EU. Clearly, the

2 The currently available publications are: (1) L. Simón, I. Molina, E. Lledó & N. Martín (2019), 'Hacia un ecosistema de influencia española en Bruselas', ARI nr 30/2019, Elcano Royal Institute, 11/III/2019, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari30-2019-simon-molina-lledo-martin-hacia-un-ecosistema-de-influencia-espanola-en-bruselas; (2) E. Lledó & M. Otero Iglesias (2019), 'Los intereses españoles en la agenda digital y la política industrial de la UE', ARI nr 39/2019, Elcano Royal Institute, 5/IV/2019, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari39-2019-lledo-oteroiglesias-intereses-espanoles-en-agenda-digital-y-politica-industrial-ue; (3) I. Molina & N. Martín (2019), 'La crisis catalana y la influencia de España en Bruselas', ARI nº 42/2019, Elcano Royal Institute, 25/IV/2019, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari42-2019-molina-martin-la-crisis-catalana-y-la-influencia-de-espana-en-bruselas; and (4) F. Steinberg (2019), 'La influencia de España en la política económica de la UE', ARI nr 43/2019, Elcano Royal Institute, 29/IV/2019, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/ari43-2019-steinberg-influencia-de-espana-en-politica-economica-de-ue.

3 For an analysis of the 2014 elections see 'European Parliament elections of May 2014: driven by national politics or EU policy making?', https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/viewFile/464/464.

internal situation will play a very important role in the form such ambition takes, but it is an opportunity that must undoubtedly be seized.

A European scenario characterised by Brexit on the one hand and the eurosceptic Italian government on the other could enable Spain to present itself as an indispensable partner to the Franco-German axis in advancing towards integration. The Spanish presence in the European Parliament will be a key element in taking advantage of this favourable context for a Spanish push in Europe. The question of how Spanish MEPs are chosen, which committees they sit on and which posts they occupy in the European Parliament is thus of the utmost importance.

It should not however be forgotten that MEPs owe their allegiance to different political groups within the European Parliament. They have two loyalties: one is to the voters in the country that elected them and the other is to the European political family to which they belong. On many issues they act in a coordinated fashion within the political group and not in accordance with national criteria. However, in cases where something important is at stake for the interests of Spain, they act along national lines, as has been seen in recent years in relation to the crisis in Catalonia and the coordinated response of Spanish MEPs from the main parties.

Bearing all this in mind, the main task of the Spanish political parties is to play a significant role within their political groups. It is thus very important to have MEPs who are well prepared and knowledgeable about European affairs, with clear ideas and ideals about the future of Europe. For these reasons, the selection of appropriate candidates by the parties (likewise their choice of relevant committees and well-prepared advisors), the campaign for the European election and the subsequent work undertaken by the representatives present an opportunity to improve Spain's influence in the EU.

This analysis reviews the role Spain has played in the European Parliament since it joined the EU and compares the important posts that its representatives have held with those of similar countries. Next, the profile of Spanish political parties in the European Parliament over recent decades is reviewed and some predictions are made for the elections in May 2019. It concludes with suggestions for enhancing Spanish influence in the EU.

Spain in the European Parliament: an historical survey

Spain's entry to the EU in 1986 and the arrival of its first directly-elected MEPs in 1987 coincided with a period when the European Parliament was extending its powers. The first direct elections had taken place just seven years earlier (until 1979, members of the European Parliament were drawn from national assemblies). Secondly, the Single European Act (1986) awarded new powers to the institution, establishing the procedure of legislative cooperation

Over the last three decades Spanish MEPs have played an important role in the European Parliament, although before reviewing the leadership positions they have occupied it is worth pointing out that Spain has been underrepresented in this institution.

in a large number of areas and giving the European Parliament the power of veto over accession and association treaties.

In 1986 the number of seats in the European Parliament rose from 434 to 518 with the arrival of 60 Spanish and 24 Portuguese MEPs, initially appointed from among their national MPs and subsequently, in 1987, elected in the first European elections in these two countries. Over the last three decades Spanish MEPs have played an important role in the European Parliament, although before reviewing the leadership positions they have occupied it is worth pointing out that Spain has been underrepresented in this institution.

As Carlos Carnero, Victoriano Ramírez González and Ignacio Molina have explained,[4] Spain elected 64 MEPs in the 1999 election, but the following year, when the Nice Treaty was being drawn up, prime minister José María Aznar chose to sacrifice seats in exchange for greater influence in the Council of the EU (an ill-judged gambit given that the Council's voting system changed shortly thereafter and the number of Spanish MEPs has never been restored).

Spain currently has 54 representatives, fewer than it should have in relation to its 46 million inhabitants. The 82 million inhabitants of Germany elect 96 representatives while 66 million French nationals return 74. The seat/population ratio works out worse for Spain, above all when compared to Germany, the most populous country in the EU. With Brexit and the departure of the British MEPs, Spain's underrepresentation was corrected to some extent when it was allotted an additional five representatives (taking it from 54 to 59 MEPs). The problem is that with Brexit having stalled, the most likely scenario involves retaining the current distribution of seats and Spain remaining underrepresented with 54 MEPs.

In any event, its political parties can play an important role in their respective groups.

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4 'El número de eurodiputados españoles, entre la Política y las matemáticas', http://agendapublica.elpais.com/numero-eurodiputados-espanoles-la-politica-las-matematicas/.

> *The power of the president has grown as the institution itself has acquired more areas of responsibility.*

In the wake of the results of the national election held on 28 April, an attempt may be made to estimate the breakdown of MEPs and thereby maximise influence in the European Parliament. Before turning to this, it is worth comparing Spain to other countries of similar size in terms of the European Parliament's key posts. This exercise will help to shed light on how Spain should position itself in the next legislative term.

Comparison of country profiles: what position does Spain occupy?[5]
A comparative look at the role played by Spanish representatives in relation to their German, French, Italian and British counterparts[6] places them in mid-ranking position, notable in certain key roles and playing a more low-profile part in others. The presidency is obviously the most influential job and most symbolic in the European Parliament. The power of the president has grown as the institution itself has acquired

more areas of responsibility. Particularly notable are the role of the president in arranging the debates in the chamber, presiding over the key decision-making body (the Conference of Presidents) and representing the European Parliament, especially at European Council meetings, where the president addresses the participants at the start of each meeting.

As Figure 1 shows, over the last three decades Spanish representatives have presided over the European Parliament on three occasions: the socialist Enrique Barón from 1989 to 1992; José María Gil Robles, of the People's Party, from 1997 to 1999; and the socialist Josep Borrell from 2004 to 2007. Spaniards have only been outnumbered in this post by Germans (who have presided over the institution on five occasions). Representatives from France, Italy and the UK have held the presidency on one occasion.

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5 For the present purposes a series of key posts at the European Parliament have been chosen (the president of the institution, the vice-presidents, the chairs of the committees, subcommittees, temporary committees, committees of joint delegations, delegations and parliamentary assemblies) to measure the influence of the Spanish representatives. The authors would like to thank the Office of the European Parliament in Madrid for its help in compiling these data.

6 German, French, Italian and British MEPs were used for the purposes of comparison because these, together with Spain, represent the five largest countries in the EU. The data only encompass the period starting in 1986, when Spain joined the EU. All the figures are drawn from this period.

Figure 1. Distribution of key posts in the European Parliament

	Spain	Germany	France	UK	Italy
Presidents	3	5	1	1	1
Vice-presidents	28	27	25	19	27
Committee Chairs	32	51	39	40	50
Subcommittee Chairs	1	10	7	1	1
Temporary Committees	3	5	4	2	2
Committee Chairs of Joint Delegations	5	14	9	15	16
Delegation Chairs	49	88	49	67	66
Parliamentary Assembly Chairs	4	4	-	6	4
Total	125	204	134	151	167

Note: for purposes of comparison all the posts for all the countries are counted starting from 1986, the year in which Spain jointed the EU.

Source: database provided by the Directorate General of the Presidency of the European Parliament.

In terms of the vice-presidents of the European Parliament, Spain is ranked first. Its representatives have held this post on 28 occasions, compared to 27 German, 25 French, 19 British and 27 Italian vice-presidents. By contrast, if one looks at the chairs of committees – another key role, given that chairs wield considerable influence over the agenda and the procedures surrounding the issuing of reports – Spaniards are ranked last (holding 32 chairs, compared with 51 German, 39 French, 40 British and 50 Italian chairs).

Turning to other, less influential posts, such as the chairs of subcommittees, temporary committees, joint delegations, delegations and parliamentary assemblies, Spanish representatives occupy a low to mid-ranking position compared to their counterparts.

In terms of the presidencies of the political groups – another fundamental role in the European Parliament's power games, given that they operate as spokespeople in the key debates and take part in the Conference of Presidents, the main internal political body – the only Spaniard to have held this

post is the socialist Enrique Barón, from 1999 to 2004. It is a post that Spaniards should undoubtedly run for more frequently. In the legislative term now ending, German representatives, once again at the forefront, have led four of the eight political blocs: EPP, S&D, GUE/NGL and the Greens (co-chair). As far as the role of Spanish parties in the next legislative term is concerned, one of the chief ambitions ought to be to secure the leadership of one of these blocs.

Spanish political parties in the European Parliament

Of all the European institutions it is undoubtedly the Parliament where Spain can play a more important role. Thanks to the size of its population and the possibility of Brexit,[7] it could have the fourth-largest national delegation in the forthcoming legislative term (or fifth-largest in the event that the UK decides to remain longer in the institution, although its cohort will in any event be weaker owing to the situation of political limbo).

As is well known, the seats are allotted proportionately in accordance with population size. Spain is fifth on the list, which is headed by Germany with 96 seats, followed by France, with 74, and the UK and Italy, both with 73. Spanish MEPs –the majority belonging to pro-European parties– are well placed to play an important and constructive role in the new political cycle.

It is important to emphasise that Spain has been a pro-European country since its return to democracy in the 1970s. Accession to the EU was fundamental in the process of consolidating democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. There has been a cross-party consensus on the attitude towards the EU stretching back decades. Up until now, and enduring such upheavals as economic crises, Brexit and the inflows of immigrants that have created a profound identity debate within Europe, the consensus Spanish response has consistently been 'more integration'. The fact that a far-right party has entered the Spanish Congress for the first time, with VOX winning 24 seats in the general election held on 28 April, suggests that it will secure representation in the European Parliament, thereby challenging this cross-party, pro-European consensus. For the first time, Spanish MEPs may belong to the same group as the French National Rally and the Italian Northern League, although this will only apply to a limited number of the Spanish intake.

Historically, Spanish MEPs have formed part of the European Parliament in the last seven legislative terms, starting with that of 1984-1989. The first direct election to the European Parliament in Spain was that of 1987 –when an individual election was held together with Portugal, after Spain joined the year before– and since then it has taken part in the rest of the elections alongside the other member states.

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7 The UK has announced that it is going to hold elections to the European Parliament and therefore Spain will once again have 54 seats. In the event of the UK's departure, Spain will send five more MEPs (in accordance with the results of the election on 26 May 2019).

As can be seen in Figure 2, during these seven legislative terms the majority of Spanish seats have had an allegiance to the European People's Party (EPP) or the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). Given that an imperfect two-party regime has predominated over recent decades, the vast majority of MEPs have been drawn from the People's Party (PP) or the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE).

Figure 2. Spanish seats classified by political groups in the European Parliament, 1984-2019

Group	Abbreviation	84-89	89-94	94-99	99-04	04-09	09-14	14-19
European People's Party	EPP	18	17	29	28	24	25	17
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats	S&D	29	27	21	24	24	23	14
European United Left/Nordic Green Left	GUE/NGL	1	3	9	4	1	1	10
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	ALDE	2	7	2	2	2	2	8
The Greens/ European Free Alliance	Greens/EFA	–	1	3	5	3	2	5
Communists and allies	COM	3	–	–	–	–	–	–
Not registered	NR	7	5	–	1	–	1	–
Total		60	60	64	64	54	54	54

Note: the groups have changed names over time and are classified here along political lines, distributing the seats accordingly.

Source: authors' compilation from European Parliament data.

The 2008 economic and financial crisis brought changes to the political parties in Spain. With the advent of Podemos and Ciudadanos, Spanish MEPs have also diversified. This accounts for the fact that Figure 2 shows a current national profile that differs from previous legislative terms. Whereas the number of MEPs affiliated to the EPP and S&D have fallen, members of GUE/NGL (likewise the Greens/EFA) and ALDE have risen –precisely because of the success of Podemos and Ciudadanos. The

> *For the first time in the history of the elections the two central blocs will not command a majority in the European Parliament.*

election in May will act as a barometer for measuring the extent to which the multi-party system and the current positions of the parties in the European Parliament has been consolidated.

Predictions for the new political cycle: 2019-2024

For the second time in the history of its direct elections the European Parliament has published detailed opinion polls[8] with forecasts of results. The report is based on polls carried out in all the member states, including Spain. According to the new report, published on 18 April, and in line with what has happened in national elections in recent years, an increase in parliamentary fragmentation can be expected, with falls in support for the centre-right and centre-left.

In the new parliament the groups will need to redouble their efforts to secure a majority. The socialist-Christian democrat consensus of recent decades will no longer be decisive when it comes to shaping the European Parliament. For the first time in the history of the elections the two central blocs will not command a majority in the European Parliament. Moreover, the VoteWatch Europe organisation[9] estimates that 55%-60% of MEPs will be new. Put another way, more than half of MEPs will require time to adapt to the institution and a significant part of the collective institutional experience will be lost in this parliament.

Turning to Spain in particular, as Figure 3 shows, the predictions suggest that PSOE will be the largest political party, with 18 seats, followed by PP, with 13. The third largest group will be the coalition of Podemos and Izquierda Unida (United Left), which is running in the election as the Unidas Podemos coalition (UP). Ciudadanos and VOX will follow hard on their heels but, given the time that still remains before the election, this order could change. Lastly, the Ahora Repúblicas (Republics Now) coalition is forecast to win two seats.

8 For the most recent report see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2019/political-landscape-developments/en-ee19-national-report-18-april-2019.pdf.

9 'EU elections countdown: state of candidates, manifestos, projections', https://www.votewatch.eu/blog/eu-elections-countdown-state-of-candidates-manifestos-projections/.

Figure 3. Predictions for the new legislative term, 2019-2024

National party	Abbreviation	Group in the European Parliament	Number of MEPs (prediction for May 2019)
PSOE	PSOE	S&D	18
PP	PP	EPP	13
Unidas Podemos Coalition	UP coalition	GUE/NGL & Greens/EFA	8
Ciudadanos	Cs	ALDE	7
VOX	VOX	–	6
Ahora Repúblicas Coalition	Ahora Repúblicas coalition	Greens/EFA	2

Source: Report of the European Parliament, April 2019.

If all the member states are taken together, according to the European Parliament report PSOE could become the largest component (or the second-largest, in competition with the British Labour Party) in the S&D group in the European Parliament. Similarly, Spain could have the greatest number of MEPs in the federal European United Left/ Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group with its representatives from the Unidas Podemos coalition.

Ciudadanos will be among the three largest parties that make up the Alliance of Democrats and Liberals for Europe (ALDE). PP will be able to claim a place as one of the three main political forces in the European People's Party, vying for this role with Fidesz of Hungary and the Republicans of France. Bearing this in mind, Spanish political

parties stand a good chance of playing more important roles in their future political groupings. This could represent a major opportunity for enhancing Spain's impact on the European Parliament and, by extension, joining forces to ensure a greater degree of influence for Spain in Europe.

The day after 26 May: what does Spain need?

If Spain is to secure greater room for manoeuvre it needs an EU strategy that takes advantage of its strengths and minimises its weaknesses. Such a strategy, which needs to be state-driven rather than party-driven, does not currently exist. A joint strategy has never been hammered out between all the political parties, although it is true that they are capable of close cooperation when some 'flare-up' breaks out

The lack of an internal debate about the future of integration and the role of Spain in the project restricts the likelihood of having an impact.

threatening Spanish interests. Elaborating a strategy would help the country increase its impact in Brussels and the other centres of EU power.

It is worth pondering which areas a grand agreement should cover. Clearly the creation of a strategy, including foreign policy, requires a consensus between political parties. This links to the internal situation in the country. It is important to emphasise that national stability will also determine the role that Spain can play at a European level. If it continues to be hostage to the separatist tensions in Catalonia, its efforts on the European political stage will be affected. It should not be forgotten that just as the separatist movement strives to internationalise the Catalan *procés*, Spain exerts energy in rebutting it; energy that could very well be expended on other issues. Settling this crisis would therefore pave the way to greater Spanish influence abroad.

The parties should study which areas need to be prioritised to determine their European strategy. As far as foreign

policy is concerned, is it the fight against climate change, renewable energy policy or controlling borders? It will be very important to set out the areas where Spain enjoys comparative advantages. The lack of an internal debate about the future of integration and the role of Spain in the project –European politics as an issue was completely absent from the parties' campaigns in the general election– restricts the likelihood of having an impact. Without a major debate about Spain's influence abroad, setting out clear and feasible aspirations, it will not be possible to have an effective strategy capable of being put into practice.

Another possible approach would be to create synergy between the countries of southern Europe. There are examples of influence exerted by regional groups of countries, such as the Visegrád Group and the New Hanseatic League. These groups defend their positions on key issues and try to exert the greatest influence possible by taking advantage of their geographical position. Spain could start to construct its regional role, turning first towards Portugal.

The creation of an Iberian strategy could be beneficial for both countries.

Lastly it is important to underline that Spanish MEPs will need to secure key posts in the European Parliament, starting with the group presidencies and followed by the *rapporteur* posts on major issues, thereby strengthening their influence in parliament. This is why it will be necessary to lay the groundwork and make preparations before and after the election, choosing the battles between the political parties and preparing to fight within the political groups. Spain should not miss the boat when it comes to securing greater influence.

Conclusions

This analysis summarises the situation of Spain in the European Parliament over recent decades. It refers not only to the key posts that Spaniards have occupied but also the role of its political parties. An overview of the past may serve as the basis for strategy in the forthcoming parliament. There are three key suggestions for the future:

(1) The European election campaign will need to ensure that the Spanish parties set out their European aspirations and that the candidates explain the role that the European Parliament plays and how this institution can provide leverage leading to greater influence abroad. In the absence of this it is impossible for the electorate to appreciate the importance of their votes.

(2) There will need to be a period of reflection among the parties after the European election to design a joint strategy aimed at enhancing Spain's influence. We all know the oft-repeated refrain: the country punches below its weight, but very rarely does it engage in dialogue and joint endeavour in a strategic and concerted manner to meet this challenge.

(3) Of utmost importance for the first two suggestions, it will be necessary to overcome fragmentation and tap into the relative strength of PSOE, UP, PP and Cs in their respective political groups in the European Parliament. Despite the highly polarised nature of national politics at this juncture, the parties will need to try to overcome this abroad. By agreeing a joint national strategy, each party will be able to play an important role in shaping committees, reports and certain key posts.

EU-Japan EPA and SPA: more than a partnership, a necessary turning point for both

Ana María Goy Yamamoto

With just few weeks for the opening of the G20 summit in Osaka on 28-29 June, the stakes that the world economy faces are higher than ever. The current US-China trade turmoil is precisely what Japan and the EU are trying to avoid.

Since the 2008 financial crisis we have witnessed almost a decade of uninterrupted global economic growth with moderate inflation. However, with a downgraded 2.9% growth projection in 2019 by the World Bank we may be approaching the end of the cycle, whose effects might be aggravated if the biggest economies resort to protectionist measures.

This decade has seen many discussions about ways to achieve sustainable economic growth, fulfil the UN millennium goals and implement environmental commitments, first of the Kyoto Protocol and now of the Paris Agreement. It is in this framework that a new partnership has been established

to respond to these challenges and send a clear message in defence of the liberal international economic order. In this light, the EU and Japan are actually walking together in the same direction. They share concerns that have arisen about the global economy since the 1990s: the post-Cold War order, the Financial Big Bang, the emergence of China and the ambivalent dynamics of the emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs).

It was precisely a day before the G20 meeting in Hamburg in 2017, where Japan was chosen to host the 2019 summit, when Shinzo Abe, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker jointly announced that Japan and the EU had reached a broad consensus over an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). It should not have come as a surprise given Abe's intensive efforts to counterbalance the moves of his main foreign political ally, Donald Trump, who has however held completely opposite policy views regarding trade. Abe is adept

The new initiative in the Pacific area was in fact given a push by the upcoming creation of the largest free trade area, as the EU-Japan EPA was due to enter into force.

at signalling his position regarding free trade and the preservation of the liberal economic order is part of his trademark economic policy, the so-called Abenomics. Only a day before Trump's inauguration, the Japanese Diet ratified the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), even though it was assumed that it would not come into effect once Trump took office and fulfilled his campaign promise of withdrawing the US from its commitment. Japan has since taken the lead to convert the failed TPP into the new Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) that tries to lure in the post-Brexit UK, South Korea and Taiwan, among others, including –paradoxically– the US.

It is interesting to see a sort of circular chain reaction in the various steps taken to ensure that a liberal ruled-based order continues to govern world trade. The new initiative in the Pacific area was in fact given a push by the upcoming creation of the largest free trade area, as the EU-Japan EPA was due to enter into force (1 February 2019). And the latter

was precisely propelled by factors including the apparently impending conclusion of the TPP, which pushed the EU to negotiations with Japan after a rather successful EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (in effect since 2011 and fully implemented from 2015), the dissipation of the TPP that jeopardised Japan's economic future, the Brexit vote that put at risk Japanese companies' leverage in Europe and the Australia-Japan Free Trade Agreement, which took more than seven years of negotiations to see the light in 2014 but had a key role in managing the difficult Japanese agricultural, pharmaceutical and auto industry lobbies, decisive sectors also in the EU negotiations.

The key to a successful and unusually fast conclusion to both economic and strategic partnership was, on the one hand, the similarity of the two mature markets with comparable protection structures and, on the other, the transparency of the negotiations in the trade agreement, not so much in the strategic partnership that relied on much more sensitive information.

Figure 1. Market sizes of current largest free-trade areas

EU-Japan EPA [in effect from 1/II/2019]		TPP-11 (CPTPP) [in effect from 30/XII/2018]
640	Market in million people	499
27.8	World trade share (%)	14.4
35.8	World GDP share (%)	13.3
EU Real GDP Increase (+0.10~0.76%) + 162,000 jobs	Expected gain	US$147 billion
Japan Real GDP Increase (+0.26~1%) + 260,000 jobs		

Source: data from the EU Commission, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, World Economic Forum and Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Though early to have data, with Japan being the 5th largest partner for the EU in both imports and exports, it is expected that EPA will provide a boost of €13 billion to European exports, which would reach 5% of Japan's market share, up from the current 3%. The EU would increase its imports from Japan by €23 billion by 2035, the year of full implementation of the agreement, according to the EU DG Trade estimates. The EU will essentially scrap 99% of the tariff lines and liberalise 100% of imports in seven to 10 years while Japan will do the same for 97% of tariff lines and 99% of imports in 15 years. Some products, such as alcoholic beverages, textiles, chemicals, cosmetics or jewellery, have been fully liberalised since day one of the implementation of the agreement but most of the sensitive products, such as wood, leather, footwear and agricultural products in the case of Japan and vehicles and auto parts in the EU's, remain to be freed from barriers by stages. Even import items not fully liberalised on the Japanese side have been granted concessions in tariff quotas. Some items have never been a subject of the negotiations, including rice, seaweed and whale meat. According to the research presented by Felbermayr e.a., 86% of the gains in mutual trade are owing to the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTB), and half of that in the services sector alone. Only the remaining 14% result from the elimination of tariffs proper. For example, regarding sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures, both sides have simplified approval and clearance procedures. In the EU this specially helps the value-added agri-food sector while in Japan the manufacturing and services sectors benefit. The adoption by Japan of around 200 European Protected Geographical Indications has been a major step forward.

In their final version, both the EPA and SPA deals address other key concerns too. In the first place, they include a clause safeguarding the compliance with the Paris Agreement on Climate, creating a precedent that aspires to set a standard for future trade agreements. Secondly, they attach great importance to data protection. It has been a major step for Japan to accept and model part of its procedures on the already comprehensive General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which commits Japanese companies to comply with European standards even when operating in third countries with information originating from European customers/clients/providers. In fact, the matter of safe data flows is considered the Data Movement Agreement or a third major agreement in its own right. Abe has taken the lead on world-wide data governance by putting on the agenda of the G20 summit in Osaka the commitment to work towards a regime built on Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) principle aiming at what he calls the Society 5.0.

Thirdly, these agreements have been presented as a pillar of the Abenomics' so-called third arrow of structural reform. The effect of their adoption could be called a positive upheaval where the exposure to liberalised trade is used as an opportunity to revamp primary and secondary sectors as well as to modernise the tertiary one by adapting to the new challenges. Akeda noted the difference between the Japanese approach at the negotiating table, more business-oriented and flexible compared with the more people-oriented and normative

European style. Japan clearly pursues the improvement of economic efficiency through FTAs and one aspect that took longer in the negotiations were the European prescriptions such as those on adopting more international industrial standards (ISO). Currently, of the 10,773 Japan Industrial Standards (JIS), 6,062 correspond to international standards, with only 38% fully identical to ISO ones. This lack of international standardisation has been one of the NTBs that protected Japanese Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) that cater to a captive domestic market without the need to internationalise. In fact, SME productivity has been long under scrutiny. To force them to open up to the global market and embrace opportunities brought by the digital economy is part of the strategy of the third arrow.

The fourth important point of the agreements is EPA's 20th chapter, devoted to the role of SMEs in global trade. Up to 88% of EU exporters to Japan are SMEs, which account for approximately 30% of trade volume. SMEs are predominantly responsible for agriculture, textile, apparel and leather products in the goods trade, and for information, communication, real-estate activities, construction, wholesale and retail in the services trade. Energy, auto, computer and electronics manufacturing as well as financial and insurance services rely on bigger corporations. The chapter tries to promote transparency of information, equal opportunities and specialised help to SMEs and their consortiums when, for example, bidding for public procurement, one of the Japanese markets that Europeans have

newly gained entrance to. SMEs will see their position improved due to the reduction of NTBs and the decrease of the proportion of fixed costs of accessing the Japanese market.

Some issues have not yet been fully agreed upon, like the arbitration court and procedures in case of foreign direct investment. However, on balance, as already stated by a very comprehensive LSE study on the impact by sector of the EU-Japan EPA, 'this new trade area would create a "smart, sustainable and inclusive growth", jobs and welfare, with no negative impact on environmental indicators, and positive effects for the EU social indicators'.

This benevolent conclusion might take more to implement than just the free movement of goods and services. Part of the less known SPA leaves an ambiguous set of goals to cover, where the intentions have been signed but the mechanisms are yet to be designed. It has been stablished to promote policies in the areas of gender

equality, consumer protection and safety and responsible consumption, but it would have been more encouraging if quantifiable goals and measures on these issues were mentioned. A challenge for two mature societies such as the sustainability of the welfare system need companion policies to a free trade agreement to ensure its accomplishment. There is a commitment to a coordinated emergency response as well as establishing prevention systems in the event of natural disasters, or the cooperation and mutual exchange in higher education and technology that could lead to shared research and outcomes. The common fight against cyberterrorism and the protection of intellectual property are some of the most discussed areas during the round tables. Common efforts in the designing of smart solutions for the future of mobility and urban living, or providing ideas on how to involve the local and regional economies in this new scenario will prove that the agreements that have been signed are just more than a simple partnership but a coalition for a future and stable set of rules.

Policy pathways for Spain's energy transition

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It is important to describe current and future Spanish energy policy decisions in order to assess a set of policy pathways for Spain's energy transition.

Summary

This paper describes and quantifies three different energy policy pathways for Spain's energy transition: government-centred, represented by the socialist party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE); market-centred, represented by the conservative party (Partido Popular, PP); and grassroots, represented by Unidas Podemos.

Analysis

A recent MUSTEC, H2020 report[1] describes the *Policy pathways for the energy transition in Europe and selected European countries.* It analyses current and potential future policy decisions in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland and the European Commission, bundling them into sets of policy pathways that describe the energy transition trajectories of countries and the EU as a whole. Each pathway is centred around a certain logic: a worldview, or belief, about the type of policies that are (to its proponents) acceptable and beneficial, leading to a distinct type of electricity (and energy) future.

The paper takes the future as given. Current, past or future policy decisions may or may not be cost-optimal, or even useful, but we assume they are implemented, as the dominant political force in Spain (which, depending on the pathway, is the PSOE, PP or Unidas Podemos, respectively) deems it appropriate at a point in time. These pathways depend both on hard facts and ideological factors which are exogenous to the energy system (eg, fundamental views on market vs state, economic efficiency vs equity, etc). Because there are so many possible decisions, there are theoretically a myriad of decarbonisation pathways that could materialise between today (2019) and 2030, 2040 or 2050. In order to produce

1 Lilliestam, J., R. Thonig, L. Späth, N. Caldés, Y. Lechón, P. del Río, C. Kiefer, G. Escribano & L. Lázaro Touza (2019), *Policy pathways for the energy transition in Europe and selected European countries*, Deliverable 7.2 MUSTEC project, Deliverable 1 SCCER JA IDEA, ETH Zürich, Zürich, http://mustec.eu/sites/default/files/reports/Lilliestam_et%20al_2019_Policy_pathways_for_the_energy_transition_in_Europe_and_selected_European_countries.pdf.

a meaningful and manageable analysis, it is key to reduce the number of possible energy-policy pathways.

This paper describes and quantifies three different energy policy pathways for Spain's energy transition: a government-centred pathway represented by the PSOE, a market-centred pathway represented by the PP and a grassroots pathway represented by Unidas Podemos. There are for sure other political parties in Spain with interesting energy worldviews to analyse, but it could be argued that the selected ones are representative of the energy transition policy space. Additionally, PP, PSOE and Unidas Podemos have prepared law proposals,[2] allowing a better specification and quantification of their pathways.

Each of the three decarbonisation pathways (government-centred, market-centred and grassroots) can include elements that would theoretically fall within two other decarbonisation pathways. For instance, the new socialist government's Climate Change and Energy Transition Law proposal includes bidding and other market mechanisms but, on the whole, it tends to assume energy transition requires tough, mandatory measures such as phase-outs, deadlines, bans and ambitious targets. Similarly, Unidas Podemos sets the most ambitious

decarbonisation targets and argues for state (and local) intervention, but its key differentiating factor lies in its grassroots-centred logic, focused on small-scale and local action, seeking decarbonisation through decentralisation of the energy system. Finally, the Popular Party self-stated market-centred logic is based on carbon pricing and letting the market identify the most cost-efficient way to meet energy and climate targets.

Nevertheless, the following pathways represent consistent, clear and the best specified set of alternatives for Spain's energy transition. Their implicit strategies are presented as 'narratives' or 'scripts'.[3] They tell the story from the perspective of 2050, ie, looking back, of how medium and long-term decarbonisation targets were (hypothetically) reached through different means and policy measures, depending on the pathway Spain took (using the past tense, ie, as if they had materialised according to the draft legislative proposals of each of the parties). The three pathways are also presented in a quantitative manner with the support of their respective tables, with the dominant (government-centred) pathway including the key elements of Spain's draft Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (INECP) presented to the EC in February 2019.

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2 Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Congreso (2019), "Proposición de Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética", http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/BOCG/B/BOCG-12-B-283-1.PDF; Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2019), "Anteproyecto de Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética", https://s03.s3c.es/imag/doc/2018-11-15/Anteproyecto-Ley-Cambio-Climatico-Transicion-Energetica.pdf; Grupo Parlamentario Confederal de Unidos Podemos-En Comú Podem-En Marea (2018), "Proposición de Ley sobre Cambio Climático y Transición Energética", http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/BOCG/B/BOCG-12-B-302-1.PDF.

3 Lawrence Freedman (2013), Strategy: a History, Oxford University Press, chapter 38.

> *By 2050 Spain had achieved net-zero emissions, both economy-wide and, in particular, in the electricity sector, which was fully renewable.*

The State-centred pathway: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)

By 2050 Spain had achieved net-zero emissions, both economy-wide and, in particular, in the electricity sector, which was fully renewable. The government's 'Target Scenario' materialised as envisaged in the INECP for 2021-30. The INECP operationalised the long-awaited Climate Change and Energy Transition Law that was finally approved in 2020, along with the development of a Long-Term Strategy and a Just Transition Strategy.

Several international and domestic factors drove Spain's shift to a lower carbon development model. These included: (1) the entry into force and ambitious implementation of the Paris Agreement; (2) the adoption of increasingly stringent targets for renewables and energy efficiency in the EU; (3) the implementation of the EU's Long-Term Strategy, that set out to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050; (4) the continued reduction in the cost of renewable energy technologies; (5) the banning (in sales and registration) by 2040 of internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles in Spain's main car markets (eg, the UK and France); and (6) an increasing concern for climate-change impacts by Spanish citizens, who ranked climate change as the top foreign-policy priority concern from 2016 onwards.[4]

A set of laws and policy measures guided the radical decarbonisation of the electricity sector, and of society as a whole, under tight government control. For the power system, this included decisions such as an orderly phase-out of nuclear power between 2025 and 2035, the phase-out of coal by 2030,[5] a ban on new fossil fuel subsidies[6] from 2020 onwards, the centrally planned phase-out of existing fossil-fuel subsidies,

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4 It should be noted that increasing concern about climate change affected policies and implementation across the three decarbonisation pathways (State-centred, market-centred and grassroots).

5 It should be noted, however, that the socialist government did not mandate a coal phase-out by 2030 but rather relied on EU legislation and on market factors (continued cost reductions in renewables, price of the tonne of CO_2 of €35 in 2030) that forced coal out of the Spanish electricity mix. The INECP, however, stated that phasing out coal was key to achieve the decarbonisation goals. Hence the Spanish government reserved the right to undertake 'any appropriate measures deemed necessary' to meet the RES electricity target (74% by 2030).

6 Article 9 of the current draft proposal for the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law presented by the socialist government states that new fiscal benefits for fossil fuel products will only be allowed under special circumstances detailed below.

> *By 2030 Spain's economy had reduced its GHG emissions by 21% compared with 1990 levels.*

the banning of internal combustion engines in cars, mandatory low-emission zones in municipalities and mandatory renovations and building retrofitting.

By 2030 Spain's economy had reduced its GHG emissions by 21% compared with 1990 levels. By 2050 Spain's GHG emissions were 90% lower than 1990 levels, with the remaining 10% being offset by Spain's carbon sinks, making the Spanish economy carbon neutral by mid-century, in alignment with the INECP and with the Spanish Climate Change and Energy Transition Law.

Overall, Spain's INECP was initially considered very ambitious, even too ambitious for some energy and emission intensive sectors, as the implementation of Spain's INECP meant a reduction of over a third of Spain's 2017 emissions in little over a decade, an unprecedented decarbonisation effort for Spain. The INECP was, however,

criticised by other sectors (mainly Civil Society Organisations, CSOs)[7] as showing limited ambition compared to other EU countries that adopted more stringent emission reduction targets.[8] Although the government initially set out to reduce its GHG emissions by 40% compared with 1990 levels by 2030, which would have aligned its ambition with most EU countries, it scaled down its ambition and settled for a 21% goal in its INECP, arguing it was a fair, achievable and balanced goal.

By 2030, the INECP's 42% renewable energy target was achieved in Spain's final energy consumption, supported by an electricity system that was largely renewable (74% of the electricity consumed in Spain). Among other measures, the objective was met through a steady stream of auctions that added at least 3,000 MW of new renewable capacity annually between 2019 and 2030. Throughout the 2021-30 period, 57,000 MW

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7 '[CSOs] can be defined to include all non-market and nonstate organizations outside of the family in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. Examples include community-based organisations and village associations, environmental groups, women's rights groups, farmers' associations, faith-based organisations, labour unions, co-operatives, professional associations, chambers of commerce, independent research institutes and the not-for-profit media' (UNDP, undated).

8 Czech Republic (-30%), Germany (-55%), Ireland (-40%), France (-40%), Latvia (-40%), Lithuania (-40%), Hungary (-40%), the Netherlands (-49%), Portugal (-45%), Romania (-50%) and Sweden (-63%).

of new renewable capacity was added to the system, supported by auctions. Solar and wind were the bulk of the auctioned power between 2019 and 2030. During this decade, 5 GW of concentrated solar power (CSP) were auctioned and constructed, restarting the expansion of this technology in Europe.

The overall target for renewable capacity installed in Spain was determined by the INECP. The government took a technology-neutral approach to decarbonisation but the 'Target Scenario' materialised by 2030. That scenario considered the expected evolution in technologies and costs and strived for a cost-efficient realisation of the decarbonisation pathways. In the 'Target Scenario' Spain's 157 GW of installed power capacity included, among other issues, 50 GW of wind, 44 GW of solar (37 GW of solar PV and 7 GW were CSP),[9] 27 GW were combined gas cycles, 16 GW were hydro, just under 7 GW of pumped hydro, 2 GW of oil and 3 GW were nuclear.[10] The INECP envisaged a very significant uptake of renewables so integrating them into the system was key. In order to achieve integration, demand-side management measures were fostered to change consumption patterns. Additionally, storage

capacity was increased, adding 3.5 GW of pumped storage and 2.5 GW of storage capacity in batteries.[11]

By 2050 Spain's power sector was fully (100%) renewable. After the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law was approved in 2020, the integration of renewables in the power system continued to be supported by the Spanish government through priority dispatch, subject to the requirements and limitations enshrined in the Energy Union regulations.

Most new fossil fuel subsidies[12] were banned by the Spanish government as of 2020. Given, amongst others, energy poverty problems, the government introduced Article 9 in the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law, allowing new fossil subsidies if justified on social grounds, to protect Spain's economic interests or due to the lack of adequate technological alternatives.[13] Initial concerns regarding these exemptions to new fossil fuels were assuaged as a robust control mechanism was put in place by the Spanish government to prevent loopholes through which undue subsidies could have been granted. Existing subsidies (consisting of tax exemptions and deductions) in 2017

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9 Most of the new CSP capacity (5 GW) had nine hours of storage capacity as modelled in Spain's PNIEC.

10 Note that nuclear phaseout took place in 2025-35, which explains the 3GW of nuclear in 2030.

11 See page 42 of the INECP.

12 Defined in Article 9 of the draft Climate Change and Energy Transition Law as fiscal benefits and other support mechanisms or measures that foster the use of fossil fuels.

13 The potential loophole in the drafting of Article 9 (effectively allowing fossil fuel subsidies to continue) gave rise to several comments in the public consultation process prior to the passing of the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law. These comments were taken into consideration by the government to ensure appropriate monitoring of subsides, effectively restricting new fossil fuel subsidies to vulnerable families and small-scale farmers whose livelihoods could be significantly affected by higher fuel prices.

> *The government reached an agreement with utilities so that nuclear phase-out became a reality in Spain by 2035, with nuclear power being phased out when nuclear power plants reached a maximum of 46 years in operation.*

(amounting to €2.3 billion for oil, €756 million for gas and €2.9 million for coal)[14] were progressively phased out following the government's calendar to do so. New exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons by conventional and new techniques such as hydraulic fracturing were also banned in Spain as of 2020. Existing permits for exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons were not extended.

Half of Spain's coal power[15] was phased out by 2020, with the rest having been phased out completely by 2030. Nine out of the 15 coal power plants in Spain were already closed in 2021 as the necessary adaptions to limit atmospheric emissions to comply with the Industrial Emissions Directive were not carried out. As regards the remaining coal phase-out, the government took a market-based approach, allowing power plants to burn coal until the drop in the cost of

renewables and the price of a tonne of CO_2 in the EU-ETS (€35 in 2030) pushed coal power out of Spain's electricity mix.

The Spanish government furthermore divested (sold its shares and other financial instruments) from companies that extracted, refined or processed fossil fuels, following a divestment plan that was drafted by 2021, in accordance with the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law.[16] Government divestment provided incentives for other social agents to follow suit.

The government reached an agreement with utilities so that nuclear phase-out became a reality in Spain by 2035, with nuclear power being phased out when nuclear power plants reached a maximum of 46 years in operation. The government's initial plans of not extending nuclear power plants' useful life beyond 40 years were adapted

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14 These figures are available from page 206 of the INECP and are based on information provided by Spain's tax agency.

15 Which amounted to 10,4 GW of installed capacity in 2018. See IIDMA (2019), 'Un oscuro panorama. Las secuelas del carbón', http://www.iidma.org/attachments/Publicaciones/Un_Oscuro_Panorama_Las_secuelas_del_Carbon.pdf (accessed 18/V/2019).

16 See the second additional provision of the draft Climate Change and Energy Transition Law for further details.

after negotiating with utilities. CSO's that had historically advocated early closures (calling for nuclear power plants to be decommissioned after 40 years in operation, at most) implicitly accepted the phase-out agreement.

Overall investment needs for the implementation of the INECP in Spain for 2021-30 amounted to €236.12 billion, most of which were disbursed by the private sector. There were initial concerns about whether the private sector would indeed be able and willing to invest 80% of the needs for the INECP, but the private sector recognised the economic opportunity of the low-carbon transition and invested accordingly, meeting the government private-sector investment figures in 2021-30. Investments in energy efficiency amounted to €86.48 billion. Estimated investment in updating power networks and electrification to meet the 2030 decarbonisation goals amounted to €41.84 billion, with an overall investment in renewables of €101.63 billion. Concerns about a potential crowding-out effect were dispelled as empirical data showed large investments in low-carbon transition need not automatically lead to investment reductions in other economic sectors.[17]

Spain's interconnections with France, Morocco and Portugal remained very limited until 2020, amounting to <5% of Spain's generation capacity in 2019, half

of which were interconnections to France. This made Spain the only European country that failed the EU target of 10% interconnection capacity in 2020. Hence, Spain developed new interconnections with Portugal (reaching 3,000 MW in 2030) and France (reaching 8,000 MW in 2030, up from 2,800 MW in 2019). A ratchet-up mechanism for interconnections, renewables and energy efficiency goals was included in the INECP for 2023, coinciding with the Global Stocktake enshrined in the Paris Agreement. Spain's INECP's target of reaching 15% interconnection of installed capacity in 2030, in alignment with the EU's interconnection goal, was met. From 2019 Morocco was a net electricity exporter to Spain, but new rules were introduced to prevent coal and gas-generated electricity being exported to the EU. Meanwhile, increasing domestic demand in southern Mediterranean partners continued to put pressure on local installed capacity, including the deployment of renewables.

As for the transport sector and electric mobility,[18] Spain banned the registration and sale of internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles in 2040 as stated in the Climate and Energy Transition Law, despite initial resistance from the car manufacturers' association. By 2050 only zero-emission privately-owned vehicles were allowed to circulate. By 2030, 5 million Electric Vehicles (EVs) were in use in Spain, with a significant

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17 Pollit & Mercure (2018) argue that Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models assume crowding-out effects as a result of climate policies. The authors argue that macro-econometric models based on non-equilibrium economic theory do not necessarily lead to crowding out effects and can even serve as an economic stimulus.

18 Whose emissions amounted to 25% of total emissions in 2015 and 48% of of diffuse sector emissions in 2017.

> *Spain's INECP included a 32.5% energy efficiency goal vs. a trend scenario, in alignment with the EU goal for 2030.*

impact on electricity demand. Charging infrastructure for EVs in Spain was small in 2018, but from 2020 onwards the Spanish Climate Change and Energy Transition Law required petrol stations across the country selling more than 5 million litres of fuel annually to present a project to install charging stations of ≥22 kW, reaching 9% of petrol stations across Spain. The Ministry for Ecological Transition regulated which petrol stations had to have charging points and when they had to be operational. For smaller petrol stations the deadlines for projects and operation of charging points was more flexible. Additionally, municipalities of ≥50,000 inhabitants established by law low-emission zones by 2023 (at the latest) and fostered the deployment of public and private EV charging points.

Spain's INECP included a 32.5% energy efficiency goal vs. a trend scenario, in alignment with the EU goal for 2030. However, Spain achieved its 'Target

Scenario' energy efficiency goal of 39.6% primary-energy intensity improvement in 2030 (3.6% primary-energy efficiency gains per annum from 2021 to 2030). Energy efficiency goals were achieved through reductions in both primary and final energy consumption (-16.16% and -6.22%, respectively) in 2030 compared with 2015 levels. Electricity consumption in final energy consumption increased 8,16% from 2015 to 2030 (from 19.951 ktoe to 21,579 ktoe), but electricity consumption in final energy consumption was reduced in the residential sector by 12% (from 6,025 ktoe in 2015 to 5,301 ktoe in 2030), essentially through improvements in the thermal envelope of buildings and improvements in district heating and domestic hot water (DHW). Energy efficiency goals achieved, in line with the government's 'Target Scenario', were highly ambitious, as Spain's energy efficiency improvements in 2000-16 period showed (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. Evolution of primary and final energy intensity, 2000-16

In accordance with the updated Energy Efficiency Directive of 2018 the Spanish government increased energy efficiency in buildings by improving the thermal envelope of 1.2 million homes from 2021 to 2030, renovated heating, water heating and air conditioning in 300,000 buildings per year and renovated 3% of publicly-owned buildings. The government also promoted an increase in the use of renewable electricity sources in retrofitted buildings and new buildings. Demand-side response policies were actively developed by the government to nudge consumers into lower carbon consumption patterns that would allow a greater penetration of renewables and greater stability in the power system. Smart metering allowed raising awareness of energy consumption, helping consumers shift energy use in heating, cooling and domestic hot water. Financing mechanisms were fostered by the government to ensure retrofitting of the existing building stock and the construction of near-zero energy buildings. Subsidies were also given to low-income families to allow for retrofitting investments, based on energy savings audits and performance. Public-private partnerships were established to reach retrofitting goals.

Figure 2. Spanish State-centred dominant policy pathway according to Spain's INECP 'Target Scenario' according to the PSOE government, 2016-50

ES: Dominant	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
GHG reduction targets. Economy-wide (baseline year)	283 Mt CO2eq	327 Mt CO2eq	-21% (1990)		-90% (1990)
ETS sector reduction targets	229 Mt CO2eq (European annual emission allocation)	219 Mt CO2eq (European annual emission allocation) -21%	-60%		
Non-ETS sectors emission reduction targets (baseline year)		-10% (2005)	-38% (2005)		
GHG reduction targets (electricity sector)					
Renewables targets (energy; % of final energy consumption)		20%	42%		
Renewables targets (electricity; % of final energy consumption)	39%; 108 TWh; 49 GW		74%		100%
Intermittent renewables	57 TWh; 28 GW	36.3 GW	87.3 GW	≥ 2030	≥ 2040
Wind onshore	49 TWh; 23 GW	27.9 GW	50.3 GW		
Wind offshore	included above	Included above	Included above		
Solar PV	8 TWh; 5 GW	8.4 GW	37 GW	> 2030	> 2040
Dispatchable renewables	51 TWh; 21 GW			≥ 2030	≥ 2040
Biomass	5 TWh; 1 GW	1.6 GW	2.4 GW		
Hydro	40 TWh; 14 GW	15.8 GW	16.3 GW		
CSP	6 TWh; 2 GW	2.3 GW	7.3 GW	≥ 2030	≥ 2040
Other renewables (year of data when different to column heading)	1 TWh; 0.2 GW (2015)	0.2 GW	0.3 GW		
Net traded renewables (year of data when different to column heading)	-3 TWh (2015)	11 TWh	6.7 TWh		

ES: Dominant	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
Nuclear	59 TWh; 7.4 GW	7.4 GW	3.2 GW	0	0
Fossil fuels	108 TWh; 48GW	45.1 GW	32.5 GW		
CCS	0	0	0	0	0
Lignite	0 TWh	0	0	0	0
Hard coal	36 TWh	10.6 GW	0	0	0
Gas	54 TWh	31.2 GW	30.2 GW		
Petroleum	16 TWh	3.4 GW	2.3 GW		
Other non-renewables	1 TWh	0	0		
Storage					
Battery			2.5 GW		
Pumped Hydropower	3.3 GW	4.4 GW	7.9 GW		
Other storage					
Cross-border interconnection NTC	< 5% of installed capacity	10% of installed capacity	15% of installed capacity		
Electrification of additional sectors					
Total heating demand incl. non-electric heating					
Heating with electricity **(energy supplied by heat pumps)**	4.1 TWh 353 ktoe	7.6 TWh 651 ktoe	47 TWh 4,076ktoe		
Total cooling demand incl. non-electric cooling					
Cooling with electricity					
Electric mobility			22% RES (electrification & biofuels) 5 million EV	>> 2030 Ban on ICE sales & registrations	>> Ban on ICE circulation
EV chargers (year of data when different to column heading)	4,974 (2017)	> 2017	>> 2020	>> 2030	>> 2040
Gross electricity consumption (year of data when different to column heading)	232 TWh (2015)	234 TWh	251 TWh		
Final energy consumption (year of data when different to column heading)	84,542 ktoe (2015)	88,994 ktoe	79,279 ktoe		

Source: the authors.

Market-centred pathway: Partido Popular[19]

By 2050 Spain had achieved an 80% decarbonisation of its economy in a manner that was economically efficient, hence not only meeting international commitments but also in a way that was 'beneficial to our families and companies'. To achieve this, the government, to the extent possible, avoided interfering with market rules except where necessary to correct market failures associated with environmental externalities and where international climate commitments were at stake. Hence, the few measures taken were market-based, such as a carbon tax (for the non-trading sector), the EU emission trading scheme and auctions for renewable power, leading to efficient levels of decarbonisation.

While all types of actors were enabled to carry out the transition, the private sector and particularly large corporations remained important players over the entire period given their ability to engage in large and cost-efficient investments. Besides renewable generators (especially utility-scale plants with lower specific generation costs), nuclear and fossil fuels with CCS played an important role in the energy transition towards a decarbonised economy. Increasing the interconnection capacity always ranked high in the agenda as a pre-requisite for a cost-optimal exchange of electricity and balancing in the internal European electricity market.

Spain has always followed the trajectory prescribed by the EU, neither lagging behind nor rushing ahead, in order to achieve a coordinated, cost-efficient decarbonisation of Europe together with the other EU Member States. Hence, the Spanish economy is expected to be 80% decarbonised by 2050 (compared with 1990), following the accomplishment of a 26% reduction of emissions in the non-trading sector by 2030. The key enabler to this was the implementation of the National Strategy for a Low-Emission Economy by 2050, which guided the transition to a low-carbon economy. Among other measures, this strategy was based on cost-efficient measures to increase energy efficiency and deploy a mix of low-carbon technologies leading to a cost-optimal mix of renewables, nuclear power and fossil fuels with CCS.

In order to make use of the most cost-efficient decarbonisation measures, the Spanish government did not define specific renewable energy or electricity targets beyond the 2030 renewable energy target (32% renewable energy); in the electricity sector, this led to the deployment of the renewables with the lowest system cost both in Spain and abroad (to the extent

19 Partido Popular (2015), 'Seguir avanzando. Programa electoral para las elecciones generales de 2015', Partido Popular, Madrid; Partido Popular (2018), 'Proposición de Ley sobre Cambio Climático y Transición Energética', Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Congreso, *Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales*, Madrid; *Público* (2018), 'El PP es el único partido que está a favor del "fracking", del almacén nuclear y del "impuesto al sol", https://www.publico.es/politica/pp-fracking-almacen-nuclear-impuesto.html (accessed 07/V/2019); SNE (2015) 'El Partido Popular promete mantener las centrales nucleares y terminar el ATC', Sociedad Nuclear Española (SNE), https://www.sne.es/es/actualidad/del-sector-nuclear-en-espana/el-partido-popular-promete-mantener-las-centrales-nucleares-y-terminar-el-atc (accessed 07/V/2019); Partido Popular (2019), 'Elecciones generales, autonómicas y municipales 2019. Programa electoral', Partido Popular, Madrid, http://www.pp.es/sites/default/files/documentos/programa_electoral_2019_pp_0.pdf.

> *Nuclear power continued to play a non-trivial role in the Spanish power system, as the old reactors extended their economic lifetime provided their technical characteristics allowed operation in safety conditions.*

allowed by the interconnectors). Already in the period before 2018, renewable electricity deployment was promoted through technology-neutral auctions and the relative increase in competitiveness through carbon price measures.

While there was no specific target for intermittent renewables, PV and onshore wind power became the main pillars of the Spanish system given the lower cost compared to other renewables and the technology-neutral design element of the renewable auctions. Similarly, dispatchable renewables-biomass (with and without CCS) hydropower and CSP never had explicit targets and their expansion occurred at the time and location where they proved cost-efficient from a system perspective as a way to balance PV and wind power.

Similarly, both physical imports or statistical transfers of renewables (through cooperation) were important measures both for balancing the Spanish power system and to meet the EU-mandated renewables targets in a cost-optimal manner. This was further supported by the expansion of new

interconnectors. The latter was one of the key Spanish priorities, both to facilitate the completion of the internal electricity market and to allow increased electricity trade, including cross-border renewables trade under the cooperation mechanism. To this end, the government both met and exceeded the EU-mandated interconnector targets.

Nuclear power continued to play a non-trivial role in the Spanish power system, as the old reactors extended their economic lifetime provided their technical characteristics allowed operation in safety conditions. Yet fossil-fuelled CCS and renewables were expanded to become the main pillars of decarbonising the Spanish power system. Consistent with the focus on cost-efficiency, there was no mandated closure of any power station, including coal power; however, the increasing carbon price (within the EU ETS) gradually forced older coal/lignite power stations off the market from the 2020s onwards. The government also promoted gas interconnections in order to strengthen the European internal gas market through access to the gas pipelines from North Africa and LNG.

Several measures were aimed at promoting the deployment of distributed generation and electric self-consumption. As a result, an increased use of decentralised batteries followed. The increased penetration of renewable energies required an increase in the use of electricity storage technologies in the form of grid-scale batteries and pumped hydropower installations.

In the residential, institutional and commercial sectors, various measures were put in place to improve and promote energy efficiency, zero emission buildings, distributed generation, electricity self-consumption, low emission heating and cooling systems, and smart metering. A sustainable transport sector was promoted with a special boost to rail transport. The promotion of the use of electric vehicles was limited by the expansion of a network of charging points, enabling but not directly supporting an expansion of the EV fleet. When it comes to public procurement, public tenders for new vehicles only allowed for alternative-fuel vehicles, except for those vehicles that could not perform public duties or for unjustified economic costs. Electrification of other sectors was pursued to the extent that it supported a cost-optimal decarbonisation of society as a whole, but no specific targets or support measures for heating were introduced.

Figure 3. Quantification of the Spanish market-centred minority policy pathway as described by the Partido Popular, 2016-50

ES: Market	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
GHG reduction targets (economy-wide)	283 Mt CO2eq	10% (GHG-2005)	Non-ETS 26% (GHG-2005)	> 2030	80% (GHG-1990)
ETS sector reduction targets	229 Mt CO2eq (European annual emission allocation)	219 Mt CO2eq (European annual emission allocation)			
Non-ETS sectors emission reduction targets		10% (GHG-2005)	26% (GHG-2005)		
GHG reduction targets (electricity sector)					
Renewables targets (energy; % of final energy consumption)		20%	32%		

ES: Market	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
Renewables targets (electricity; % of final energy consumption)	39%; 108 TWh; 49 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Intermittent renewables	57 TWh; 28 GW				
Wind onshore	49 TWh; 23 GW	> 2016	> 2 020	> 2030	> 2040
Wind offshore	included above	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2 040
Solar PV	8 TWh; 5 GW	> 2016 (mainly centralised)	> 2020 (mainly centralised)	> 2030 (mainly centralised)	> 2040 (mainly centralised)
Dispatchable renewables	51 TWh; 21 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Biomass	5 TWh; 1 GW				
Hydro	40 TWh; 14 GW				
CSP	6 TWh; 2 GW				
Other renewables	1 TWh				
Traded renewables					
Physical import of renewables (cooperation)		> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Statistical transfer of renewables (cooperation)		= 2016	≥ 2016	≥ 2016	≥ 2016
Explicit trade of CSP or hydropower					
Nuclear	59 TWh 7 GW	= 2016	= 2016	= 2016	=2016
Fossil fuels	108 TWh; 48 GW				
CCS	0	> 2016		> 2030	> 2040
Lignite	0 TWh	≤ 2016	≤ 2016		
Hard coal	36 TWh	≤ 2016	≤ 2016		
Gas	54 TWh	≥ 2016	≥ 2016	≥ 2016	≥ 2016
Petroleum	16 TWh				
Other non-renewables	1 TWh				

ES: Market	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
Storage					
Battery		> 2016	> 2020	≥ 2030	≥ 2040
Pumped Hydropower		> 2016	> 2020	≥ 2030	≥ 2040
Other storage					
Cross-border interconnection NTC		≥ 10% of yearly power production	≥ 15% of yearly power production	≥ 2030	2030
Electrification of additional sectors					
Total heating demand incl. non-electric heating					
Heating with electricity					
Total cooling demand incl. non-electric cooling					
Cooling with electricity					
Electric mobility					
EV chargers		> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Gross electricity consumption	275 TWh				
Final energy consumption					

Source: the authors.

Grass-roots-centred pathway: Unidas Podemos[20]

Spain almost achieved a full decarbonisation of the entire economy by 2050. In the electricity sector, this was achieved through strict phase-out policies for fossil-fuel power and emphasising the role of citizens and communities in building up a new and renewable power system. The needs of the citizens were at the core of all climate and energy policies, supported by institutions such as the State Climate Change

20 Podemos (2018), 'Proposición de Ley sobre Cambio Climático y Transición Energética', Grupo Parlamentario Confederal de Unidos Podemos-En Comú Podem-En Marea, *Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales*, Madrid; Podemos (2019), 'Programa de Podemos para un nuevo pais. Programa Electoral elecciones 2019', https://podemos.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Podemos_programa_generales_28A.pdf.

Agency and the Citizen Climate Change Commission. Through active policy, citizens were empowered to have a more pro-active role by supporting the decentralisation of the energy system and encouraged to become prosumers. The re-communalisation of electricity provision was approved in subsequent local referendums following the example of Barcelona Energy in 2018, when a public metropolitan electricity operator started supplying renewable electricity to the city so that, over time, control over the entire system became communal.

Regarding interconnections and EU cooperation mechanisms, the emphasis is on decentralisation and re-communalisation instead of cross-border mega-projects and further market integration. As a consequence, by 2050 interconnections remain at the 2030 15% goal or slightly higher while virtual and physical cooperation mechanisms remain marginal: the maxim was and remains 'Spanish renewables for and by Spanish citizens'. Another key aspect of the Unidas Podemos strategy was an emphasis on energy efficiency: the targets of 40% less primary energy demand by 2030 and 50% less by 2050 (compared to 1990) were achieved in part with efficiency measures and in part through electrification of additional sectors, primarily transport.

When it comes to greenhouse emissions, compared with 1990 levels, in 2030 emissions had fallen by 35%, by 70% in 2040 and by 95% in 2050. This was accomplished through the combination of reducing primary energy consumption (40%

less energy consumed by 2030 and a 45% reduction of energy consumption by 2040 compared with 1990 levels) as well as the strong deployment of renewables to fill the gap of the phased-out fossil and nuclear generators. The transition was facilitated by two broad energy programmes: (a) the Energy Efficiency National Plan that targeted the housing, transport and industrial sectors; and (b) the Renewable Energies National plan that focused on deployment of renewable power generation (solar, wind, geothermal, small hydropower and low-emitting biomass).

To implement these plans, 1.5% of GDP was mobilised annually over 20 years, comprising both public and private resources, to drive the necessary investments in generation and infrastructure. For example, a Green Finance Fund for mitigation and adaptation was created and the Law for Energy Transition also provided funds for a fair transition in part raised through new environmental taxes and the abolishment of subsidies and tax exemptions for the fossil-fuel industry and for consumption. New measures to prevent oligopolistic practices (including vertical integration) in the electricity market were implemented to prevent large energy corporations concentrating too much power and to support the small-scale actors entering the system. Finally, measures were put in place to decouple the ownership and management of the distribution system. Aligned with a grassroots political party ideal, both plans were implemented in a way that ensured most electricity generation and distribution phases remained in the hands

of public entities (especially municipalities), consumers or small enterprises and not large corporations.

With respect to renewable power, the power system has been 100% renewable since 2045, following the achievement of the interim renewable power target of 80% in 2030. Besides targeted support measures for small renewable power plants, the municipalities granted soft loans through the Green Finance Fund (*Fondo de Financiación Verde*). Furthermore, there was a green procurement strategy by which all public administrations were obliged to consume 100% renewables on their premises so as to reduce the life-cycle environmental impacts of energy use. Finally, the government divested funds from fossil-fuel related companies to incentivise private consumers to invest in renewable energy through subsidies.

Intermittent renewables, especially PV, experienced a great expansion as a result of the support measures included in the Renewable National Plan, including dedicated support for onshore wind power (> 6 MW). A special emphasis was put on special support mechanisms for investments in renewable generators smaller than 1 MW. Furthermore, a new regulatory framework was implemented already in 2018 and maintained since, to support self-consumption, which included the following features: (a) self-consumption was not taxed; (b) electricity fed into the electricity system was remunerated in a fair manner by the distributor company; and (c) quick and simple administrative procedures were

established. Consequentially, all renewables grew continuously from 2018 onwards, but decentralised PV grew particularly fast.

As for dispatchable renewables, research, development and innovation plans were specifically designed for the development of new dispatchable technologies, including measures to improve the flexibility of renewables. As the performance of these technologies improved, their deployment grew from 2020 on. As a result, a diverse fleet of dispatchable renewables was deployed over time, including both CSP, hydropower and biomass. When large hydropower plants private ownership came to an end, they became state-owned. As a result, the role of large hydropower plants changed from providing bulk power to being providers of back-up capacity to complement variable solar PV and wind-power generation. Similarly, the growing biomass power fleet was used mainly to balance the system, and not merely to generate bulk energy.

Accompanying the rise of renewables was the decline of nuclear and fossil power. Following the phase-out decisions in 2019, all nuclear and coal power plants were shut down progressively until the last power plants were closed in 2025. The existing gas power stations were allowed to continue operating beyond 2025 insofar as they provided back-up capacity to the system and contributed to guarantee supply. Throughout the whole period, fracking was forbidden and natural gas production in Spain was practically banned; further, as CCS was not supported, there was no

In order to support the balancing of fluctuating renewables, and to minimise the need for further electricity grids, the government supported early on the development and deployment of new storage technologies.

expansion of CCS stations at any time. In all these phase-out cases (especially nuclear and coal plants), the abandonment of the plants followed a fair transition approach for workers so that they have found new employment opportunities.

Given its focus on small-scale, local and distributed electricity, Unidas Podemos limited the development of new interconnection capacity to the minimum necessary to support the further deployment of renewables in Spain (in accordance with EU targets). Instead of developing new transmission infrastructures, Unidas Podemos supported the development of micro- and other local networks, minimising the need for transmission. Consequently, there was no explicit trade with renewables, dispatchable or fluctuating, and Spain has not made use of cooperation mechanisms.

In order to support the balancing of fluctuating renewables, and to minimise the need for further electricity grids, the government supported early on the development and deployment of new

storage technologies. This included both batteries and hydrogen, initially through R&D support and later on through deployment support, so as to keep the power system stable and minimise the need for new national and cross-border grid infrastructure. Through various support measures (such as the provision of special tariffs), the law for the energy transition and climate change supported the electrification of certain consumptions such as industrial, heating and transport.

As to the decarbonisation of the transport sector, Unidas Podemos: (a) promoted the use of bicycles in many ways (for example, by facilitating bicycle access to other public transport modes); (b) revised public transport services provision contracts; and (c) promoted electric vehicles. Thanks to the various support measures in place, Spain achieved a 25% share of EV in sales of new cars by 2025, 70% of new cars were EV by 2030 and all new vehicles were EVs by 2040. Furthermore, a programme was developed to promote the use of electric vehicle chargers.

Figure 4. Quantification of the Spanish grassroots-centred minority policy pathway as described by Unidas Podemos, 2016-50

ES: Grassroots	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
GHG reduction targets (economy-wide)	283 Mt CO2eq		35% (1990)	70% (1990)	95% (1990)
ETS sector reduction targets	229 Mt CO2eq (European annual emission allocation)	219 Mt CO2eq (European annual emission allocation)			
Non-ETS sectors emission reduction targets		10% (GHG-2005)	26% (GHG-2005)		
GHG reduction targets (electricity sector)					
Renewables targets (energy; % of final energy consumption)		> 2016	45%	60%	100%
Renewables targets (electricity; % of final energy consumption)	39%; 108 TWh; 49 GW	> 2016	80%		100% (by 2045)
Intermittent renewables	57 TWh; 28 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Wind onshore	49 TWh; 23 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Wind offshore	included above	= 2016	= 2016	= 2016	= 2016
Solar PV	8 TWh; 5 GW	>> 2016 (mainly decentralised)	>> 2020 (mainly decentralised)	>> 2030 (mainly decentralised)	>> 2040 (mainly decentralised)
Dispatchable renewables	51 TWh; 21 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Biomass	5 TWh; 1 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Hydro	40 TWh; 14 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
CSP	6 TWh; 2 GW	> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Other renewables	1 TWh				

ES: Grassroots	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
Traded renewables					
Physical import of renewables (cooperation)					
Statistical transfer of renewables (cooperation)					
Explicit trade of CSP or hydropower					
Nuclear	59 TWh 7 GW		0 (by 2025)	0	0
Fossil fuels	108 TWh; 48 GW				
CCS	0				
Lignite	0 TWh	<< 2016	0 (by 2025)	0	0
Hard coal	36 TWh	<< 2016	0 (by 2025)	0	0
Gas	54 TWh	< 2016	< 2020	< 2030	< 2040
Petroleum	16 TWh	< 2016	< 2020	< 2030	0
Other non-renewables	1 TWh	≥ 2016 (Waste)	≥ 2020		
Storage					
Battery		> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Pumped Hydropower					
Other storage		> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Cross-border interconnection NTC		≥ 10% of yearly power production	≥ 15% of yearly power production	= 2030	= 2040
Electrification of additional sectors					
Total heating demand incl. non-electric heating					
Heating with electricity					
Total cooling demand incl. non-electric cooling		> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040
Cooling with electricity		> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	> 2040

ES: Grassroots	2016	2020	2030	2040	2050
Electric mobility		3% EV (by 2020), 25% EV (by 2025)			
70% (EV)	100% (EV)				
EV chargers		>> 2016	> 2020	> 2030	≥ 2040
Gross electricity consumption	275 TWh				
Final energy consumption					

Conclusions

The pathways described, depicted in this paper as if they had materialised, are not the only ones proposed by political parties for Spain's energy transition. However, they illustrate the continuum of options in the energy transition policy space and constitute the best-specified set of energy transition alternatives for Spain. As expected, they do not represent 'pure' State, market or grassroots-centred closed models, but rather 'scripts' for energy transition with different combinations of elements present in other logics. For instance, the socialists' State-centred logic includes auctions, the Popular Party's market approach includes some command and control measures, and the Unidas Podemos' grass-roots approach comes with significant State intervention. Nevertheless, they constitute coherent, all-encompassing alternative stories on how to achieve the energy transition in three different ways, following three distinct decarbonisation logics and leading to three very different (more or less) climate-friendly energy futures.

For the Socialist Party, the decarbonisation of the Spanish power system is driven by targeted measures enacted by the government, in addition to having economy-wide decarbonisation targets for 2030 and 2050. Some of the key measures included a mandatory and gradual nuclear phase-out between 2025 and 2035, a largely market-driven coal phase-out ahead of 2030 (fostered by EU regulation), banning internal combustion engines and (most) new fossil fuel subsidies, a gradual phase out of existing fossil-fuel subsidies, mandatory deployment of recharging infrastructure for EVs and mandatory retrofitting of buildings, among others. Interconnections were promoted by the government in this pathway, in line with EU requirements, to prevent blackouts during dry years and to support the expansion of renewables.

Under the Popular Party's market-centred logic, the Spanish energy transition is mostly driven by private actors under an economy-wide decarbonisation target. The government took a few high-level, strategic decisions to ensure the alignment with EU energy and climate objectives and ambition and, whenever needed, the government used market-based instruments (carbon tax, technology neutral auctions for renewables, etc) to correct market failures and get the transition going. The government also put a special emphasis on increasing interconnections as a way to transition to an integrated and cost-efficient EU electricity market.

Unidas Podemos is aligned with the grassroots logics. The key for enabling the Spanish energy transition is empowering citizens and local communities as the main actors of the transition strategy, while progressively abandoning fossil and nuclear technologies. As a result, a highly decentralised small-scale and smart local community-owned power system was achieved. New technologies were developed as a result of R&D programmes (technology push) as well as market pull policies (support policies in the form of subsidies and other incentives). Regarding interconnections and cooperation mechanisms, the local and community logic has limit interconnections to compulsory EU targets and intra-EU renewable exchange remains small.

Despite the differences across energy transition pathways Spain embraced a low(er) carbon development model from 2020 to 2050. The acrimonious political debate that had stalled the drafting and passing of the Climate Change and Energy Transition Law between 2011 and 2019 was finally resolved in 2020. The response from the EC, and from civil society, to Spain's draft INECP made its content the benchmark across political parties that avoided defaulting on Spain's energy and climate commitments, albeit relying on different policy instruments to ensure targets were met. This meant a more command-and-control (CAC) based approach from socialist governments, more use of market-based instruments (MBIs) by conservative governments and greater emphasis on both CAC and moral suasion, coupled with bottom-up initiatives, from left-wing governments.

However, the INECP had to be strengthened over time to align Spain's targets to the goals of the Paris Agreement. Key elements in robust climate laws were gradually included in Spain's climate actions by governments from across the political spectrum. Among these elements were an independent committee on climate change *à la* UK, national and sectoral carbon budgets, parliamentary oversight of climate and energy goals, transparent and regular stakeholder engagement, and the requirement to disclose exposure to climate risks by investors and asset managers, following France's lead.

¿Qué es la digitalización?

Gregorio Martín Quetgla

La palabra "digitalización" despierta simultáneamente esperanza y temor. Pero, ¿qué entendemos por digitalización?

Resumen

Analizar la digitalización supone revisar lo conseguido en cinco ingenierías: (1) microelectrónica; (2) telecomunicaciones; (3) arquitectura de ordenadores; (4) robótica; y (5) *software*. Este orden no es caprichoso, pues las tres primeras son más básicas y sin ellas no existirían ni la Robótica que optimiza o sustituye el esfuerzo físico, ni las aplicaciones del *software* relacionadas con lo inmaterial y cognitivo.

Análisis

Introducción

La palabra "digitalización" despierta simultáneamente esperanza y temor, sensaciones relacionadas con un desplazamiento muy brusco que afecta a la "comprensión" y a las relaciones internas y externas de personas, máquinas, conocimientos, economías y empleos. Usamos los términos numerización, automatización, digitalización, transformación digital y robotización como sinónimos cuando no lo son, pero no es este el lugar para distinciones semánticas; nos conformaremos con recordar que "dígito" es un número que puede expresarse con un solo guarismo. Si usamos el sistema decimal o arábigo representamos las cantidades numéricas en base a potencias de 10, por lo que usamos 10 dígitos del 0 al 9; si recurrimos al uso de potencias de 2, tenemos el sistema binario y manejamos sólo dos dígitos: 0 y 1, un bit (acrónimo de *binary digit*). La potencia de lo binario reside en que puede representarse en sistemas físicos con dos estados posibles, como los semiconductores. Una información en formato digital permite procesar, filtrar, comprimir, almacenar, transmitir, recuperar, visualizar, automatizar, combinar, modelar, autoproteger, compartir y virtualizar.

Entenderemos por digitalización al conjunto de resultados derivados del uso de este formato que cambia tanto la forma de llevar a cabo tareas, la comunicación y el acceso al conocimiento. Estamos ante una tecnología de propósito general cuyo desarrollo con otras ramas aporta conocimientos y técnicas que impactan en los distintos sectores económicos, el empleo, los hábitos de les personas y la propia geopolítica, como estamos viendo en el devenir de las decisiones de EEUU, China y Europa.

"

Analizar la digitalización supone revisar lo conseguido en cinco ingenierías: (1) microelectrónica; (2) telecomunicaciones; (3) arquitectura de ordenadores; (4) robótica; y (5) software.

Máquinas y revoluciones

Una máquina ha sido entendida como un conjunto de elementos, móviles y fijos, cuyo funcionamiento permite aprovechar, dirigir, regular o transformar la energía, con el objetivo de realizar tareas mecánicas de resultado físico. Hoy también disponemos de máquinas que obtienen productos cognitivos. Aunque "industria" sea transformar materias en materias al obtener resultados inmateriales ampliamos el concepto, al hablar de revolución industrial (RI).

La 1ª RI tuvo lugar entre los siglos XVIII y XIX, asociada al desarrollo de la máquina de vapor; la 2ª RI ocurrió entre 1870 y la Primera Guerra Mundial basada en el motor de explosión y la electricidad; la 3ª RD, iniciada a finales de los 70 del pasado siglo, ya se basó en lo digital y entre otros avances registró el ordenador personal, Internet (incluida la web) y lo que hemos llamado Tecnologías de la Información y de las Comunicaciones (TIC). La 4ª RI es un término consagrado por el Foro Económico Mundial en 2016 que expresa los resultados obtenidos por la retroalimentación de la digitalización con nuevos bienes y servicios en un mundo globalizado (la reunión de Davos de enero de 2019 se centró en la Globalización 4.0, como arquitectura de la 4ª RI). Hablamos de los acelerados avances registrados en los últimos 10 años en: robótica, inteligencia artificial, telefonía inteligente, comunicaciones 4G y 5G, nanotecnología, biotecnología, Internet de las cosas, impresión 3D, bibliotecas universales, vehículos autónomos y nuevas armas, cartografía de detalle, cirugía y diagnósticos médicos, ciudades inteligentes y control continuo de señales corporales. A esta relación, en poco tiempo, habrá que añadir aquellas que acaben siendo aceptadas socialmente: nueva educación, arbitraje judicial, reconocimiento facial en el espacio público, conversación simultánea en distintos idiomas y manipulación genética.

Cinco áreas de la digitalización

Analizar la digitalización supone revisar lo conseguido en cinco ingenierías: (1) microelectrónica; (2) telecomunicaciones; (3) arquitectura de ordenadores; (4) robótica; y (5) *software*. Este orden no es caprichoso, pues las tres primeras son más básicas y sin ellas no existirían ni la Robótica que optimiza o sustituye el esfuerzo físico, ni las aplicaciones del *software* relacionadas con lo inmaterial y cognitivo.

La microelectrónica se encarga de diseñar y fabricar dispositivos integrados de densidades crecientes.

(1) Microelectrónica

La válvula marcó la electrónica durante la primera mitad de siglo, y no extraña que se usara en el primer ordenador, ENIAC, que acabo pesando 30 toneladas y consumiendo la electricidad de una ciudad mediana. En los 50 apareció el transistor con sus propiedades semiconductoras, camino de la electrónica digital.

La microelectrónica se encarga de diseñar y fabricar dispositivos integrados de densidades crecientes. La miniaturización no es caprichosa ya que, a menor tamaño, más velocidad de procesamiento, más movilidad para el usuario, y, sobre todo, reducción de energía demandada expresada por la "Ley de Komey", popularizada en 2011, según la cual, en capacidad de computación la eficiencia energética se duplica cada 18 meses.

(1.1) Sensores para la automatización
Entendiendo por automatización la descomposición de una actividad, física o cognitiva en tareas ejecutables por una máquina, el primer requisito es conocer el estado del medio sobre el que se pretende interaccionar. Un transductor es un dispositivo que transforma un tipo de energía en otra de carácter diferente: electro-acústico, electro-magnético, electro-mecánico, electro-químico, foto-eléctrico, magneto-mecánico, piezo-eléctrico, radio-acústico y termo-eléctrico. Un micrófono es un transductor electro-acústico que convierte oscilaciones de la presión del aire en variaciones de voltaje eléctrico, mientras que un altavoz sigue el camino contrario, al transformar corriente eléctrica en vibraciones sonoras. Los transductores se usan tanto para obtener medidas puntuales como continuas, en contacto constante con el medio objeto de instrumentación; en este caso hablamos de sensores, dispositivos que miden de forma continua una variable que es interpretada por otro dispositivo, habitualmente un procesador, que a su vez da órdenes a los actuadores. Es el caso del piloto automático de un avión o el brazo de un sistema robótico en entornos humanos.

(1.2) Circuitos integrados
Un procesador de propósito general consta de tres elementos: memoria activa, unidad aritmética/lógica para cálculos y la unidad central de procesos (CPU por sus siglas inglesas) para gestionar la ejecución. Los

componentes electrónicos de un procesador o de uno de sus elementos son conocidos como chips, para cuya obtención se han desarrollado técnicas, diseños, requisitos y materiales que producen circuitos electrónicos integrados en una pastilla con la mayor densidad posible de transistores en ella. Su fabricación es compleja, con numerosas etapas basadas en la fotolitografía y en el procesado químico. Afortunadamente, estos dispositivos han acabado siendo abundantes, rápidos, baratos y adaptados a todo tipo de tareas. Un ejemplo son los coprocesadores dedicados a obtener y gestionar gráficos que aligeran el trabajo del CPU en aplicaciones como videojuegos, interfaz hombre-máquina y el video 3D interactivo, usado en realidad virtual.

(1.3) Dispositivos de almacenamiento de datos

Además de memorias activas, rápidas y potentes para procesar, también necesitamos dispositivos y sistemas que almacenen datos. Estos son muy diversos (extraíbles, internos y externos) y su evolución define la tecnología habida desde el inicio de la 3ª RI:

(a) Almacenamiento magnético: banda magnética, cintas de cassette, disquete y disco duro.

(b) Almacenamiento óptico, basado en láser y señales de luz como método de lectura y/o escritura: disco de Blu-ray, CD-ROM y Disco DVD.

(c) Dispositivos de memoria flash: unidades flash USB, tarjetas de memoria y disco duro de estado sólido.

(d) Almacenamiento en línea, que permite acceder a los datos desde múltiples dispositivos: almacenamiento en la Nube y medios propios de Internet.

Hoy no existen problemas tecnológicos para que la humanidad guarde toda la información generada o que vaya a generarse.

(1.4) Computación cuántica

Con el transistor se dio un paso muy trascendente, ya que se empezó a hacer con materiales sólidos (semiconductores) lo que antes se hacía en el vacío (válvulas). Hoy, el desafío es hacer con fotones lo que logramos con electrones. La mecánica cuántica describe el universo subatómico cuyas leyes son muy diferentes de las de la mecánica clásica siendo sus resultados inesperados y contrarios a nuestra intuición. Un ordenador cuántico es una máquina que admite como entrada una secuencia de bits cuánticos, que representan 1 o 0 o cualquier superposición de esos dos estados. Cuando estas máquinas funcionen se espera resolver problemas ahora inabordables, como descomponer números de miles de dígitos en factores primos propios, un tema clave en criptografía. La dificultad de construir estos ordenadores es evidente al requerir que las operaciones se hagan a escala atómica. Por el momento hay que conformarse con computadoras clásicas que simulan la computación cuántica, una idea que, como la fusión fría, desde la Física, se sueña con fundamento pero que no acaba de materializarse, cosa que no impide que sea objeto de grandes inversiones públicas y privadas.

> *Transmitir datos digitales supone transferir un flujo de bits por un canal, en paquetes que contienen los datos propiamente dichos y una información de control, con la ruta a seguir hasta el destino.*

(2) Telecomunicaciones

Transmitir datos digitales supone transferir un flujo de bits por un canal, en paquetes que contienen los datos propiamente dichos y una información de control, con la ruta a seguir hasta el destino. Esta descomposición en paquetes permite que cada uno de ellos pueda seguir una ruta distinta de tal manera que con la información que contienen, al llegar a su destino, pueda reagruparse adecuadamente y recuperar la información completa que se quiere transmitir.

(2.1) Corta distancia

Para esta comunicación se empezó prefiriendo la robustez del cableado basado en el estándar Ethernet, encargado de: detectar la onda portadora de bits; resolver las posibles colisiones; definir las características del cableado y de otros elementos físicos; y los formatos de las tramas de datos propias de una conexión local de múltiples dispositivos, incluida la salida al exterior. En pocos años las tecnologías inalámbricas irrumpieron en la corta distancia con la generalización de las tecnologías, Wifi y Bluetooth, cuyo éxito y eficacia han cambiado muchos hábitos domésticos y personales. La primera es una especie de Ethernet sin cables que conecta dispositivos debidamente habilitados y Bluetooth es una especificación industrial también sin cables para el área personal para voz y datos entre dispositivos diversos. Ambas se complementan cubriendo diferentes y crecientes necesidades.

(2.2) Redes fijas

Para transmitir voz se usa un rango de frecuencia reducido y, para contento de las antiguas compañías telefónicas, en los cables queda una gran parte del espectro de frecuencias utilizable para conmutar paquetes, lo que en la infraestructura ya existente se transmite simultáneamente en voz y datos. Además, la tecnología supo "domar" la luz para que se pudiera propagar de forma controlada dentro de un cable que conocemos como fibra óptica, un medio de transmisión basado en un hilo muy fino de material transparente, vidrio o materiales plásticos, por el que se envían pulsos de luz con los datos a transmitir. Gracias a sus mínimas pérdidas de señal y a sus óptimas propiedades de ancho de banda, la fibra se ha convertido en un gran medio de transmisión con instalaciones fijas.

(2.3) Redes inalámbricas y teléfonos inteligentes

Las ondas electromagnéticas han hecho posible la conexión digital a larga distancia, con el uso de antenas emisoras y receptoras terrestres, complementadas con satélites que emiten señales de radio en zonas amplias al actuar a modo de grandes antenas suspendidas del cielo. Con las redes inalámbricas ha sido emocionante el devenir de los teléfonos móviles, primero analógicos, después digitales, a los que desde 2007 se les añade el término "inteligente" que, además de su gancho comercial, refleja su capacidad para su uso como ordenador y su conexión a Internet. Las últimas versiones de estos dispositivos contienen 1.000 veces más transistores que los que tenía el procesador Pentium de 1995 con el que se universalizó el PC. A lo largo de estos últimos años se han desarrollado distintos protocolos o generaciones de comunicación digital hasta llegar a la 5G, en desarrollo, que se adapta a las velocidades de los procesadores vigentes. La comunicación digital basada en dispositivos móviles y en redes inalámbricas permite utilizar casi todos los recursos digitales en cualquier lugar y en todo momento.

(3) Arquitectura de ordenadores

Una vez asumida la sinergia entre computadores y redes digitales, hay que referirse a los avances en materia de organización y funcionamiento de toda la capacidad computacional existente.

(3.1) Del mainframe a la nube

Al inicio de la 3ª RI, cuando la informática salió de los laboratorios y de las instalaciones militares, la computación se daba de forma centralizada con pesados ordenadores (*mainframes*) ubicados en sofisticados Centros de Proceso de Datos, que eran responsable de todo: ordenadores, *software*, dispositivos de almacenamiento, controladores de redes, impresoras y útiles diversos. Los usuarios trabajaban con terminales de texto, siendo sus primeros beneficiarios civiles las centrales de reservas y el sistema bancario. Las principales preocupaciones residían en el tiempo de respuesta y en la solidez del sistema, pues si este caía, las consecuencias en el trabajo diario eran muy costosas.

El paso siguiente vino marcado por la aparición de miniordenadores que conseguían algunas de las prestaciones de mainframe desde habitáculos mucho más reducidos, pudiéndose utilizar por científicos y por empresas de menor envergadura. Metidos ya en los 80, la capacidad de los microprocesadores dio lugar tanto al *Personal Computer* (PC), como a potentes estaciones de trabajo. El objetivo ya no era compartir una memoria central y garantizar la estabilidad del sistema, sino optimizar costes, simplificar el uso y obtener resultados en aplicaciones cotidianas. Hubo que enfrentarse a las demandas de una gran cantidad de usuarios y para ello surgió el concepto de sistemas distribuidos con muchos ordenadores conectados en red. Desde entonces se interconectaron, de forma descentralizada, redes físicas heterogéneas camino de una única red lógica de alcance mundial, que conocemos como Internet. La nueva arquitectura cambió la forma de programar para que las tareas pudieran repartirse de forma efectiva; por un lado, los

proveedores de recursos de determinados servicios (servidores) y usuarios (clientes) desde donde un programa realiza peticiones a otro programa del servidor. Ejemplos de esta metodología son el correo electrónico, el servidor de impresión y la web.

La arquitectura Nube es un conjunto compartido de sistemas configurables y servicios de alto nivel, cuyo objeto es aprovechar la infraestructura existente descomponiéndola en sistemas "virtuales", es decir, en dirigir las peticiones a un conjunto de ordenadores sin saber cuál de ellos las atiende. La Nube se vincula a recursos compartidos y a economías de escala y para ello descompone y ejecuta las demandas en "servicios", como hace el médico de urgencias que virtualiza su trabajo contando con los servicios de especialistas, a quienes redirige la demanda a tenor de su criterio.

(3.3) Sistema operativo (SO)
Un SO es una especie de puente entre el usuario y la máquina, formado por un conjunto de programas encargados de funciones básicas: interfaz con el usuario, administración de recursos, gestión de archivos, asignación de tareas y afrontar las actualizaciones. Los SO se encuentran en la mayoría de dispositivos con microprocesadores, por lo que cada tipo de máquina tiene un SO adaptado. Los más usados, ordenados por tamaño de la máquina, son los siguientes.

Teléfonos móviles:
- *iOS,* SO de Apple exclusivo para sus propios dispositivos móviles: iPod, iPhone y iPad…

- *Android*, creado por un grupo de compañías bajo la dirección de Google. Es de "norma abierta", por lo que muchos desarrolladores pueden adaptar su *software*.

- *Kirin*, en fase de desarrollo por Huawei (China).

Para ordenadores personales:
- *Mac OS X*, la versión exclusiva de los Apple Macintosh.

- *Windows*, SO desarrollado y operado por Microsoft. No siendo de código abierto sí puede instalarse en *hardware* de diferentes fabricantes.

Para sistemas cliente-servidor:
- *Linux*. Muy utilizado en ambientes profesionales, proviene de Unix, desarrollado en 1969. AT&T.

- El noruego Linus Torvalds creo Kernel Linux basado en la comunidad de defensores del *software* libre.

Para la Nube:
- *Amazon EC2* dice garantizar un control completo sobre recursos y herramientas.

- *Microsoft Azure* ofrece un puente natural desde el escritorio hasta la Nube.

- *Google Cloud Platform* promete al usuario olvidarse de tareas complicadas.

La Robótica es una ingeniería que se ocupa de la obtención de resultados con entidad física, históricamente relacionada con el proceso propio de la manufactura.

(4) Robótica

Tendemos a pensar que "inteligencia" es un concepto propio de la abstracción, pero existen otras "inteligencias humanas" como la de los dedos o de los brazos. La Robótica es una ingeniería que se ocupa de la obtención de resultados con entidad física, históricamente relacionada con el proceso propio de la manufactura.

(4.1) Robots colaborativos e Impresoras 3D
La fabricación robótica se ha desarrollado en dos nuevos sentidos: el robot colaborativo y la impresión 3D. La robótica colaborativa consiste en la obtención de máquinas de programación sencilla que pueden trabajar junto a operarios sin tener que tomar medidas de seguridad especiales; en esta línea de compatibilidad han aparecido robots encargados del cuidado de personas con necesidades especiales como los enfermos o con problemas de soledad como los ancianos.

Una impresora 3D es un robot que construye objetos de cualquier forma o geometría, trabajando con sucesivas capas de material, un proceso conocido como "fabricación aditiva" que se realiza depositando material en una plataforma desde donde trabajan los cabezales de impresión tras inyectar las distintas capas. Los materiales y las técnicas de aporte son: polimerización; inyección de aglutinante; extrusión de material; cama de polvo; y laminación de metal. La actual capacidad del diseño de precisión permite plasmar la complejidad de cada subtarea e individualizar el producto final sin grandes costes. Los procesadores empotrados en la propia impresora consiguen controlar cada operación aditiva interpretando unos "planos" muy exactos que dirigen los movimientos correspondientes.

(4.2) Industria 4.0
Este término se acuñó en 2011 en Alemania para denominar la adaptación de la fabricación industrial a todas las posibilidades digitales. Esta nueva forma de entender una fábrica distingue tres niveles de integración:

(a) Componente, constituido por el conjunto de sensores que proporcionan los datos primarios para soportar un proceso automatizado con la máxima precisión posible. Gracias a la incorporación de una determinada inteligencia detectan

por sí mismos sus posibles errores, dotándolos de memoria suficiente para integrase con otros sensores para formar mecanismos autónomos.

(b) Máquina, cuya fuente de datos son los distintos componentes con los que gobierna sus controladores y actuadores. Dentro de la cadena de producción determina el acabado y la calidad, vigilando el aprovechamiento de los materiales utilizados.

(c) Sistema de Producción, que es el nivel macro de la fábrica que puede verse como un sistema en red encargado de los productos finales; su misión consiste en obtener de forma autónoma la máxima eficacia global de todo el equipo, en busca de la finalización y almacenaje de lo producido, camino de su distribución.

Con la Industria 4.0 las factorías se hacen flexibles fabricando elementos diferenciados adaptados a cada necesidad o cliente, sin que se pierda ni automatización, ni productividad.

(4.3) Sistemas ciberfísicos: Internet de las cosas (IoT, Internet of Things, en inglés) Cibernética se refiere a la estructura de los sistemas de regulación y se vincula a disciplinas más reconocidas académicamente, como la teoría de control y la teoría de sistemas. Hablamos de "sistemas ciberfísicos" para referirnos a la integración de las capacidades digitales interactuando con el mundo físico. Un ejemplo es la vivienda inteligente, donde la construcción tradicional se integra con elementos digitales,

que aprovechan toda la capacidad de procesamiento que existe dentro y fuera del edificio.

Cuando la conectividad de la máquina a Internet superó la conectividad humana era cuestión de tiempo que saltara a los objetos. Hoy estamos viendo alrededor de 25.000 millones de dispositivos conectados, un número que crece constantemente, y por ello necesitamos codificar unos 100.000 millones de objetos. Un ser humano está rodeado de 1.000 a 5.000 de ellos, un nivel de identificación inalcanzable con el protocolo usual de Internet, pero sí posible recurriendo a otros nuevos. El concepto de IoT va más allá de la conectividad entre máquinas ya que propone disponer en cada momento de un sistema de información integrado de la parte física. La IoT contempla una infraestructura global en la que los objetos físicos se combinan con instalaciones digitales y con representaciones virtuales integradas en red que permiten formas de interacción y "comprensión" entre objetos. El desarrollo del IoT soporta el concepto de Infraestructura Inteligente vista como una red de computación, datos y entidades físicas que hace que los entornos humanos sean más favorables, interesantes y seguros. Esta infraestructura está comenzando a aparecer en dominios como el transporte, la medicina, el comercio y las finanzas, con enormes implicaciones para las personas y las sociedades.

(5) Sistemas de *software*
No hay un computador para cada tarea, sino una máquina para ser programada. Para que un programa se ejecute se necesitan

La búsqueda de bases de datos en Internet ha promocionado el uso de metadatos: datos que describen otros datos.

unos datos al inicio, pero serán procesados siguiendo los pasos marcados por un algoritmo subyacente y así llegar a una solución final. Al estar el lenguaje humano muy alejado del código binario, existen lenguajes de programación para crear un código que finalmente es ejecutado por el hardware del ordenador. La evolución tecnológica y la variedad de tareas a afrontar han dado lugar a una frenética aparición de nuevos lenguajes, una inevitable torre de Babel. La ingeniería de Sistemas es la rama encargada de analizar, diseñar, codificar, optimizar, limpiar, documentar y proteger el código. Además de los programas escritos con la sucesión lógica propia del algoritmo (programa) tradicional, también se han desarrollado soluciones basadas en estimaciones hechas a partir de un gran número de datos y del conocimiento de equipos humanos: se trata del *software* de Inteligencia Artificial (IA), una ingeniería específica que se aleja de la ingeniería de sistemas tradicional.

(5.1) Sistemas de Gestión de Bases de Datos, Big Data y BlockChain
Una base de datos (BD) es un conjunto de datos pertenecientes a un mismo contexto,

sistemáticamente almacenados para su uso posterior. Un ejemplo de base de datos es una biblioteca. Las bases de datos en formato digital, además del hardware para el almacenamiento, deben disponer de un *software* para su explotación, llamado Sistema de Gestión de Base de Datos cuyas funciones son controlar el acceso a los datos, asegurar su integridad lógica, gestionar las demandas concurrentes, recuperar los datos tras fallos y hacer copias de seguridad. Estos sistemas cuentan con un lenguaje específico diseñado para administrar y simplificar la tarea de programar aplicaciones. Existen BD distribuidas y ubicadas en diferentes espacios lógicos y geográficos, interconectadas siempre por red.

La búsqueda de bases de datos en Internet ha promocionado el uso de metadatos: datos que describen otros datos. Un grupo de metadatos describe el contenido informativo de un objeto o recurso, al tiempo que ayuda a ubicarlo y a proporcionar información sobre él. Una etiqueta es un metadato, en forma de palabra clave o marca que se asigna a los datos almacenados en un repositorio para facilitar su recuperación. El lenguaje propio de

la Web HTML (siglas inglesas de lenguaje de marcado de hipertexto) se basa en el uso de etiquetas que, entre otras cosas, proporcionan al navegador las informaciones necesarias presentar una página sobre una pantalla.

Big Data es un término que describe cualquier cantidad voluminosa de datos con la posibilidad de ser explotados. Sus fuentes son muy diversas: los sistemas de sensorización; el uso diario de Internet; los propios de una transacción; comercio electrónico y web; interacciones máquina a máquina; datos biométricos; colaboración voluntaria, etc. Los *Big Data* requieren nuevas tecnologías para manejarlos ya que su volumen supera la capacidad de los sistemas actuales.

Una cadena de bloques, en inglés *blockchain*, un concepto aplicado por primera vez como parte del bitcoin, es una base de datos distribuida pensada para datos ordenados en el tiempo con un libro mayor, parecido al usado en contabilidad, compartidos por los usuarios en una red sin importar si es pública o privada. Toda información presente en el libro está cifrada mediante criptografía de clave pública que sólo se puede descifrar con la clave privada apropiada. Cada participante en la red tiene una copia idéntica del libro y su contenido sólo está disponible para aquellos con las claves privadas/públicas adecuadas. Toda nueva información debe agregarse a una cadena de bloques sin que se pueda eliminar o sobrescribir, ya que la información contenida en un bloque sólo puede ser repudiada o editada modificando todos los bloques posteriores. Nótese que el libro acaba siendo un perfecto historial de auditoría con todas las

transacciones habidas en él. Antes de agregar un nuevo bloque en una cadena los usuarios usan unos protocolos de consenso, de forma que no existe ningún "administrador central" con todos los permisos para los accesos. La confiabilidad la construyen los propios participantes ya que un comportamiento malicioso requeriría de una mayor potencia de cómputo y de presencia en la red que el resultante de la suma de todos. Existen dos inconvenientes importantes que van más allá de la tecnología: (a) un gran gasto energético, en el límite de lo tolerable, a causa de la enorme demanda de cálculo criptográfico que incorpora; y (b) su generalización afecta a la gobernanza ya que propone estructuras organizativas que necesitan un nuevo pensamiento jurídico. La desintermediación practicada subvierte la regulación que ahora practicamos, socavando la capacidad supervisora de los gobiernos en actividades vitales como banca, comercio, derecho, etc.

(5.2) Inteligencia Artificial (IA) y Aprendizaje Automático (AA)
El término Inteligencia Artificial (IA) despierta excesivas especulaciones económicas y culturales, por lo que sus resultados deben tratarse con el mayor cuidado y rigor. Lleva a distinguir entre capacidad de llevar a cabo cualquier tarea intelectual exclusiva de los humanos (IA general o dura), que por el momento es poco más que una especulación, de aquella otra (IA blanda) que se conforma con enfrentar el desarrollo de sistemas capaces de realizar tareas que normalmente requieren inteligencia humana, como la percepción visual, el reconocimiento de voz y la traducción entre idiomas (estas

La "Ciencia de los Datos" se encarga de elaborar métodos rigurosos para que los datos no produzcan ningún tipo de sesgo.

tres ligadas a la clasificación perceptiva), y la toma de decisiones automáticas. Incluso para la modesta IA blanda, los lenguajes de programación tradicionales son insuficientes, por lo que se ha optado por programar las computadoras para que aprendan: es el Aprendizaje Automático (AA), que combina ideas de estadística, informática y de otras disciplinas (véase más abajo) aprovechando la enorme capacidad de cálculo existente y el acceso a los *Big Data*. En esta nueva visión del algoritmo se programan conjuntos de reglas que permiten al sistema evolucionar al ritmo de la recopilación de nuevos datos, lo que brinda a las máquinas la posibilidad de aprender a partir de miles de ejemplos y habitualmente con supervisión humana. La mayor parte de lo que hoy se llama IA, particularmente en la esfera pública, es resultado del AA, que todavía tiene que conseguir tres potencialidades casi innatas del humano: sentido común, capacidad de autoexplicación del razonamiento seguido y comprensión del lenguaje. A pesar de ello, el AA concentra en la actualidad grandes inversiones, justificadas por los estimulantes resultados en las aplicaciones ligadas a la clasificación perceptiva:

AA = *Big Data* + Algoritmos de Aprendizaje + Capacidades de Proceso

Para usar *Big Data*, cuyo desarrollo debe mucho al AA, hay que asegurar que aquellos disponibles sirvan para extraer la información necesaria para cada aprendizaje concreto. La "Ciencia de los Datos" se encarga de elaborar métodos rigurosos para que los datos no produzcan ningún tipo de sesgo.

Los algoritmos de AA siguen cinco tendencias imitando disciplinas diversas:

(a) Selección natural: algoritmos evolutivos basados en mantener un conjunto de entidades que representan posibles soluciones que se mezclan para competir entre ellas, de forma que las más aptas prevalezcan y evolucionen hacia mejores soluciones.

(b) Psicología: al igual que los humanos, estos algoritmos se basan en analogías, buscando, entre los datos explotados, problemas similares ya resueltos.

(c) Método científico: aprendices simbólicos que trabajan por inducción.

(d) Probabilidad condicionada (Teorema de Bayes): tras asignar probabilidades iniciales a hipótesis basadas en nuestro conocimiento, se deja que aquellas que resulten ser consistentes con los datos pervivan por ser más probables, abandonando las que no lo sean. A continuación se hacen predicciones dejando que todas las hipótesis voten, con más peso para las más probables. Obviamente los resultados obtenidos tienen probabilidades asociadas.

(e) Funcionamiento del cerebro humano: a partir de un modelo matemático de la neurona, se construyen redes neuronales de miles o millones de unidades y se deja que aprenda fortaleciendo gradualmente las conexiones entre aquellas que se activan conjuntamente al observar los datos. Se conoce como conocimiento profundo (*deep learning*) el obtenido con redes superpuestas en capas. La "profundidad" la da el número de capas, no el conocimiento.

Conclusiones

Aunque algunas de estas ingenierías pueden estar en el límite de lo plausible, las consecuencias de la digitalización no van a frenarse. Estas tecnologías van a instalarse de forma más o menos oculta, como la electricidad que siempre damos por sobrentendida. Los próximos pasos puede que no sean estrictamente digitales: computación cuántica, redes neuronales, redefinición del trabajo y transición energética, pero no hay que abusar de la especulación futurista.

Es posible que en la valoración del impacto de la transformación digital estemos al nivel de conocimiento que teníamos en la investigación climática hace unos 30 años, cuando empezaba a ser un tema de política global. Vivimos una asimetría entre la información codificada y los efectos de su uso. Con la digitalización, electrones que pasan a través de microprocesadores dirigen los flujos energéticos y materiales en el marco de una tecnosfera que abarca desde las órbitas de satélites a 40.000 kilómetros de altura hasta 10 kilómetros de profundidad en la litosfera.

EU policy in the face of the Chinese challenge

Mario Esteban & Miguel Otero Iglesias

As the People's Republic of China transforms itself into a technological and military superpower, while maintaining a party-state system, there is increasing debate at the heart of the EU about the terms on which relations with the country should be pursued. Pressure has been exerted on the debate by the EU's main ally, the US, whose strategic rivalry with China is growing daily.

For decades the EU sought to enhance relations with China on the basis that it was a developing country, something that carried two main implications. First, the EU was willing to accept a relationship based on asymmetrical rules that were advantageous to the Asian giant. Secondly it was hoped that China's socioeconomic development and its incorporation into the value chains of the global economy would translate into greater political pluralism and a general improvement in civil liberties and political rights.

The spectacular progress China has made over the years (it has become the world's second-largest economy, with the second-largest budgets in research and development and defence) has rendered any attempt to describe it as a developing country as obsolete. There are many voices in the EU, moreover, that consider the situation unsustainable, owing to the size and ambitions of China.

China accounts for 20% of the world economy in terms of purchasing power parity and it is therefore hardly surprising that it has become a trading and financial partner of great importance for many European countries. The relationship has always been complex, offering major opportunities and challenges to European companies and governments. The EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, has frequently pointed out that 3 million jobs in the EU depend on trade with China and that many EU companies obtain competitive advantages thanks to their presence in China and their contacts with Chinese suppliers. However, Malmström has also repeatedly called for an end to the discrimination EU companies suffer in China, given that they face various barriers to entry, are not able to access the same sources of finance or tender for the same state contracts as local firms, and

nor do they enjoy the same level of legal protection as their local counterparts. Despite these problems, the document that guided Sino-EU relations from 2013 onwards, the *EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation*, describes China as a vital strategic partner for addressing the main issues on the global agenda in a multilateral international order. This view was substantially revised on 12 March 2019 in a European Commission document titled *EU-China – A Strategic Outlook* prior to the European Council meeting of 21-22 March, in which less benign descriptions of China such as 'economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership' and 'systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance' were added.

This new, more assertive, view of China stems from concern about the fact that the country's development, driven to a large extent by its international relations, has not translated into the adoption of economic and political governance models prevailing in Europe, but rather into the strengthening of a markedly protectionist party-state system; the latter has aided the internationalisation of its companies in strategic sectors that are closed or barely open in its own market to EU firms, and driven its technological development in economic sectors that play a key role in the fourth industrial revolution, such as digital platforms, 5G, big data and artificial intelligence.

Is EU policy towards China being 'Trumpified'?
While the change in the European Commission's narrative on China is highly significant, it is not at all clear how this will translate into the foreign policy of the various member states, nor that the EU or its member states will sign up to the policy of containing China pursued by the Trump Administration and set out at the end of 2018 in a major speech by his Vice-President, Mike Pence.

The member states do not have an agreed stance on relations with China. Indeed, it is possible to identify three distinct positions. In one faction there are countries such as Germany and France, which are driving the more assertive tone in EU policy towards China, and which is also translating into concrete steps such as the implementation of a mechanism to oversee foreign investments. These players are especially concerned, in the European context, by the geostrategic implications of China's rise and by the loss of their companies' competitiveness compared to their Chinese counterparts in strategic and high-added-value industries. Moreover, as they have confirmed in a recent manifesto, the two countries advocate the bolstering of EU industrial policy and the role of the state in driving the creation of European champions that ensure the importance of European companies in these economic sectors, preferably in the global marketplace, but at the very least within the EU market.

In a second group there are countries that share the unease of the first, but are more reluctant to increase the level of state intervention in the economy as a means of addressing the economic challenge posed by China. This group includes the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and the

> *The document that guided Sino-EU relations from 2013 onwards describes China as a vital strategic partner for addressing the main issues on the global agenda in a multilateral international order.*

UK. Brexit has thus had a major effect on the current EU debate on the nature of relations with China, because the group's main champion has lost influence within the Union.

In a third group, the majority of countries in the EU's south and east are more receptive to continue strengthening economic ties with China, even if the Chinese authorities are not willing to embrace economic governance models more attuned to European ones, and choose to continue with an economy that is notably more closed and subject to intervention than its European counterparts. Such countries usually show more interest in attracting Chinese investment and finance than the members of the preceding two groups, because they have more problems in satisfying their financing needs. Moreover, governments that have had disputes with the Commission or with France or Germany on other issues have tended to turn to China to make it clear to their European counterparts that they have other options to diversify their foreign policy. Hungary, Greece and Italy fall into this group.

The most recent illustration of these divisions came with the European Council meeting of 22 March, where discussions on

relations with China ended without an official communiqué, while on the very next day the Italian government agreed a memorandum of understanding to sign up to Xi Jinping's stellar foreign policy project, the Belt and Road Initiative, despite being at the receiving end of repeated lobbying from Washington and Brussels against the initiative. There are now 14 EU member states, including Italy, that have signed some type of agreement to support the initiative (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Romania). The rest (including Spain) reject doing so until such time as the initiative operates in a more transparent and multilateral way, in accordance with the social, environmental and financial sustainability standards recognised internationally and set out in the connection strategy proposed by the EU.

Having said this, it is important to point out that even the players advocating a more assertive reformulation of EU policy towards China, such as the European Commission and the Federation of German Industry (known by its German initials BDI), which published a report on the issue recently, deem it essential to continue bolstering

> *Spain too takes a line that is clearly different from that advocated by the more hard-line members of the Trump Administration, who argue for containment measures against China and a reduction of the interdependence between the two countries.*

economic and political links with China. This is the same message that Juncker, Macron and Merkel conveyed to Xi during his recent visit to Paris, reflecting the lack of EU support for the US desire to block Chinese technology in the development of 5G networks.

Spain too takes a line that is clearly different from that advocated by the more hard-line members of the Trump Administration, who argue for containment measures against China and a reduction of the interdependence between the two countries. This difference of approach stems from a divergence of interests between the US and European authorities. The former are more focused on perpetuating US hegemony and consequently on the evolution of the balance of forces (including in the military sphere) between the US and China. The European authorities on the other hand place more importance on the absolute economic gains and the role that Beijing could play in consolidating a multilateral international order capable of ensuring the provision of global public goods. Whereas the zero-sum game predominates in the US, there is still a belief in Europe in a positive-sum alternative.

What should the EU do?

The growing rivalry between the US and China forces the EU to reflect and ask itself what role it wants to play within the international community in a context in which the US is going to be increasingly concerned with preserving its hegemony and less with ensuring the provision of global public goods and defending the values it shares with Europe, whereas China is going to push in an increasingly concerted way to impose its models of political and economic governance at an international level.

The EU thus faces four possible scenarios: (1) aligning itself with the US, on the grounds of sharing principles and values, and because, over the short and medium-term, the US still underpins European security; (2) aligning itself with China, because it is the most dynamic market in the most dynamic region and because in the long run China will become the largest economy in the world; (3) the EU not acting uniformly, thus becoming divided and weakened, with some countries taking a lead from the US and others from China, and with recurring internal tensions; and (4) the EU coming closer together and acting as a third pole in

a world characterised by systemic strategic rivalry between China and the US and by occasional multilateral cooperation.

The EU should aspire to the fourth scenario, something that entails being committed to taking integration further in order to become a global actor with growing strategic autonomy. Only then will it be able to harmonise and consolidate an effective multilateral international order. The more integrated Europe is –in terms of a banking, fiscal, economic and political union– the more similar will be the interests of the various member states. The process will not be easy and will need to be conducted with sensitivity, empowering the various players to enable them to integrate their interests and thereby feel they are represented.

The Franco-German engine is indispensable for this, but not sufficient. Decision-making about future European champions cannot be the exclusive preserve of Paris and the German industrial cities. Pan-European conglomerates and consortiums are needed along with the distribution of resources in accordance with the specialisations and comparative advantages of the various participants. The watering-down of competition law will not solve anything if it is not accompanied by a greater commitment to funding for education, research, development, enterprise and innovation. Meanwhile, the EU needs to complete the internal market in services and apply the prohibition on unfair state-aid to non-EU companies too. The rules in the single European market must be the same for everyone.

Lastly, Spain, in particular, has a great deal to offer in many areas of this new technological race, from banking, telecommunications and energy, by way of the auto-industry, infrastructure, services (whether involving tourism or otherwise, including education and health) to entertainment, defence and aviation, farming and artificial intelligence. This is the first time in history that Spain has been well placed to play an active rather than a passive role in an industrial revolution. It is a starting point that must not be allowed to let slip.

But it will require a national strategic plan to be developed for the digital era and a new industrial policy and a cross-party national agreement to be forged regarding shared interests. Only then will Spain be able to play a leading role in Europe. Over the course of recent years, Brussels, Berlin and even Paris have requested more input from Spain in EU debates, because they know that Spain is a country convinced that it needs a more united EU to be able to address the major challenges of the 21st century. The rivalry between the US and China is one of these, and Spain is especially well positioned to try to catalyse a consensus on this matter within the Union thanks to its ability to build bridges between member states concerned by the geostrategic implications of China's rise and the loss of competitiveness among their companies, those reluctant to increase the level of state intervention to combat Chinese competition and those who want to attract a greater volume of investment and finance from China.

From the depths to the surface: conflict drivers in the MENA region

Joost Hiltermann & Maria Rodríguez Schaap

Failing to acknowledge the 2011 Arab uprisings as a breaking point announcing the need for a regime overhaul in the region, and therefore a long overdue revision of Western policy, would be a mistake with serious adverse consequences. The 2011 uprisings' strong aftershocks still have the potential to undermine not just individual states but the entire Arab state system.

Summary

Dramatic changes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after 2011 dictate the need for external actors to forge a new policy approach to address the region's long-term challenges. In tackling the region's increasingly intersecting and conflicting politics, aggravated by external interventions, international policy makers should keep their eyes on both old and new conflict drivers, or risk fighting symptoms rather than causes, and thus potentially do more harm.

Analysis

On the periphery of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), in Algeria and in the Sudan, popular uprisings toppled two of the region's longest-ruling leaders in April 2019, opening a new chapter in calls for better governance. In constituting a rejection of the status quo, they carry a similarity with the 2011 Arab revolts.[1] In Algeria, the prospect of a fifth term for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika created a sense of national humiliation and pushed citizens to take to the streets. In their view, the 82-year-old and ailing President could not possibly lead reform, and many Algerians saw their country's potential wasted by interest groups around him.[2] In the Sudan, a cut

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1 Jon Alterman (2019), 'A new Arab Spring?', Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15/IV/2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-arab-spring.

2 International Crisis Group (2019), 'Post-Bouteflika Algeria: growing protests, signs of repression', 26/IV/2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/b068-post-bouteflika-algeria-growing-protests-signs-repression.

> *Today, after all that the region's people have suffered and lost, mass protests in Algeria and the Sudan seem unlikely to trigger a domino effect similar to that initiated by Tunisia almost a decade ago.*

to a government subsidy that trebled the price of bread sparked protests against the 76-year-old President Omar al-Bashir, who had ruled the country for almost 30 years. Protests are of course about much more than bread, with anger centred more generally on a police state's governance failures. Today, the outcomes of the political transitions in the two countries remains unclear.

Continued popular activism throughout the region is proof of a people's enduring aspiration for an end to corruption and for better governance. However, eight years after citizens across the Arab world took to the streets voicing a widespread sense of social injustice, authoritarianism has begun to re-establish itself with a vengeance, bankrolled by Saudi and Emirati cheque-book diplomacy. The regimes that survived the challenge to their rule, instead of re-imagining and reforming themselves to head off further popular protests, are mostly reinforcing the fragile governance structures that have long fed the grievances that prompted the Arab uprisings, including by channelling scarce resources into strengthening their repressive capabilities.

Meanwhile, events in the region continue to create new security concerns for external actors.

Although rightly concerned by developments in the region and fearing the impact in the form of refugees/migrants and jihadism, outside actors are generally not helping. Whereas at the start of the 2011 Arab uprisings Western actors had voiced support for the aspirations of the people in the squares, today short-term priorities are producing securitised policies, which dominate their relations with MENA states. Longer-term drivers of conflict, although recognised rhetorically as part of policy, remain on the backburner of policy makers' agendas.

Today, after all that the region's people have suffered and lost, mass protests in Algeria and the Sudan seem unlikely to trigger a domino effect similar to that initiated by Tunisia almost a decade ago. Yet they should serve as a clear reminder that unaddressed grievances will spawn popular rebellion sooner or later. Failing to acknowledge the 2011 Arab uprisings as a breaking point

announcing the need for a regime overhaul in the region, and therefore a long overdue revision of Western policy, would be a mistake with serious adverse consequences.

Old and new drivers of MENA conflicts

Throughout history, the region has suffered repeated upheavals that either advanced or challenged it, and each of these 'earthquakes' has set off its own set of conflicts. At least five separate 'conflict clusters' have emerged from the trauma of WWI, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the onset of colonial rule, as Arab societies are still seeking to overcome the grievances of their founding:[3]

- Cluster I: internal conflicts deriving from the creation of the region's disjointed governing structures (I-A), and challenges to its borders (I-B). Examples of I-A: various military coups (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Tunisia); and of I-B: Kurdish insurgencies against their respective central states, and the transnational ambitions of jihadist movements.

- Cluster II: Israeli-Arab wars and Palestinian uprisings deriving from the 1948 creation of the state of Israel. Examples: in 1967, 1973, 1982, 1988 and on.

- Cluster III: conflicts stemming from Iran's outward projection in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and efforts to curb it. Examples: the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and Israel-Hezbollah wars in 1993, 1996 and 2006.

- Cluster IV: fighting associated with Sunni radicalisation, which was triggered by the Arab states' defeat in the 1967 war and the 1979 siege of Mecca. Examples: jihadists vs Soviets in Afghanistan, efforts to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood, the 9/11 and other jihadist attacks.

- Cluster V: civil wars triggered by state collapse in the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Examples: Libya, Yemen and Syria. Other states may still be standing but are both highly repressive and internally fragile. Examples: Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and possibly also Saudi Arabia.

The Arab uprisings have left the region in disarray and more deeply polarised. Power vacuums resulting from collapsing states, in the absence of regional unity, functioning conflict-resolution mechanisms or a global arbiter, have empowered ambitious non-state actors and invited interventions by regional actors who fear negative implications to their vested interests. External actors compound this situation through interference, often destructive, that invariably is driven by self-interest, even if well-intentioned.

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3 For a detailed account of the five conflict clusters, see Joost Hiltermann (2018), 'Tackling the MENA region's intersecting conflicts", International Crisis Group, 13/II/2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/tackling-mena-regions-intersecting-conflicts.

The 2011 uprisings' strong aftershocks still have the potential to undermine not just individual states but the entire Arab state system.

The 2011 uprisings' strong aftershocks still have the potential to undermine not just individual states but the entire Arab state system. They largely removed previously influential Arab states (Egypt, Iraq and Syria) as significant actors, compelling the Gulf states to step into the breach and launch new interventions across the region.[4] Yet, ill-equipped to tackle the region's challenges, these actors are failing to impose even the outlines of a new order, and instead contribute to the chaos.

Unprecedented levels of intersecting conflict in the MENA region pose difficult challenges to international policymakers. As pre-existing conflict 'clusters' intersect, original conflict drivers are obscured by new grievances and objectives. This makes individual conflicts harder to analyse and address and heightens the risk that external assistance has adverse unintended consequences. Syria is in the unique position of seeing all five conflict clusters intersect.[5]

Tackling the region's new complexity will require a new approach. Outside actors should identify, acknowledge and accommodate both new but also old conflict drivers, and understand how positive impact in one arena could cause adverse effects in another. They should be wary of unintentionally strengthening local non-state actors pursuing sub-state or transnational agendas, or regional states pursuing sub-state agendas in neighbours in an attempt to keep them weak and to counter adversaries.

The Arab uprisings and their aftermath
To many, the uprisings signalled the need for a change of course in policy towards the MENA region, where a Western 'stability

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4 'Reflections five years after the uprisings', Project on Middle East Political Science, POMEPS studies, 28/III/, https://pomeps.org/2016/03/28/pomeps-studies-18-reflections-five-years-after-the-uprisings.

5 The 2011 challenge to the regime (I-A) dragged in Iran and Hizbollah (II and III), as well as Turkey and Qatar (pro-Muslim Brotherhood, IV), which have competed with Saudi Arabia (anti-Brotherhood, IV); the war has fomented intra-Sunni radicalisation (IV), leading to an increasingly sectarian-tinged struggle (III and IV), while the Kurds have been emboldened to demand self-rule (I-B). To top it off, the rise of jihadists provoked military intervention by the US and its Western allies; the threat of Assad falling drew in Russia; and the PKK's local affiliate's progress in northern Syria triggered Turkish intervention (related to Ankara and the PKK's own Cluster I-B conflict inside Turkey). The Syrian war itself is a Cluster V conflict, with an as yet unknown outcome.

> *The economic and financial crisis of 2008-09, combined with the legacy of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, accelerated the decline of Western primacy in the MENA region.*

paradigm' had long supported inherently fragile authoritarian regimes,[6] and where overly securitised policies were overlooking and aggravating deeper drivers of conflict. For a short moment, such a policy shift seemed to be taking place.

In February 2011, at the yearly Munich Security Conference, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted that security and 'the need for democratic development' had never so clearly converged in the Middle East. Clinton said that the status quo was 'simply not sustainable' and that 'leaders in the region may be able to hold back the tide for a while, but not for long'. To 'help our partners take systematic steps to usher in a better future where people's voices are heard, their rights respected, and their aspirations met' was no longer simply a matter of idealism but a strategic necessity.[7]

However, this reprioritisation did not take place. The economic and financial crisis of 2008-09, combined with the legacy of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, accelerated the decline of Western primacy in the MENA region. In a more multipolar world, a multiplicity of players made common solutions and political settlements more elusive. Thus, in those instances and fields where Western actors aimed to support the region's people, competing agendas were at play, resulting in an incoherent response to the uprisings. Expressing support for protesters in Egypt and intervening directly in Libya, Western powers failed to act in Bahrain, not wanting to confront their Gulf allies. Then, in acknowledgement of their limited ability to impose order on the region, they did not intervene in Syria either.

Soon, a counterrevolution led by Saudi Arabia began to reverse the changes set in motion by the uprisings. It helped reinstate the Egyptian military regime; kept monarchies in Jordan, Morocco and Bahrain afloat with large amounts of aid;

6 Shadi Hamid (2015), 'Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the failure of America's do-nothing policy in the Middle East', *The Atlantic*, 9/X/2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egypt-us-policy/409537.

7 'Hilary Clinton's remarks at the Munich Security Conference', 5/II/2011, US Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/156044.htm.

and funded militias elsewhere. The region's activists failed to unite around a common vision and to drive out status quo powers that violently resisted change. As regional and non-state armed actors jumped into the power vacuums created by collapsing states, Western actors that initially voiced their support for the aspirations of the region's citizens began to shift towards more reactive, heavily securitised, approaches. In many cases these realigned them with the 'same-old' state forces seeking 'stability' and restoration of expired social contracts.

Thus, while the uprisings initially raised hopes of profound social change, they brought disillusion instead, as change proved cosmetic or turned into worse. In the aftermath of the uprisings, instead of re-imagining themselves, the states that remained standing resisted reform and reinforced their repressive apparatus.

Yet, protests in the Sudan and Algeria are the most recent reminder that a deeply felt sense of social injustice persists. Elsewhere, protests expressing frustration with dysfunctional systems of governance have continued sporadically, including in Jordan, Iraq and Tunisia.[8] Protests occurred before 2011 as well, which underlines the continuum of unaddressed grievances.

Towards a more positive engagement with the MENA region

Addressing MENA's persistent governance crisis will not be easy. External actors wishing to support positive change face a region in desperate need of reform yet governed by elites with an existential interest to counteract change whose outcome they cannot control. In almost every MENA country today, the political, economic and social challenges present before the uprisings have worsened, and the political and economic environment post-Arab uprisings is even less conducive to reform.

While some Arab states are making expensive public-relations efforts to attract foreign investment, genuine reform will depend on more inclusive political and economic governance, which utilises the region's human potential to the fullest. Resource-rich Arab states are in a race against time as they rely on elusive economic growth to redistribute wealth and pre-empt dissent. But for the resource-poor, a more inclusive growth process will be the only viable way forward, lest they face collapse.

In the face of these challenges, Western powers might be tempted to see the re-emergence of 'the enemy that we know' as a welcome return of some sort of stability. After all, the dysfunctional but familiar (dis-)order that emerged out of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had long underwritten at least relative stability. Without the trigger of the popular uprising in Tunisia, the prevailing conditions could perhaps have endured for a while longer: the way in which reform-resisting regimes in the region muddle through today serves as evidence.

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8 Marc Lynch (2019), 'Is the next Arab uprising happening in plain sight?', *The Washington Post*, 'Monkey Cage', 26/II/2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/26/is-next-arab-uprising-happening-plain-sight.

> *Past lessons serve as evidence of the limited capacity of external actors to impose order on the region and, moreover, Western governments are by no means the sole external actors in the region.*

Indeed, although the region-wide uprisings 'demonstrated the short-sightedness of the 'stability paradigm' –the model of Arab governments doing the West's bidding in return for the West overlooking the suppression of dissent– that had animated US and European policy for a half-century',[9] energy, restricting migration and terrorism continue to top Western policy agendas.

However, failing to see the Arab uprisings as a breaking point warning of the need for a new approach would be a mistake. Just because the region's collapse is not complete does not mean the remnants will be able to survive for long.

Thus, the question facing external actors today is whether it is in their interest to maintain the current order or to enable its transformation. To the extent that the uprisings represented a final rupture of the social contract in individual MENA societies, and a rejection of the post-WWI order/disorder more broadly, they should serve to refocus outside actors' attention on the Arab states' lingering legitimacy crisis. In engaging with the region, they should give priority attention to issues of governance and other deeper drivers of conflict.

Of course, a new social contract can only emerge locally, from within societies, and change must be driven by the region's citizens. Past lessons serve as evidence of the limited capacity of external actors to impose order on the region and, moreover, Western governments are by no means the sole external actors in the region. Yet, in rethinking their relationship with the MENA region today, they should at the very least seek to become more aware of how their part in the interaction serves to either support or impede change.

External interventions interact with conflict drivers in their various clusters, often compounding them, and overly securitised, short-term policies directed towards individual events in individual conflicts pay insufficient attention to a conflict's deeper drivers. The idea that authoritarianism can

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9 Hamid, *op. cit.*

help tackle extremism continues to prove just as misguided today as it has done in the past. Meanwhile, efforts at mediating negotiated settlements to MENA conflicts flounder on these conflicts' increasingly interconnected nature. The structure of Western governments' and organisations' bureaucracies does not help either: they remain compartmentalised in their understanding of, and approach to, the MENA region, having erected internal, artificial barriers that obstruct efforts at finding a collective way out.

It is clear that the last thing the region needs is a refashioning of the old order. Driven by fear of further chaos, Western states risk setting the stage for even greater chaos once their re-found allies breathe their last.

Instead, they should:

- Rebuild the trust and credibility they have lost with the region's people as a result of decades of support for postcolonial autocrats and the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Technical cooperation and development aid have the potential to do so, but only when that cooperation is actually based on the values that the international community purports to advance. Today, much aid continues to discredit the providers.

- Use development cooperation to build up the autonomy of the region and its citizens, instead of perpetuating dependency ties. Donor countries tend to prefer working with and supporting national governments, overlooking local actors. As a result, recipient states too often treat the funds they receive as rents that help them resurrect the dysfunctional characteristics of the current (dis-)order instead of instituting overdue reforms. Encouraging substantial reforms will likely require finding a range of new partners, from local NGOs to local-level governments, and providing new incentives.

- Beware of the inherent power imbalance of 'partnerships' involving a broader set of citizens, as the outside actor still holds the purse and sets the terms. To help build more participatory and representative structures, development cooperation should respond to local priorities, and external actors should be open to speak to all parties, regardless of political or ideological differences (for example, in the case of Islamists enjoying broad popular support).

- Engage with MENA actors through a coordinated regional and inter-disciplinary approach. Careful inter-agency coordination is instrumental for consistency and for preventing adverse secondary conflicts, including across conflict clusters.

- Start with an accurate real-time understanding of who and what drives conflicts when designing policy responses and be aware of how policies either help address or instead exacerbate deeper conflict drivers,

of the actors they might empower or disempower, and of the grievances this might feed. This requires better independent cross-MENA analysis.

Conclusions

The Arab uprisings underlined the notion that existing conditions in MENA had become unsustainable and announced the region-wide expiry of a socio-economic order that had underwritten relative stability for decades –and with it, the shortcomings of the international system that helped sustain it–. Today, the grievances that led to the near collapse of the regional order persist, and economic trends paint a bleak picture of further decline. Arab states willing or able to only cater to wealthy elites will continue to feed frustrations among the mass of the population, fuelling unrest and outmigration.

At the same time, the 2011 uprisings produced a certain momentum for change, and in some places provided new opportunities. Somehow, new governing structures must emerge, and external actors, if they want to be part of the solution, should be aware that they have long been part of the problem. They need to be aware of how their policies towards the MENA region either help advance or thwart local agendas promoting reform and seek ways in which they may more positively engage with the region.

La salud global y las dificultades prácticas en la implementación de la Agenda 2030[1]

Gonzalo Fanjul

La salud global se ha convertido en un indicador imprescindible del progreso común.

Resumen

El ODS 3 asume la tarea inacabada de los Objetivos del Milenio en asuntos centrales de la pobreza como la mortalidad materno-infantil y amplía su alcance y ambición con metas como la cobertura universal de salud. Por sus conexiones con otros objetivos, sus avances y sus desafíos en materia de financiación, estrategia y gobernanza, la salud global se ha convertido en una especie de piedra angular de la Agenda 2030. Para España, la cooperación internacional en este ámbito y, concretamente, la renovación de su contribución al Fondo Mundial contra la Malaria, el SIDA y la Tuberculosis, se ha convertido también en una oportunidad de reactivar una política que lleva casi una década en coma.

Análisis

Cuando los líderes del G20 se reúnan en Japón en octubre de 2019, uno de los ocho asuntos que discutirán es el de la salud global. Del catálogo interminable de temas que determinan hoy las relaciones internacionales y el bienestar del planeta, la cumbre de Osaka ha decidido destacar materias como la cobertura universal de salud, las pandemias, las resistencias antimicrobianas o el envejecimiento saludable. Y lo harán en el contexto de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) y de una visión informada y científica del progreso humano sobre la base de la equidad y la sostenibilidad.

La salud se ha convertido en un indicador imprescindible del progreso común. A diferencia de los Objetivos del Milenio (2000-2015), las metas de la Agenda 2030 conciernen al conjunto de las naciones del planeta y establecen un doble rasero para la comunidad internacional: las aspiraciones

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> *La salud se ha convertido en un indicador imprescindible del progreso común.*

comunes mínimas y las aspiraciones particulares de cada uno de los países, de acuerdo a su punto de partida y a sus capacidades. En esta hoja de ruta, los indicadores de salud establecen un termómetro del éxito o fracaso de otras políticas. La mortalidad, la longevidad, la libertad y seguridad sexuales, la posibilidad de acceder a un servicio médico libres del miedo a la incompetencia o la deuda: cada uno de estos ámbitos refleja y determina al mismo tiempo el éxito de otros indicadores de tipo económico, político, ambiental e institucional.

La primera parte de este análisis describe brevemente las prioridades de salud en la Agenda 2030, incluyendo algunos de los desafíos principales a los que hace frente. La segunda parte se centra en las contribuciones que puede realizar España a través de su cooperación, utilizando como ejemplo la lucha contra las tres grandes pandemias de la pobreza.

Los ODS le sientan bien a la salud global

La agenda definida por el conjunto de la comunidad internacional en 2015 asume la tarea inacabada de la etapa anterior (Objetivos del Milenio) en asuntos centrales de la pobreza como la mortalidad materno-infantil y las grandes pandemias infecciosas. A pesar del avance sin precedentes de las dos últimas décadas, que ha desplomado las cifras de mortalidad directamente ligadas a la pobreza extrema –alrededor de la mitad en el caso de los menores de cinco años y de sus madres, según el Banco Mundial–, seguimos lejos de los objetivos originales y nos enfrentamos incluso a un repunte de enfermedades como la malaria.

Pero la agenda inacabada es mucho más amplia. Por primera vez, los objetivos globales de desarrollo incorporan el desafío de las enfermedades no transmisibles, de su prevención y de su tratamiento. El cáncer, la diabetes, las enfermedades cardiovasculares, las respiratorias y los trastornos mentales han dejado de ser una preocupación exclusiva de los países más ricos y constituyen hoy la principal carga de morbilidad y mortalidad en el mundo en desarrollo, muy especialmente en las grandes regiones emergentes. De acuerdo con la OMS, el 85% de los 15 millones

de muertes evitables derivadas de estas enfermedades se produce en países de ingreso bajo y medio como las que proliferan en América Latina, Asia y África del Norte, en plena transición epidemiológica y demográfica. La lucha contra el tabaco y el alcohol se han unido a las metas globales hacia 2030.

El tercer gran ámbito de los nuevos objetivos es el de la cobertura universal de salud (CUS). A diferencia de las metas de carácter más finalista, esta asume la responsabilidad de garantizar un derecho que está en la base de los Estados de bienestar modernos: que el acceso a la salud no derive en la quiebra financiera de los pacientes y de sus familias. Se trata de una aspiración compleja, que debe ser interpretada de acuerdo al contexto y a las capacidades de países que se encuentran en un rango amplísimo de nivel de desarrollo.

No hace falta decir que una agenda tan amplia escapa con mucho los límites formales de la salud e ilustra la imbricación profunda entre los diferentes ODS. Aunque sus metas se encuentran formalmente limitadas al ODS3 ("Garantizar una vida sana y promover el bienestar para todos en todas las edades"), la realidad es que no es posible abordarlas con seriedad sin considerar los determinantes sociales y ambientales de la salud, reflejados en otros objetivos. Desde la lucha contra el calentamiento global (ODS13) hasta la reducción de las desigualdades (ODS10), el consumo sostenible (ODS12), la alimentación (ODS2) o el acceso al agua

potable (ODS6), resulta sencillamente imposible alcanzar el primero sin avanzar decididamente en cualquiera de los demás.

Pero la consecución del ODS3 se enfrenta a desafíos más concretos, vinculados de forma directa al propio sector de la salud. El primero de ellos es el de la financiación. La Comisión Lancet sobre Inversión en Salud ha calculado que los recursos adicionales para lograr los objetivos descritos más arriba están en un rango de entre 70.000 y 90.000 millones de dólares anuales. El origen de estos fondos no sólo vendría de los países donantes –a los que se pide que intensifiquen el esfuerzo realizado hasta ahora–, sino también de los propios gobiernos de los países en desarrollo e incluso una parte a través de copagos de los ciudadanos. Una miríada de buenas e innovadoras ideas se han puesto al servicio de este esfuerzo de financiación, que, en todo caso, constituye una de las inversiones más rentables a las que puede hacer frente un Estado: como señalan los autores del informe Lancet, por cada dólar invertido en la financiación de la salud, los países pobres recuperan entre 9 y 20 dólares en forma de mejoras de productividad, incremento del rendimiento educativo y dinamización de la inversión y el acceso a recursos naturales.

El segundo de los desafíos afecta a la dificultad para establecer prioridades dentro de la propia agenda de salud. Los ODS tienen la virtud de ser comprehensivos, pero eso puede derivar en una competencia entre las propias necesidades del sistema. Para los países más pobres, el

ejemplo tradicional es de los programas denominados "verticales" (contra el VIH y la malaria, por ejemplo) frente a los programas transversales de fortalecimiento de la salud primaria. En un país de renta media el conflicto se podría plantear entre esa misma salud básica y la financiación de especialidades en hospitales a menudo limitados a áreas urbanas. Pero también en los sistemas de salud más sofisticados –como el español– es necesario analizar con detenimiento el valor añadido de las intervenciones ligadas a la Agenda 2030 y evitar a toda costa un efecto de vasos comunicantes con otras prioridades sanitarias.

Finalmente, la agenda de salud de los ODS plantea un desafío relacionado con la gobernanza. Un sistema sanitario universal, para empezar, exige un entramado institucional capilar y perfectamente sincronizado, lo que no siempre está al alcance de los países que aspiran a este objetivo. O embridar las relaciones comerciales de todo un país, de las que depende la normativa de propiedad intelectual y el precio de medicamentos esenciales. Pero la gobernanza se complica también por el carácter transversal de los objetivos de salud, que exige consolidar el principio de 'la salud en todas las políticas'. La lucha contra la contaminación y sus efectos sobre las enfermedades no transmisibles ilustra bien la dificultad de coordinar movilidad, urbanismo, pedagogía pública y atención sanitaria bajo un mismo paraguas de políticas.

La acumulación de metas y la complejidad de la Agenda 2030 en el campo de la salud no justifica su incumplimiento. Antes que una obligación, los ODS constituyen una oportunidad. La autopista abierta por la comunidad internacional con esta agenda permite a los gobiernos poner las luces largas y considerar estrategias y políticas que van mucho más allá de uno o dos ciclos electorales. La amplitud abrumadora de las 169 metas de la agenda hacen imposible cumplirlo todo en un período tan corto como 15 años. Por eso mismo, el propósito último de este ejercicio es establecer en cada uno de los países un plan de trabajo que equilibre la contribución necesaria a los objetivos comunes y globales con la aspiración de un puñado de objetivos nacionales ambiciosos y relevantes. Y hacerlo de un modo que busque sinergias entre los propios objetivos.

España es un buen laboratorio de este proceso. De acuerdo con mediciones internacionales comparadas como el *SDG Index*, nuestro país suspende en una serie de indicadores como la prevalencia elevada de obesidad infantil y adulta, de uso diario de tabaco, consumo de alcohol, nuevas infecciones de VIH o tuberculosis, y de desigualdades en salud reflejadas por diferencias en la esperanza de vida al nacer entre regiones. Otras áreas, como la contaminación ambiental en las ciudades o el desempleo juvenil y su interrelación con la salud precisan de un impulso decidido que apueste por soluciones positivas y sostenibles a largo plazo. Otras se ven desafiadas por políticas que muestran la

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fragilidad del sistema como los cambios en la cobertura sanitaria universal o el acceso a medicamentos y tecnologías sanitarias (un ejemplo reciente es el tratamiento de la hepatitis C en nuestro país).

Pero en ninguno de estos indicadores nuestro país puntúa más bajo que en el del compromiso con la promoción de la salud global en otras regiones. Los datos muestran el estancamiento de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD) y de la inversión en investigación, dejando a España en un mal puesto en comparación con otros países de la UE o la OCDE.

El propósito de este análisis es precisamente comentar el papel que la cooperación española podría jugar en el éxito de los objetivos globales de salud. Para ilustrar este argumento se puede recurrir al ejemplo de la lucha contra las tres principales pandemias de la pobreza: VIH-sida, malaria y tuberculosis. La posibilidad de retornar como donante significativo a esta batalla sería un modo de combinar varias de las metas comprendidas bajo el ODS3 y

asegurar la contribución de nuestro país a la consecución de este importante objetivo.

Las tres pandemias, los ODS y las dificultades prácticas en la implementación de la Agenda 2030

Dos décadas atrás, las pandemias del SIDA, la tuberculosis y la malaria parecían imparables. Hoy podemos decir que el mundo ha revertido esta tendencia. La acción de gobiernos, sociedad civil y sector privado –conjurados alrededor de una estrategia común y del valor distintivo de sus aportaciones– ha permitido asegurar el acceso de millones de personas a los tratamientos, mosquiteras y servicios que salven y mejoren sus vidas. En este esfuerzo han sido determinantes los nuevos fondos multilaterales y público-privados, como el Fondo Mundial (FM), Unitaid y ONUSIDA, modelos institucionales de movilización de recursos y estrategias que han revolucionado métodos y objetivos.

La batalla, sin embargo, está muy lejos de ser ganada. De hecho, el desafío de la triple pandemia se encuentra en una suerte de

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encrucijada binaria que podría llevarnos a completar la tarea o a revertir el camino recorrido. El fin de la malaria, el SIDA y la tuberculosis es hoy parte inseparable de una agenda de la salud global en la que la cobertura universal de salud, la reducción de las desigualdades o la innovación científica establecen el horizonte de trabajo hacia el año 2030.

Como enfatiza el propio FM en un reciente documento sobre su estrategia 2021-2023, "los programas [que apoyamos] ayudan a construir sistemas sanitarios resilientes y sostenibles que apuntalan la cobertura universal de salud". Esta concatenación de intereses se explica por el papel necesario de los sistemas de prevención y atención primaria en las estrategias de lucha contra las tres pandemias, aunque también por la focalización en grupos de población particularmente abandonados y en la necesidad de presentar la cobertura como parte de un derecho fundamental de los pacientes. Dicho de otro modo, en los países de alta prevalencia sería casi imposible garantizar objetivos como el de la cobertura universal sin una inversión estratégica en la lucha contra estas tres pandemias, que sobrecargan de forma crónica los servicios sanitarios.

Las posibilidades de canalizar este compromiso no van a escasear. El próximo mes de octubre, por ejemplo, tiene lugar en Francia la conferencia de reposición financiera del FM, donde países donantes y receptores deben garantizar los 14.000 millones de dólares que pueden definir el éxito o el fracaso del ODS3. Existen todo tipo de razones éticas, políticas y de interés propio para que el Gobierno español resucite por esta vía una política de cooperación que lleva casi una década en coma: desde la posibilidad cierta de salvar la vida de casi un millón y medio de personas a lo largo de tres años, hasta la oportunidad de apuntalar sectores estratégicos nacionales como el de la investigación científica. También de demostrar la voluntad de liderazgo y apuesta por el multilateralismo de nuestro país,

en un momento en el que el nacionalismo reaccionario campa a sus anchas por medio mundo.

Si esto es así, ¿qué podría impedir a España retomar esta senda? Se me ocurren al menos tres obstáculos importantes en este camino. El primero de ellos está relacionado con la doble competencia inherente a los ODS de salud: la que se produce entre los objetivos nacionales e internacionales, y la que afecta a las propias metas globales dentro del Objetivo 3. La paradoja del caso español es que las instituciones públicas han asumido el desafío de los ODS con tanto entusiasmo que el empeño en las prioridades propias ha orillado hasta este momento las internacionales. Y no es de extrañar, considerando que la Cooperación Española no sólo carece de presupuestos y peso político, sino que debe hacer frente a un menú de opciones abrumador.

El segundo obstáculo es de carácter político e institucional. Incluso aunque el nuevo Gobierno acelerase la recuperación del sistema de ayuda, pasará algún tiempo antes de que se definan las nuevas estructuras y políticas. Mucho más cuando la Cooperación Española sale del coma en un contexto que se parece poco al de 2010. Si las autoridades esperan demasiado, España perderá la oportunidad de contribuir a un esfuerzo que, curiosamente, refleja mejor que otros las características de la ayuda del futuro. A diferencia de los enfoques de principios de este siglo –financiación del alivio humanitario y la provisión de servicios sociales básicos– hoy buena parte de la

ayuda propone un valor añadido diferente. La financiación directa de intervenciones sigue siendo relevante en ámbitos como el de la acción humanitaria, pero en otros empieza a abrirse camino un modelo basado en el intercambio de conocimiento, la colaboración entre actores públicos y privados, y la búsqueda de impacto estratégico.

Finalmente, el tercer obstáculo podría ser de tipo ideológico. Para algunos de quienes deben tomar esta decisión –como los socios del gobierno a la izquierda del PSOE– ni la cooperación ni los ODS son prioridades evidentes de la acción exterior de España. Para otros que deben influirla –como una parte de la sociedad civil– la financiación de fondos finalistas o "verticales" se produce a costa de otras prioridades de carácter más transversal, y definitivamente a costa de la cobertura universal de salud.

Ninguno de estos obstáculos es insorteable, pero ilustran las dificultades prácticas de sacar adelante una agenda cuajada de encrucijadas.

Conclusiones

El éxito del ODS3 y de las otras metas relacionadas con la salud puede salvar y mejorar la vida de centenares de millones de personas. Reflejan derechos fundamentales cuyo reconocimiento práctico constituye un punto de no retorno para muchas sociedades. Apuntalan la consecución de otros objetivos prioritarios del desarrollo humano, lo que les convierte en una suerte de piedra angular de la Agenda 2030.

Pero para llegar a la meta debemos vencer los desafíos de la financiación, atomización y gobernanza de estos objetivos. Para ello, los países firmantes de este compromiso están obligados a realizar un diagnóstico del estado de la cuestión y un plan para definir, costear y evaluar acciones basadas en las circunstancias propias de cada caso. Eso implica objetivos bien definidos y estrategias para alcanzarlos. De todo el menú de prioridades que despliega la Agenda 2030, ¿cuáles son los grandes debates de Estado, los grandes desafíos en materia de desarrollo sostenible? ¿En qué ámbitos queremos rentabilizar el impulso político que ofrecen los ODS, promoviendo reformas y pactos de Estado, midiendo y siendo medidos?

Lamentablemente, en España todavía no es posible responder a estas preguntas. Cuando ya ha pasado casi un tercio del plazo establecido, nuestro país carece de un orden de prioridades claro, al menos uno que sea público. Diferentes áreas de la Administración han comenzado a trabajar en la dirección que proponen los ODS –el esfuerzo por la llamada Transición Ecológica es un buen ejemplo–, pero sin que exista una vinculación con una estrategia general claramente definida. Esta debe llegar pronto de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de la Agenda 2030. Precisamente por el tiempo transcurrido, es más importante que nunca que el plan defina prioridades claras y reconocibles para el conjunto de la opinión pública.

El acuerdo UE-Mercosur: ¿quién gana, quién pierde y qué significa el acuerdo?

Carlos Malamud y Federico Steinberg

Tras 20 años de negociaciones se ha alcanzado un acuerdo entre la UE y Mercosur. Este análisis explora sus implicaciones económicas y políticas.

Resumen

El acuerdo UE-Mercosur, que parecía que nunca llegaría, crea un mercado de 780 millones de consumidores prácticamente sin aranceles y supone un espaldarazo a la cooperación internacional y al libre comercio en un entorno de crecientes tensiones comerciales. También abre importantes oportunidades económicas de exportación para muchas empresas y, a la vez, supondrá beneficios para los consumidores europeos, pero generará algunos perdedores a los que se debería compensar con instrumentos al nivel europeo.

Análisis

El viernes 28 de junio de 2019, después de una frenética última ronda de negociaciones en Bruselas, finalmente se firmó el acuerdo político que dará lugar a la firma del esperado Tratado de Asociación entre la UE y el Mercosur (Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay). Los intentos de cerrar el acuerdo se han sucedido en los últimos 20 años y si bien las negociaciones estuvieron suspendidas entre 2004 y 2010, en este último año se abrió un proceso que, más allá de sus altibajos, terminó cerrándose de forma positiva.

Una pregunta que se impone en este punto es por qué esta vez sí se logró cerrar la negociación, mientras que en otras ocasiones fue imposible. Y la respuesta hay que buscarla en el cambiante entorno político internacional, caracterizado por las crecientes tensiones proteccionistas y en la ventana de oportunidad que se ha abierto y tenía riesgos de cerrarse el próximo otoño. Era ahora o nunca. Y se ha logrado el acuerdo. En las próximas páginas se analiza cómo se ha fraguado el acuerdo, cuáles son sus principales implicaciones, quién gana y quién pierde con el mismo y qué puede esperarse en el futuro, con un comentario adicional al papel de España en estas negociaciones.

Qué significa el acuerdo y por qué se ha alcanzado ahora

Uno de los elementos que sin duda ha sido clave, tanto en la parte europea como en la latinoamericana, es el cambio de la coyuntura internacional, la presencia de Donald Trump en la Casa Blanca y sus efectos desestabilizadores sobre la economía internacional, comenzando por sus amenazas al multilateralismo y a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC). Seguramente, ante un entorno internacional más cooperativo, la sensación de urgencia por firmar un tratado tan complejo hubiera sido mucho menor.

En el caso de la UE no hay que olvidar que las amenazas contra Europa en general (incluyendo a la OTAN), y contra Alemania en particular, han llevado a muchos actores europeos a cuestionarse el futuro de la alianza transatlántica y la fiabilidad de EEUU como socio estratégico. A esto se suma el obligado cambio en la composición de la Comisión Europea a partir de octubre, que si bien no ha sido un argumento decisivo sí fue importante en el último momento, ya que una nueva dilación hubiera estirado la negociación durante meses o incluso años.

En lo que a Mercosur se refiere, también ha habido nuevos factores importantes que han influido en la negociación, plasmados en los cambios de gobierno en Argentina y en Brasil, pero también en Paraguay. En este sentido, la postura de los países del Mercosur frente a la globalización y al libre comercio no es igual con los presidentes Mauricio Macri, Jair Bolsonaro, Mario Abdó y Tabaré Vázquez que con Cristina Kirchner, Dilma Rousseff, Fernando Lugo y José Mujica, presentes en 2012, y mucho más favorables al proteccionismo.

Y si bien el triunfo de Bolsonaro y la presencia de Paulo Guedes hicieron temer inicialmente por el futuro de Mercosur, las ideas de este último sobre la apertura internacional de Brasil, junto al fuerte liderazgo asumido por Macri terminaron imponiéndose y reduciendo las fuertes pulsiones proteccionistas presentes en sus países. Como ha señalado Andrés Malamud, la voluntad política de las partes ha sido esencial para sacar adelante el Tratado y "contra análisis y pronósticos, Macri se propuso este acuerdo desde el inicio de su mandato. Para bien o para mal, este resultado no existiría sin su determinación".

Esto nos lleva a señalar que estamos frente al primer acuerdo que firma Mercosur con otro gran bloque regional. Esto es muy importante porque el bloque estaba muy aislado internacionalmente e incluso durante años prefirió vivir de espaldas a la otra gran instancia regional, la Alianza del Pacífico, formada por Chile, Colombia, México y Perú. Pese a ello, el inicio de la segunda presidencia de Michelle Bachelet en 2014 permitió iniciar una cierta convergencia entre la Alianza y Mercosur, un proceso que aún no ha cristalizado de forma definitiva. De alguna manera esto explica los tres únicos tratados de libre comercio que tiene firmados Mercosur, más allá de los existentes dentro del llamado marco ALADI (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración)

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y de los actualmente en negociación pero no cerrados, que son con países económicamente tan poco relevantes como Israel, Egipto y la Autoridad Palestina.

Desde la perspectiva europea no se debe minusvalorar el hecho de que lo ocurrido implica un gran triunfo para la UE, cuyos productos entrarán en los países de Mercosur con claras ventajas sobre los de sus más directos competidores como EEUU o Japón. Al mismo tiempo se demuestra que más allá de la retórica y de la idea de conformar una "alianza estratégica" birregional, por cierto bastante carente de contenidos concretos, América Latina importa, y mucho, a la UE y sus Estados miembros.

Desde ahora, la UE tendrá firmado algún tipo de acuerdo con todos los países latinoamericanos salvo Bolivia y Venezuela. Tratados de Asociación con Chile, México, América Central + Panamá y ahora Mercosur; de Libre Comercio (multipartes) con Colombia, Ecuador y Perú y de Cooperación con Cuba. Incluso

Bolivia, durante años muy refractaria a negociar cualquier acuerdo con la UE que implicara el más mínimo contacto con el libre comercio, a través de la cuenta de twitter de su presidente Evo Morales, se ha mostrado más que satisfecha con el acuerdo alcanzado: "Saludamos el acuerdo comercial alcanzado por la UE y el Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), organismo que tiene a Bolivia como miembro en proceso de adhesión. Es importante trabajar juntos en complementariedad y solidaridad en beneficio de nuestros pueblos".

La importancia del acuerdo es tanto simbólica como real. Se trata, sin lugar a dudas, de un espaldarazo político a las oportunidades que los acuerdos de asociación de este tipo, que combinan la cooperación, el diálogo político y el libre comercio, pueden brindar para evitar la corrosión de las normas de gestión de la globalización. Pero a nivel práctico su impacto también es relevante al aportar una dosis de riqueza y crecimiento extra a los firmantes. Pero tampoco hay que llevarse a engaño, ya que ni este tratado

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ni ningún otro resolverá los problemas económicos de la UE ni de Mercosur, aunque tampoco los agravará. Ahora bien, a la luz de las numerosas críticas que ya se han escuchado a ambos lados del Atlántico, algunas provenientes de sectores directamente perjudicados, otras de alto contenido político y más dada la proximidad de las elecciones argentinas, también hay que insistir en esta última idea.

Implicaciones económicas, y más allá
A la espera de que los negociadores cierren la letra pequeña, incluyendo los plazos para la desaparición de ciertas barreras arancelarias y para-arancelarias y el futuro de algunos sectores sensibles para alguna de las partes, lo cierto es que este acuerdo crea un mercado integrado de 780 millones de consumidores y rebaja aranceles por valor de 4.000 millones de euros sólo para los exportadores europeos. En la práctica esto constituye el mayor acuerdo firmado hasta la fecha por la UE.

Según un estudio de la Universidad de Manchester, realizado en 2008 a petición de la UE, la firma del Tratado permitiría

incrementar el PIB de Argentina en un 0,5%, el de Brasil un 1,5%, el de Uruguay un 2,1% y el de Paraguay hasta un 10%. Por su parte, la mejora del PIB europeo sería del 0,1% en el caso de una apertura comercial completa. Siempre conviene tomar estas estimaciones con cautela. Pero lo cierto es que este acuerdo de libre comercio, como todos los anteriores, permitirá aumentar la producción y la eficiencia a nivel agregado y generará ganancias netas en ambos bloques, que en algunos sectores serán especialmente elevadas dados los altos aranceles existentes. Cosa distinta es cómo se distribuirán esas ganancias y cómo se puede compensar a los perdedores. Pero eso es responsabilidad de los mecanismos de redistribución internos en los distintos países.

Hasta ahora, las relaciones económicas birregionales se habían desarrollado muy por debajo de su potencial, sobre todo en materia comercial (aunque menos en lo relativo a las inversiones). Esto no excluye, sin embargo, que la UE sea el segundo socio comercial del Mercosur, sólo por detrás de China. Por eso este acuerdo

El acuerdo asegura el compromiso de los países del Mercosur con los acuerdos de París sobre Cambio Climático, lo que también constituye un éxito para la UE.

abre enormes oportunidades de expansión comercial para ambas partes. En 2018 las exportaciones de bienes de la UE a Mercosur fueron de 45.000 millones de euros y las de servicios de 23.000 millones de euros. La UE es el mayor inversor en Mercosur con un stock de 381.000 millones de euros mientras que el stock de inversión de Mercosur en la UE es de 52.000 millones de euros.

El acuerdo permitirá a las empresas europeas vender sus productos industriales en un mercado hasta la fecha muy protegido, cuyos aranceles al automóvil, calzado y textiles eran del 35%, los de auto- partes del 14%-18%, los de maquinaria del 14%-20%, los de productos químicos del 18% y los de farmacéuticos del 14%-18%. En el sector agrícola, Mercosur también eliminará sus aranceles en productos como el chocolate (arancel actual del 20%), vinos (del 27%) y gaseosas (del 20% al 35%). También elimina aranceles del 28% para productos lácteos, que pasarán a ser administrados mediante cuotas. Esto será especialmente relevante para los quesos europeos. Asimismo, Mercosur se

compromete a proteger 357 denominaciones de origen europeas, incluyendo el Jabugo español.

Por último, las empresas europeas tendrán mayor acceso al enorme mercado de compras públicas que realicen los gobiernos de los países del Mercosur, así como a sus sectores de servicios (tecnologías de la información, telecomunicaciones y transportes, entre otros). Junto con el sector automotriz, la producción cárnica y láctea y las denominaciones de origen este había sido uno de los mayores escollos históricos para cerrar el acuerdo en las dos últimas décadas.

Pero más allá de lo estrictamente comercial, el acuerdo asegura el compromiso de los países del Mercosur con los acuerdos de París sobre Cambio Climático, lo que también constituye un éxito para la UE, que está intentando (sin plantear ultimátums "a la Trump"), que todos sus nuevos acuerdos comerciales incluyan un compromiso ineludible por la lucha contra el cambio climático. Hasta la fecha había dudas sobre la posición de Brasil, como pusieron

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de relieve las prevenciones de Macron para cerrar el acuerdo, aunque estas también tenían el objetivo de intentar frenar lo más posible la apertura del mercado agropecuario europeo a las exportaciones de Mercosur.

También, como había demandado la UE de forma reiterada, el Acuerdo reconoce altos estándares en materia laboral para los trabajadores que participan en el sector exportador, lo que permite a la UE seguir impulsando sus valores (además de sus intereses) en sus acuerdos comerciales. Se trataba de una demandada fuertemente respaldada por los sindicatos europeos y muchos empresarios, especialmente de las pymes, que veían con preocupación una pérdida de competitividad frente a la competencia latinoamericana. Los debates en el seno del Comité Económico y Social Europeo (CESE) son buena prueba de ello y tienden de alguna manera a restar validez a las acusaciones de opacidad en las negociaciones con Mercosur. Otra cosa es la realidad de las instituciones del Mercosur, menos preparadas para este tipo de debates.

Más allá de algunas de las consideraciones aquí expresadas, también hay que señalar que no todo son ventajas para la parte europea. Como en todo acuerdo comercial habrá ganadores y perdedores. Y los que históricamente se oponían al acuerdo en la UE eran los productores agrícolas, especialmente Francia, Irlanda y Polonia. Aunque la UE ha logrado que los países del Mercosur se comprometan a cumplir los estándares europeos de producción agrícola (que se encuentran entre los más exigentes del mundo en materia sanitaria y fitosanitaria), sin duda el acuerdo aumentará las exportaciones agrícolas desde América Latina, en perjuicio de los productores europeos. Ahora bien, más allá de las presiones de los agricultores y ganaderos de algunos países de la UE, lo cierto es que tanto los consumidores europeos como los latinoamericanos, se encuentran entre los grandes ganadores del acuerdo.

No debe olvidarse que Mercosur es el principal proveedor de productos agrícolas de la UE con el 20% y de casi el 70% de los productos para la alimentación animal, fundamentalmente de Brasil. Cerca del 80% de la carne de vacuno importada en

> *La firma del Tratado pone de manifiesto que la UE es quien más claramente está liderando esta defensa de las instituciones de cooperación económica, tanto a nivel multilateral (con la propuesta de reforma de la OMC) como preferencial.*

Europa procede igualmente de esa zona. Es evidente que todo esto pondrá mayor presión sobre muchos agricultores europeos. Por eso es crucial que la UE mejore sus herramientas para compensar a los perdedores de los acuerdos de liberalización comercial. Tanto de este como de los demás firmados.

Pese a que la política comercial se negocia en Bruselas y los tratados sólo requieren del refrendo del Parlamento Europeo (y de los parlamentos nacionales si cubren competencias mixtas), su impacto en los distintos países y regiones de la Unión es muy desigual. Por eso resulta imprescindible mejorar la situación económica y el bienestar de los perdedores de la liberalización con instrumentos fiscales centralizados al nivel europeo si se quiere aumentar la legitimidad de los acuerdos comerciales dentro de la UE, que últimamente está en horas bajas. Es necesario, por ejemplo, reformar el Fondo de Ajuste para la Globalización para aumentar sus recursos y hacerlo más flexible, de modo que más individuos y empresas (sobre todo pymes) puedan aprovecharlos.

Conclusiones

Refrendo al libre comercio y escollos a superar

La firma del Tratado vuelve a demostrar el gran interés por los acuerdos de liberalización comercial que existe entre los países partidarios de mantener un sistema económico abierto y basado en reglas estables y predecibles en un contexto de amenazas a la cooperación y crecientes guerras comerciales iniciadas por Trump. También pone de manifiesto que la UE es quien más claramente está liderando esta defensa de las instituciones de cooperación económica, tanto a nivel multilateral (con la propuesta de reforma de la OMC) como preferencial. Este acuerdo UE-Mercosur se suma a los recientemente alcanzados con Japón, Singapur, Canadá, Australia y Vietnam, a los cuales hay que añadir el previamente negociado con Corea y los más de 15 actualmente en fase de negociación.

Por último, se debe subrayar el papel de España, que siempre ha estado interesada, con independencia del color de sus gobiernos, en que este acuerdo llegara a

buen puerto. Prueba de ello fue el intento de relanzar las negociaciones a partir de la Cumbre euro latinoamericana de Madrid en 2010, así como otras iniciativas más recientes. En la fase final de la negociación, y cuando parecía que se podría llegar a un nuevo bloqueo, el gobierno español lideró una iniciativa para acelerar el acuerdo. Tras una nota de Francia, Irlanda Bélgica y Polonia advirtiendo sobre los riesgos que el acuerdo implicaba para los sectores agrario y ganadero, España impulsó la firma de una nueva carta de compromiso con el tratado y las oportunidades que se presentaban, que apoyaron Alemania, los Países Bajos, Letonia, Portugal, la República Checa y Suecia, y que parece que ha sido determinante. Entre otras cosas, esto demuestra la creciente influencia de España en la UE.

Tras la negociación de la letra pequeña, a producirse en los meses venideros, queda la aprobación por parte del Parlamento Europeo y de los parlamentos nacionales de los cuatro países del Mercosur para que el Tratado comience a implementarse. Sería importante que los dos procesos se completaran cuanto antes. Sin embargo, no hay que perder de vista las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias argentinas, a celebrar en octubre próximo, en las cuales podría producirse un triunfo del kirchnerismo.

De confirmarse tal escenario, y a tenor de algunas manifestaciones escuchadas en los últimos días, incluyendo al candidato presidencial y al hijo de la candidata a vicepresidenta (y verdadera jefa del movimiento), no sería imposible un rechazo categórico a lo acordado y un nuevo comienzo de las negociaciones. En ese caso tampoco sería descartable que la UE junto a Brasil y Paraguay (y eventualmente también Uruguay) decidieran continuar la marcha solos, sin Argentina (como había comenzado a esbozarse ya en 2013).

Emerging security challenges in NATO's southern neighbourhood

Ian O. Lesser

NATO confronts an increasingly complex and risk-prone environment. A more assertive Russia poses specific challenges and the Alliance has made headway in addressing risks emanating from the east. NATO has been less explicit in addressing risks emanating from the Mediterranean and from the 'south' more generally. These risks are real and will make new demands on Alliance strategy in the years ahead.

Summary

NATO has always had a southern exposure. Since the early years of the Alliance, the question of how to understand and address challenges emanating from the Mediterranean and beyond has been on the NATO agenda in political and security terms. Today's strategic environment provides a new context for this traditional question, but also raises fundamental questions of geography, alliance politics and a shared approach to risks. Transatlantic relations and NATO burden-sharing will be elements in the equation as NATO looks south.

Analysis

The definition of the southern limits of the NATO area of responsibility was a key political issue when Algeria was still part of France and other members retained colonies in Africa and elsewhere. The earliest NATO enlargements were southbound, with Greece and Turkey. During the Cold War, the East-West military balance had a distinct southern dimension, alongside more focused threats on the northern and central flanks. But despite the considerable military assets and infrastructure deployed across NATO's southern region, the Mediterranean remained a secondary concern in Alliance strategy. The defence of Frankfurt and Athens were never really equivalent strategic priorities. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, challenges in the south were seen as local concerns, or linked to broader questions of global strategy, of interest largely to the US. The experience of two Gulf Wars reinforced this perception, with NATO's south serving, above all, as a logistical link to the Gulf.

Formal NATO strategy continued –and continues– to treat Mediterranean challenges as a fully equivalent part of collective defence. But Alliance politics and the wider strategic debate are another matter.

Today, strategy looking south is experiencing a renaissance. Terrorism is a key part of the equation in both public and elite perception, and this concern is hardly limited to NATO's southern members. Power projection and crisis management in the face of a very unstable security environment from North Africa to the Levant is another key element. Unease over migration pressures and hard and soft security challenges emanating from the global south are also driving the debate. Yet the sheer scale of the relevant geography, the diversity of risks and their diffuse character, and strategic distractions elsewhere continue to complicate Alliance thinking about the security environment across the 'southern neighbourhood' and how to address it.

What south?

The contemporary question of NATO's southern strategy has provoked a fundamental debate over what, precisely, is meant by the 'south'. The Mediterranean is the undeniable centre of gravity in this context. Developments across the Mediterranean space, at sea and ashore, touch directly on the security interests of the Alliance as a whole. NATO has a well-established partnership programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue, embracing North Africa and the Levant.[1] This initiative, celebrating its 25th anniversary in 2019, has evolved significantly over time. It has acquired a more practical orientation with the broad aim of capacity building and encouraging a shared security culture around the Mediterranean. It remains a vehicle for multilateral discussions in a setting that allows for few interactions between, for instance, Israel and the Arab states, or Morocco and Algeria. It could be even more active in this context if political conditions were more permissive.[2] The inclusion of Mauritania appears much less eccentric today against the backdrop of mounting security challenges emanating from the Sahel.

But it is increasingly clear that effective consideration of NATO strategy looking south cannot stop at the Mediterranean and its immediate hinterlands. NATO's southern exposure has broadened in political and practical terms. Beyond the Maghreb, Africa as a whole is now part of the strategic equation and is set to become even more important over time. Migration, spill-overs of terrorism and illicit flows of all kinds have made Africa an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus. The US, France and other NATO members now have a substantial military presence across the Sahel and West Africa. The latter is a

1 Founded in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue now includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Mauritania.

2 See Ian Lesser, Charlotte Brandsma, Laura Basagni & Bruno Lété (2018), *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: Perspectives on Security, Strategy and Partnership*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, May, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/future-natos-mediterranean-dialogue.

Migration, spill-overs of terrorism and illicit flows of all kinds have made Africa an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus.

growing focus of intelligence collection, surveillance and security partnerships. The deployment of new NATO assets, including Global Hawk drones based in Sicily, is clearly oriented towards risks emanating from this quarter. The enlargement of this security space implies closer cooperation with institutions such as the African Union (AU) and the G5-Sahel. Ultimately, countries such as Senegal, Nigeria and South Africa could be significant partners in NATO's effort to 'project security' (a somewhat unfortunate term) southward.

The relevant geography for NATO is potentially even more far-reaching. Analysts and policymakers are focusing more directly on illicit flows around the Atlantic basin. Today, European and North American security interests are directly affected by the substantial flow of drugs and related trafficking from Latin America and the Caribbean across the Atlantic to West Africa, Cape Verde and northward to the Maghreb and across the Mediterranean. This phenomenon is an example of trans-national threat par excellence.

Taking this approach even further, the 'south' could imply all those challenges facing NATO outside the confrontation with Russia in the east. It could easily embrace the entire geography from West Africa and its Atlantic approaches to South and even South-East Asia. Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf are already part of this southern calculus given the counter-terrorism and maritime security missions in which NATO members have already been engaged. Ultimately, this outlook converges with the steadily growing pressure for the Alliance to address risks generated by the rise of China and instability in the Indo-Pacific. Clearly, there are limits to this immense enlargement of NATO's operational space. Pressing defence requirements in Europe's east and disillusionment with the mission in Afghanistan have reduced the appetite of allies for expeditionary strategies.

Operationally, there are obvious limits to NATO's global engagement. But it is important to distinguish between the idea of NATO action in the global south and the role of the Alliance as a place where wider strategic concerns can be discussed and

> *A vision of southern security in which instability and conflict is not an aberration but the norm underscores the importance of missions beyond periodic crisis management.*

policies coordinated. In a political sense, NATO's south can stretch as far as allies agree to take it.

Thinking beyond crisis management

The Alliance has more than enough to deal with even in a limited definition of the south. The range of potential contingencies and missions around the Mediterranean, Africa and the southern Atlantic is substantial. Many of these challenges are of an unconventional or irregular nature, or involve long term political, economic and environmental pressures. But there are also some tangible territorial threats. Turkey faces potential Article V-type contingencies on its eastern and southern borders, and an unstable balance with Russia in the Black Sea. Experience in Libya, Syria and elsewhere encourages a view of Mediterranean security as an ongoing exercise in crisis management. This may be an inadequate template for the future. There will surely be crises requiring a concerted response. Yet the weakening of states around the southern Mediterranean and the prospect of open-ended conflict in places like Libya, raises

the spectre of something closer to sustained instability or durable chaos. The regime in Damascus may well be able to secure its position, but will Syria ever return to the pre-civil war status quo? There is a very real possibility that Syria and the Levant will remain unstable and prone to proxy wars for years to come.

A vision of southern security in which instability and conflict is not an aberration but the norm underscores the importance of missions beyond periodic crisis management. In addition to making risks more transparent through better air, maritime and cyber surveillance –current situational awareness–, the Alliance will need to build its capacity for warning. This implies better sharing of longer-term intelligence and analysis of over-the-horizon risks. The NATO Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples can be one vehicle for this task. But the real capacity for warning is likely to come from bringing together the assessments of Alliance members and partners across the south.

One of the key developments across this vast space has been the emergence of new actors and the return of some old ones.

New actors, new stakes

At the risk of restating the obvious, the source of the challenge to NATO in the east is clear, even if the dimensions of the security problem are complex, ranging from the nuclear to the conventional, the irregular to the digital and, ultimately, the political. In the south, NATO confronts immense diversity across the spectrum of risk. There are flashpoints, but no clear centre of gravity in security terms.

One of the key developments across this vast space has been the emergence of new actors and the return of some old ones. Russia has a long history of involvement in Mediterranean affairs dating to Czarist times. During the Cold War, Soviet strategy emphasised the cultivation of security relationships around the Middle East and Africa, north and south. The Soviet navy maintained a meaningful presence in the Mediterranean, even with the limited infrastructure available ashore in such places as Syria and Algeria. This presence essentially evaporated for more than a decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Russia is now back, politically and militarily. The Russian intervention in Syria is the most obvious facet of Moscow's return, alongside a longstanding relationship with Algeria, activism in Libya and a revived security relationship with Egypt. Russia has remained an influential political actor from the Balkans to the Levant. Moscow's relationship with Ankara has flourished even as Turkish-Western relations have deteriorated (the planned sale of the Russian S-400 air defence system to Turkey is now the central issue in a deeply troubled relationship between Washington and Ankara). In short, Russia is once again a political-military actor of some importance around the Mediterranean and beyond.

Russian activism bridges NATO's eastern and southern concerns in some tangible ways, not least in terms of Black-Sea security. As in the Baltic, the growing friction between Russia and NATO has led to a heightened risk of military incidents in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, where forces are operating in proximity. The current level of Russian engagement on

Emerging challenges and NATO strategy looking south take on special meaning in the context of the current transatlantic security debate.

NATO's southern periphery may or may not be sustainable over the longer term. But, for the moment at least, Moscow is back.

A transatlantic debate

Emerging challenges and NATO strategy looking south take on special meaning in the context of the current transatlantic security debate. US engagement and transatlantic burden-sharing are likely to play out in distinctive ways on Europe's southern periphery. As in Eastern Europe, fears of US disengagement across the region have so far proved to be exaggerated. Deterring and defending against a revived Russia –an existential issue for the Alliance in the East– can hardly be contemplated without US nuclear and conventional contributions. For all the sharp rhetoric around Washington's pointed pursuit of rebalancing in European defence, the US security presence in Europe has increased in recent years. This is evident in the south, too, although the posture is clearly in flux (as seen in the rapid growth and equally rapid reduction in US forces deployed in West Africa and the Sahel). Washington remains a leading diplomatic and security actor from the Maghreb to the

Indian Ocean, from the Black Sea to sub-Saharan Africa. To be sure, the US naval presence in the Mediterranean does not resemble its Cold War form, when the Sixth Fleet kept at least one carrier battle-group in the area. The current pattern was set during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when European naval forces took over much of this Mediterranean role through NATO's Operation Active Endeavour. But the US maintains substantial command, air and rapid deployment assets in and around the Mediterranean. The bulk of the ballistic missile defence capacity is afloat in the region.

The US presence in the south is, however, subject to uncertainty over time. A major crisis in Asia could draw substantial US attention and presence away from Europe's southern periphery. Indeed, allies are already concerned about the durability of US engagement in the Middle East and North Africa. Persistent crises and calls for intervention in the region are unlikely to be well received by the Trump Administration –or by its possible successors–. The Sahel and the Balkans are already seen as areas

for European security leadership. The US strategic class tends to see these as places Europe can reach and should be able to manage in security terms. Calls for European 'strategic autonomy' and new EU defence initiatives, if they amount to anything, should be felt first and foremost in the south where European allies already deploy significant forces. As an area where low-intensity maritime, humanitarian and counter-terrorism contingencies abound, this is a particularly promising theatre for NATO-EU cooperation. Operations in the south are also redefining US priorities for bilateral military cooperation in Europe. Today, France is arguably Washington's leading security partner.

Conclusions

There is an evident asymmetry between the scale and character of NATO's security challenges in the east and the south. But the Alliance politics in these settings is less clear-cut than is sometimes assumed. To be sure, NATO's southern members are more inclined to focus on risks emanating from a wider south. Poland and the Baltic states have their own well-founded concerns. But beyond these obvious differences, security perspectives across the Alliance are more nuanced and complex. For most of Western Europe, the risk of terrorism and political violence emanating from the south trumps the fear of Russian aggression. Terrorism below the level of 'super terrorism' and uncontrolled migration –both emblematic of challenges emanating from the south– may not pose an existential threat in strict terms, but both can be politically existential for the societies affected.

Some southern members may be characterised as softer on Russia. Growing Russian activism around the Mediterranean, at odds with southern European interests in Libya and elsewhere, may lead to a hardening of attitudes over time. In short, geography may be a declining guide to strategic priorities in a time of trans-regional risks. The contours of the NATO debate about strategy south –a traditional issue in political and defence terms– are changing rapidly under pressure of emerging challenges and evolving ideas about what exactly is meant by the 'south'. Whatever the geographic parameters, the weight of these southern challenges in Alliance planning is likely to increase as part of a broader, global rise in risk.

La influencia de España en el ecosistema europeo de energía y clima

Gonzalo Escribano, Lara Lázaro y Elisa Lledó

España debe aprovechar el nuevo Parlamento y la nueva Comisión para mantener y renovar su influencia en materia de energía y clima.

Resumen
La agenda energética de la nueva Comisión y Parlamento europeos plantea numerosos y muy diversos retos para España, desde los imperativos de la transición energética a la integración de Argelia en el espacio energético europeo, pasando por la siempre presente cuestión de aumentar la integración energética de España en Europa con más interconexiones. En el caso de las políticas de energía y clima, España cuenta con sendas de política pública (*policy pathways*) claras, tanto por parte del gobierno (que ha enviado a Bruselas su Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima-PNIEC, cuenta con un anteproyecto de Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética y ha desarrollado una Estrategia de Transición Justa, que es ejemplo de buenas prácticas a nivel internacional)[1] como por parte de los principales partidos del arco parlamentario.[2] En abril de 2019 el gobierno presentó también una Estrategia Nacional contra la Pobreza Energética y está trabajando

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1 UN (2019), "Deputy Secretary-General, praising Spain, Germany for just Coal-to-Renewable Energy Transition Plan, stresses need to address social impact of economic restructuring". De hecho, España lidera, junto con Perú, una de las áreas de acción (el conocido como *track 2* de motores sociales y políticos) de la semana de acción climática (*Climate Action Week*) que organiza el secretario general de Naciones Unidas, Antonio Guterres en septiembre de 2019. El track 2 se centrará en los aspectos de transición justa y salud de la transformación hacia sociedades neutras en carbono. Los resultados esperados del *track 2* incluyen que al menos 50 Partes del Acuerdo de París incluyan la transición justa en sus próximos compromisos determinados a nivel nacional (NDC) y asegurar el cumplimiento de los estándares de calidad del aire establecidos por la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS). Véase E. Kosolapova (2019), Climate Action Summit coalitions outline expected outcomes under each of nine tracks, IISD, 7/V/2019.

2 Grupo Parlamentario Popular en el Congreso (2019), "Proposición de Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética", http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/BOCG/B/BOCG-12-B-283-1.PDF; Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2019), "Anteproyecto de Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética", https://s03.s3c.es/imag/doc/2018-11-15/Anteproyecto-Ley-Cambio-Climatico-Transicion-Energetica.pdf; Grupo Parlamentario Confederal de Unidos Podemos-En Comú Podem-En Marea (2018), "Proposición de Ley sobre Cambio Climático y Transición Energética", http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/BOCG/B/BOCG-12-B-302-1.PDF.

en la estrategia de descarbonización a largo plazo.[3] Las prioridades actuales del gobierno también parecen claras y centradas en el *Green New Deal*, uno de los mensajes clave de la campaña de los socialistas europeos. No obstante, de los análisis sobre la influencia de España en Bruselas, parece deducirse que hay margen para aumentar dicha influencia en determinadas parcelas del ecosistema de las políticas de energía y clima de la UE. El análisis se basa parcialmente en los resultados de un grupo de discusión con *stakeholders* del sector en la oficina del Real Instituto Elcano en Bruselas y de consultas posteriores con diferentes actores energéticos, públicos y privados.

Análisis

En el primer análisis de esta serie dedicada a la influencia de España en Bruselas, sus autores apuntaban que "se requiere una estrategia de país que establezca prioridades claras sobre cómo gestionar la influencia nacional en las distintas áreas temáticas e instituciones relevantes de la UE".[4] Además de varias cuestiones relacionadas con los procesos, también se preguntaban Simón *et al.* en qué políticas concretas tiene España más influencia y, más importante, para qué quiere España influir, es decir, los objetivos y prioridades de dicha influencia.[5] Respecto a los procesos relacionados con las políticas de energía y

clima, poco puede añadirse a su conclusión de intentar aumentar el peso en el Consejo, los contactos con la Comisión, la cohesión de los europarlamentarios españoles y la presencia de la sociedad civil (ONG, asociaciones empresariales y profesionales, medios de comunicación y *think-tanks*). Uno de los elementos destacados es aumentar el peso de los europarlamentarios españoles en los comités relevantes del Parlamento Europeo (ITRE, ENVI, TRAN, ECON, entre otros) y su capacidad para liderar dosieres clave; por el contrario, su excesiva rotación es percibida como poco recomendable.

Todos esos elementos suman en la conformación de las tendencias de las políticas energética, climática y energética exterior europeas. Al igual que en otros sectores, algunos actores españoles del paisaje energético comunitario destacan que otros países parecen conocer mejor los procesos y que su participación en los mismos está más "sistematizada" y "tasada". Además, en otros países parece haber un mayor consenso sobre "qué hacer juntos". También se alude en algunos casos a la conveniencia de una mayor "coordinación", siquiera "informal", entre empresas. Respecto a la existencia de foros, existe un Círculo Energético Español de Bruselas (CEEB) que, bajo los auspicios de Enagás, trata de reproducir lo que otros Estados miembros venían haciendo desde

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3 Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica (2019), "Consulta pública para la 'Estrategia a largo plazo para una economía española moderna, competitiva y climáticamente neutra en 2050'", https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/ministerio/servicios/participacion-publica/Estrategia_2050.aspx.

4 L. Simón, I. Molina y N. Martín (2019), "Hacia un ecosistema de influencia española en Bruselas", ARI nº 30/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 11/III/2019.

5 *Ibid.*

> *España tiene la situación "perfecta" para liderar la transición energética, pero tiene que estar "más presente" en la escena europea, como lo están Francia y Alemania.*

hace tiempo, reuniendo periódicamente a representantes españoles del sector energético activos en Bruselas, tanto del sector privado como de las instituciones europeas y españolas. Su objetivo es crear una red de profesionales que intercambien información, identifiquen asuntos de interés común en perspectiva nacional y debatan posibles acciones conjuntas para promoverlos. Este foro podría usarse como punto de partida para intensificar la coordinación de los actores energéticos españoles en Bruselas en materia de energía y clima.

Según una destacada funcionaria española de la Comisión, España tiene la situación "perfecta" para liderar la transición energética, pero tiene que estar "más presente" en la escena europea, como lo están Francia y Alemania. Sin embargo, esta falta de presencia no se observa únicamente en el sector de energía y clima, siendo abordada dicha ausencia parcial desde una perspectiva más política y procedimental por otros análisis de esta serie. Por ejemplo, algunos actores energéticos destacan la

necesidad de una mayor coordinación entre las administraciones españolas. De hecho, una de las recomendaciones frecuentes de los funcionarios españoles en Bruselas es la de "romper silos", adoptar una visión global que aborde la complejidad del ecosistema de energía y clima: no se trata sólo de renovables y gas, sino de transporte, industria, sector financiero y telecomunicaciones.

En consecuencia, las páginas que siguen se centran en las prioridades más que en los procesos. Se destaca primero la existencia de una estrategia con prioridades claras, aunque con lagunas en la transmisión de las preferencias geográficas españolas a la política energética exterior. Es evidente que resulta difícil compensar la pérdida de un comisario de Energía y Clima, pero hay elementos para mantener e incluso aumentar la influencia, tanto general como sectorial. Así, el reciente nombramiento como alto representante de Política Exterior de la UE del actual ministro Josep Borrell, que conoce bien los dosieres energético y climático, así como el mediterráneo y el latinoamericano,

puede ser una buena oportunidad para corregir esos vacíos. La segunda parte del análisis aborda las especificidades de un sector como el energético, que incluye intereses muy variados y en ocasiones contrapuestos, lo que obliga a identificar las preferencias compartidas para elevar su rango en el debate energético europeo. El último apartado concluye con las recomendaciones más destacadas del documento.

Estrategia y prioridades

En relación con la existencia (o inexistencia) de una estrategia y prioridades claras en materia de energía y clima, tanto la UE como España cuentan con planes energéticos a medio y largo plazo para alcanzar el objetivo compartido de la neutralidad en carbono en 2050. Aunque la UE y los Estados miembros cuentan con sendas de política (*policy pathways*) alternativas, todas ellas coinciden en el objetivo final.[6] España cuenta con un borrador del plan energético a medio plazo, el PNIEC (2021-2030), que es, en términos generales, ambicioso en comparación con los borradores de los PNIEC de otros Estados miembros. De hecho, la evaluación de la Comisión Europea del PNIEC ha sido muy positiva. Dicha evaluación refuerza el potencial de liderazgo español en la UE. En este sentido, España ha demostrado capacidad de liderazgo al posibilitar el aumento de los objetivos de renovables y de eficiencia energética a 2030 tras su cambio de postura en 2018. Además, Alemania ha perdido parte de su fuelle climático, Francia se está recuperando de los "chalecos amarillos" y el Reino Unido puede ver su liderazgo climático mermado tras el *Brexit*.[7] En el plano político, las prioridades actuales del gobierno español están alineadas con el *Green New Deal* de los socialistas europeos, como ha repetido el candidato Josep Borrell durante su campaña europea y ha sido explicitado en esta misma serie de análisis.[8]

Otros grandes partidos políticos españoles cuentan también con propuestas consistentes con los objetivos comunitarios en materia de energía y clima.[9] Los funcionarios españoles de la Comisión destacan la importancia de contar con un consenso nacional en materia de clima y energía.[10] Es más, la Comisión espera del gobierno español un impulso a la agenda renovable y climática europea,[11] que podría consolidar el legado dejado por el comisario

6 Véase al respecto J. Lilliestam, R. Thonig, L. Späth, N. Caldés, Y. Lechón, P. del Río, C. Kiefer, G. Escribano y L. Lázaro Touza (2019), "Policy pathways for the energy transition in Europe and selected European countries", Deliverable 7.2 MUSTEC project, Deliverable 1 SCCER JA IDEA, ETH Zürich, Zürich.

7 C. Burns, J. Gravey, A. Jordan y A. Zito (2019), "De-Europeanising or disengaging? EU environmental policy and Brexit", *Environmental Politics*, vol. 28, nº 2, pp. 271-292, DOI 10.1080/09644016.2019.1549774.

8 Véase la reflexión de José Manuel Albares, secretario general de Asuntos Internacionales de Presidencia del Gobierno (2019), "España da seguridad a Europa", Real Instituto Elcano, 24/IV/2019, destacando el papel del *New Green Deal* y de la I+D+i para la industria española.

9 N. Caldés, G. Escribano, L. Lázaro, Y. Lechón, C. Kiefer, P. del Río, R. Thonig y J. Lilliestam (2019, "Policy pathways for Spain's energy transition", ARI nº 63/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 4/VI/2019.

10 En este sentido, Pedro Sánchez ha anunciado que en la XIII legislatura impulsará un pacto de Estado por la transición ecológica.

11 Véase A. Barreira (2018), "Spain to lead the energy transition in Europe?", Euractive, 3/VII/2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/spain-to-lead-the-energy-transition-in-europe/1253119/.

> *La Comisión espera del gobierno español un impulso a la agenda renovable y climática europea, que podría consolidar el legado dejado por el comisario Arias Cañete.*

Arias Cañete.[12] Los agentes empresariales son también conscientes de que tiene que haber una política nacional consensuada y coherente con la europea para "asentar" la influencia de España. Según algunos actores empresariales, esto sí sucede desde hace tiempo en algunos Estados miembros, que cuentan con una visión a largo plazo estable sobre la que cimentar sus posicionamientos en el Consejo y ante la Comisión y Parlamento. En una de las reuniones realizadas en el marco de este proyecto se planteó que "a Alemania no hace falta preguntarle qué opina, ya se sabe". La claridad y ambición del posicionamiento del actual gobierno parece hacer también innecesaria esa pregunta respecto a la actual política energética y climática española, independientemente de que a las diferentes empresas les pueda gustar más o menos.

Otro elemento positivo es el apoyo por parte de España a la consecución de una Unión de la Energía que incluya un mercado único a nivel europeo. Sin embargo, el objetivo de la Unión de la Energía de lograr un mercado energético donde la energía fluya libremente a través de las fronteras no se ha conseguido. La resistencia de Francia ha limitado y retrasado los logros conseguidos, pero la situación no es la misma en gas que en electricidad. En electricidad resulta especialmente urgente incrementar el nivel de interconexión actual para poder cumplir con los objetivos de renovables comprometidos a 2020 y 2030, dado que los niveles actuales de interconexión (en torno al 5%) están lejos del objetivo europeo del 10% de la potencia total instalada para 2020 y del 15% previsto para el año 2030.

Como se ha destacado en el plano económico, España se ha caracterizado por un impulso integrador, siempre bienvenido por la Comisión.[13] Aunque en ocasiones se haya podido pecar de europeísmo ingenuo, en materia de energía no ha habido lugar

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12 M. Arias Cañete (2019), "European Commission –Speech. Press Conference Speaking points. State of the Energy Union Report", http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-2072_en.htm.

13 F. Steinberg (2019), "La influencia de España en la política económica de la UE", ARI nº 43/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 29/IV/2019.

para ambigüedades: una de las señas de identidad de la política energética europea de España es su insistencia en reforzar las interconexiones de gas y electricidad para acabar con el aislamiento energético de la Península Ibérica. Aunque en ocasiones se haya obviado el hecho de que la política energética (y climática) europea va más allá de las interconexiones,[14] sin ellas no se pueden alcanzar los objetivos europeos de energía y clima, pues una descarbonización eficiente en costes descansa sobre un mercado europeo integrado. Así, el PNIEC contempla un aumento de las exportaciones de electricidad españolas. A diferencia de lo referido para la influencia española en la política económica de la UE, en energía no parece hacer falta salir del "modo supervivencia",[15] al menos en lo que a política energética y climática se refiere. Sí resultan aplicables, en cambio, las recomendaciones genéricas en el ámbito económico sobre mejorar la coordinación y la comunicación.

El cambio climático y la transición hacia un modelo de desarrollo de menores emisiones van a plantear oportunidades y retos a sectores económicos clave en la relación de España con Europa, como son la agricultura y la automoción, entre otros. Por tanto, parece razonable pensar que entre las prioridades de España se incluya

impulsar la adaptación al cambio climático en la UE y apoyar la creación de un Fondo para la Transición Justa. Sin embargo, un tema que sigue fuera de la agenda europea, sorprendentemente, es el análisis de los límites de la adaptación al cambio climático. Es decir, qué va a hacer la UE frente a los impactos a los que no vamos a poder adaptarnos y cuyos daños pueden no ser compensados por los actuales sistemas de seguros públicos y privados. España podría impulsar este tipo de análisis, basándose en su experiencia en materia de adaptación y, en particular, en el ámbito de la gestión de riadas, sequías y desarrollo de infraestructura verde.

Una cuestión diferente es la política energética exterior de la UE, dominada por el debate sobre Rusia y poco sensible a las preferencias españolas en el Norte de África.[16] Así, mientras que proyectos como el Nord Stream 2 y la reducción de la dependencia de Rusia vienen protagonizando los debates europeos por el impacto que tienen en muchos Estados miembros y por sus implicaciones en las políticas de vecindad con Ucrania y en la diversificación de fuentes de suministro, parece que existe margen para que la relación de la Unión con los países del norte de África cobre un mayor protagonismo en la agenda europea. Hay un extendido

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14 A este respecto, un representante empresarial apuntó que en lo referido a las interconexiones gasistas "no valen todas las interconexiones y no a cualquier precio", destacando que en esta materia el Ministerio de Transición Ecológica y la autoridad de competencia, la CNMC, "no siempre están alineados" y recordando la negativa de la CNMC a aprobar el proyecto STEP con Francia por falta de interés comercial por parte de los operadores.

15 Steinberg (2019), *op. cit.*

16 Resultando clara la prioridad otorgada por España a un Norte de África ampliado y con mayor profundidad estratégica (Sahel y Golfo de Guinea).

consenso acerca de que España debe de seguir intensificando sus esfuerzos, tanto a nivel europeo como bilateral, para que Argelia se convierta en un socio preferente europeo. Incluso en el paisaje energético mediterráneo, donde las preferencias con Italia, Portugal, Francia o Grecia deberían ser más convergentes, España mantiene significativas ausencias. Basta comparar la presencia de representantes italianos en casi todas las instituciones energéticas pan-euromediterráneas, desde la asociación de reguladores (MedReg) a la de operadores de electricidad (Med-TSO). El secretario de energía y clima de la Unión por el Mediterráneo, con sede en Barcelona, es portugués, como lo fue su antecesora.

Además de presencia, también se echa en falta un relato mediterráneo (y en general exterior) más acorde con la estrategia nacional, que incluya un paquete comprensivo de buena gobernanza, desarrollo sostenible y cooperación energética y tecnológica.[17] A modo de ejemplo, las tensiones geopolíticas que surgen en torno al gas del Mediterráneo Oriental[18] deberían favorecer las opciones de diversificación gasista propuestas por España para Europa: más Gas Natural Licuado (GNL) y ofrecer a Argelia un horizonte claro para su gas que incite

las reformas en el sector energético del país.[19] La competencia entre España e Italia por convertirse en hubs gasistas del Mediterráneo debe mantener un campo de juego equilibrado: la propuesta de que la UE financie un gasoducto de más de 7.000 millones de euros y 2.000 km desde los campos de gas offshore de Chipre e Israel hasta Europa supondría falsear con subvenciones europeas la competencia gasista en el Mediterráneo. Sobre todo, si hay infraestructuras, gasoductos y plantas de GNL, ya operativas y con capacidad ociosa en España que no están lo suficientemente integradas con el resto del mercado interior. Desde la perspectiva europea, resulta más coherente promover las interconexiones y crear un mercado interior de la energía operativo.[20] En palabras de un alto funcionario español, las interconexiones son una "condición habilitante" para alcanzar el mercado interior de la energía.

Un segundo elemento geográfico consistiría en intentar situar también a América Latina en el mapa europeo. Hay varias dimensiones interesantes, empezando por las importantes inversiones españolas y europeas en el sector energético latinoamericano. El potencial renovable y la influencia en la gobernanza climática de América Latina también suponen vectores convergentes

17 G. Escribano (2015), "Towards a Mediterranean Energy Community: no roadmap without a narrative", en Rubino, Otzurk, Lenzi y Costa (eds.), *Regulation and Investments in Energy Markets. Solutions for the Mediterranean*, Academic Press, Elsevier.

18 M. Tanchum (2019), "Un sistema de intercambio virtual puede generar paz en el Mediterráneo Oriental", Comentario Elcano nº 21/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 12/VI/2019.

19 G. Escribano (2018), "Elección presidencial y reforma energética se citan en Argelia", ARI nº 117/2018, Real Instituto Elcano, 26/X/2018.

20 En G. Escribano (2019), "Algunas citas con la energía en la agenda global española de 2019", ARI nº 11/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 29/I/2019, véase la sección "Más competencia entre hubs que cooperación energética en el Mediterráneo".

El compromiso de España con la Agenda 2030 supone otra oportunidad para elevar su perfil en el debate europeo relativo a la paz y la seguridad, estando alineadas las visiones española y europea.

con la política exterior europea. Por ejemplo, América Latina y la UE han sido determinantes para aumentar la ambición en el ámbito de los acuerdos climáticos internacionales. En el futuro, el binomio UE-LAC podría aumentar su peso específico en el proceso de gobernanza climática global,[21] con un liderazgo necesariamente más distribuido, de materializarse el abandono del Acuerdo de París por parte de EEUU y en un contexto europeo con menos peso de Alemania, Francia y el Reino Unido como líderes de la acción climática. Para ello, España puede contribuir a modelar la cooperación UE-LAC dotando de un carácter estratégico instituciones de cooperación de carácter eminentemente técnico como la Red de Oficinas Iberoamericanas de Cambio Climático (RIOCC) o la Asociación Iberoamericana de Entidades Reguladoras de la Energía (ARIAE). Además, este tipo

de redes y asociaciones podrían plantearse también en cooperación con los países del Norte de África, dada nuestra vulnerabilidad compartida en el ámbito climático.[22]

Por otro lado, el compromiso de España con la Agenda 2030 supone otra oportunidad para elevar su perfil en el debate europeo relativo a la paz y la seguridad, estando alineadas las visiones española y europea. Para España la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) tiene implicaciones en la construcción de una nueva arquitectura para la seguridad[23] y la narrativa europea subraya la importancia del desarrollo sostenible y de la acción climática[24] para el mantenimiento de la paz:

> "En Europa la experiencia nos dice que la paz y la seguridad no se sustentan únicamente en acuerdos de paz y en

21 G. Edwards y L. Lázaro Touza (2016), "Spanish investors can capitalize on the low-carbon transition in Latin America", ARI 33/2016, Real Instituto Elcano, 25/IV/2016.

22 L. Lázaro Touza y E. López-Gunn (2014), "Climate change diplomacy in Spain's future foreign policy", SFS (EEE), nº 18/2014, Real Instituto Elcano, 9/VI/2014.

23 L. Lázaro Touza (en prensa), "La preservación del medio amiente en marco de la Agenda 2030", en Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, *La Agenda 2030 y los ODS: nueva arquitectura para la seguridad*, Gobierno de España, Ministerio de la Presidencia, Relaciones con las Cortes e Igualdad.

24 L. Lázaro Touza y L. Gómez de Ágreda (2019), "Integrating climate change action into EU security policy", en E. Conde Pérez, Z. Yaneva y M. Scopetelli (eds.), *Routledge Handbook on EU Security Law and Policy*, Routledge, Londres.

presupuestos de defensa. La paz debe ser duradera, así como la seguridad debe ser duradera. Y, una paz duradera precisa de trabajos decentes, acceso a los recursos naturales y desarrollo sostenible. Una paz duradera y una seguridad duradera necesitan de acción climática y creo que ese es el mensaje hoy. Esto es también lo que acordamos cuando lanzamos los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible" (traducido de Federica Mogherini, 2018).[25]

En suma, en materia de energía y clima España cuenta con una estrategia clara a medio plazo (2021-2030) plasmada en un PNIEC, bien acogido no sólo por la Comisión, sino también por la sociedad civil,[26] y que marca prioridades claras en materia de política energética y climática. España cuenta además con el anteproyecto de Ley de Cambio Climático y Transición Energética que establece el objetivo de alcanzar la neutralidad en carbono[27] en 2050 y con una Estrategia de Transición Justa que tiene como objetivos principales acompañar a los territorios, sectores y personas cuyos empleos se verán afectados por la transición energética. Se trata por tanto de un espacio de política en el que España puede contribuir e incluso liderar, y aprovechar esa tracción para abordar las

resistencias francesas al desarrollo de las interconexiones, necesarias para alcanzar una verdadera integración energética.

En materia de política energética exterior ha sido más complicado elevar las preferencias españolas en una agenda europea marcada por el debate sobre el Nord Stream 2 y Rusia. Pero las prioridades de España también están claras: garantizar la estabilidad y la sostenibilidad a largo plazo de una vecindad sur ampliada, y, en la medida de lo posible, proyectar sus preferencias latinoamericanas. El nombramiento del ministro Borrell como alto representante, buen conocedor de los retos y oportunidades de la transición energética y de las preferencias exteriores españolas, es una oportunidad para completar el potencial de liderazgo del Ministerio para la Transición Ecológica con una mayor presencia de los asuntos relacionados con clima y energía en la agenda exterior de la UE.

Elevar el rango de las preferencias compartidas

Además de las preferencias del gobierno, reveladas en numerosas leyes y planes energéticos recientes, resulta evidente que en el sector energético español coexisten intereses muy diferentes, todos ellos legítimos desde la perspectiva empresarial. Por fuentes primarias, hay empresas cuya

25 F. Mogherini (2018), "Mogherini at the high-level event 'Climate, peace and security: the time for action'", European External Action Service, 22/VI/2018.

26 Ecologic y Climact han elaborado un ranking de PNIEC que sitúa a España en el número 1. No obstante, España obtiene 52 puntos sobre 100. La evaluación de los PNIEC de la CE se hizo pública a mediados de junio de 2019 con muy buenos resultados para España. Véase https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/recommondation_en.pdf.

27 El anteproyecto de Ley pone como objetivo la reducción del 90% de las emisiones en 2050 en comparación con las emisiones de 1990 y el 10% restante de absorción por parte de sumideros. Véase https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/prensa/19022 2leydecambioclimaticonotadeprensa_tcm30-487293.pdf.

Los operadores y gestores del sistema eléctrico y gasista, como REE y Enagás, tienen además como vocación natural aumentar las interconexiones energéticas, tanto con la UE como con terceros países.

actividad se centra en la cadena de valor del gas y el petróleo, mientras que otras tienen un mayor componente nuclear, renovable o siguen quemando carbón. Los operadores y gestores del sistema eléctrico y gasista, como REE y Enagás, tienen además como vocación natural aumentar las interconexiones energéticas, tanto con la UE como con terceros países. Algunas de ellas cuentan con una oficina de representación en Bruselas, y todas forman parte de asociaciones europeas encargadas de canalizar sus preferencias sectoriales, como Fuels Europe, la Asociación Internacional de Productores de Petróleo y Gas (IOGP, por sus siglas en inglés), Eurogas, Eurelectric, SolarPowerEurope, GIE, ENTSO-G, ENTSOE, Marcogaz, NGVA WindEurope, Foratom y ESTELA (termosolar), entre otras. Además, no se debe obviar la presencia de representantes españoles en los Consejos de Administración y puestos de responsabilidad de muchas de estas asociaciones, lo que representa un vector de

influencia destacable. No obstante, resulta necesario completar este enfoque sectorial para trabajar en una estrategia de país basada en los intereses compartidos, que son más relevantes de lo que aparentan.

En lo que al desarrollo de una estrategia de país se refiere, es obvio que todos los actores españoles tenderán a beneficiarse de una mayor influencia de España en los procesos de decisión comunitarios, sea en el Consejo, la Comisión o el Parlamento Europeo, por las vías expuestas en otros análisis de esta serie.[28] También se beneficiarán de cualquier impulso que refuerce la posición política del país, como se ha destacado tras el resultado de las recientes elecciones en España: "cuando el capital político es tan precario en casi todas las demás capitales, se acoge con satisfacción un caso en el que se mantiene a salvo la gobernabilidad, no triunfa la eurofobia y… se refuerza la capacidad de liderazgo político de su Gobierno a nivel

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28 Véase, además de los ya citados: M. Fernández Díez (2019), "Ganar influencia en la UE: propuestas operativas para la Administración", ARI nº 55/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 20/V/2019; e I. Toygür y C. Carnicero Urabayen (2019),"El peso de España en el Parlamento Europeo: panorama histórico y predicciones para el nuevo ciclo político", ARI nº 45/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 6/V/2019.

nacional y europeo".[29] A esto se añade que España cuenta, como se argumenta en la sección anterior, con una política energética y climática plasmada en un plan detallado y sometido a supervisión europea.

El siguiente paso es buscar los intereses compartidos por el conjunto del sector energético, empezando por los consumidores. El primero de ellos, compartido también por el conjunto de la comunidad empresarial española, es la creación de un mercado energético único, basada en la integración de los mercados mediante interconexiones físicas, y reglas claras y comunes. La obligación de planificación conjunta de infraestructuras de gas y electricidad mejoraría la eficiencia y reduciría los costes del sistema energético en su conjunto. Por otro lado, no parece aceptable que empresas con participación pública compren empresas españolas y éstas no puedan adquirir empresas en otros Estados miembros,[30] ni que se primen mega-infraestructuras gasistas o eléctricas con terceros países de dudosa viabilidad económica a expensas de las infraestructuras que aseguren la interconectividad de los propios mercados europeos (y resulten rentables). La competencia y la eficiencia deben venir de la apertura de los mercados, y en

eso España contará con el apoyo de la Comisión. Quizá la ausencia del comisario Arias Cañete se note más en lo relativo a mejorar las interconexiones con Francia, por lo que no se debería desatender dicho vector de integración de mercados.

Otro elemento de convergencia está relacionado con el marco financiero plurianual 2021-2027. Fomentar la dimensión industrial y de I+D+i está en el interés de todo el sector energético español, sea en el campo de la reducción de emisiones, las baterías, las renovables, las redes inteligentes, la captura y secuestro de carbono, el hidrógeno o la digitalización, entre otros. El gobierno ha declarado su intención de dinamizar el sector industrial español, y el sector energético tiene oportunidades importantes en todos esos campos. Es importante que todas las empresas energéticas, cada una en su ámbito de actividad, puedan contribuir según sus posibilidades a ese *Green New Deal* promovido por el gobierno, como también se ha destacado en el documento de análisis de esta serie que aborda la dimensión económica de la influencia de España en la UE.[31]

En este sentido, uno de los expertos entrevistados abogaba por mantener un

29 Véase I. Molina (2019), "El (positivo) impacto de las elecciones generales sobre la influencia española en la UE", ARI nº 48/2019, Real Instituto Elcano, 10/V/2019, que concluye que España tiene ahora potencial para aspirar a ser el tercer país más influyente en el Consejo Europeo, el cuarto en el Consejo (Italia sería más poderosa en el Consejo de Ministros, pero España lo sería más el Consejo Europeo), el segundo entre los tres grandes grupos del Parlamento Europeo, el primero de la socialdemocracia y el tercero entre los países del Sur.

30 Uno de los expertos entrevistados recordaba que en Portugal "el Estado ha acogido con entusiasmo el capital chino que le negaban las empresas europeas". En relación con este punto, puede recordarse igualmente que Marruecos y Portugal propusieron, con financiación china, tender la tercera interconexión eléctrica con la Península Ibérica si España no la acometía.

31 Steinberg (2019), *op. cit.*

> *En el ámbito de la financiación climática internacional, es sabido que el cumplimiento de los compromisos de las Partes es fundamental para que los países en desarrollo puedan mitigar sus emisiones y adaptarse a los impactos del cambio climático.*

equilibrio entre "electrones y moléculas" en la dimensión industrial y de I+D+i, refiriéndose como ejemplo a la combinación de la electrificación con las ventajas del hidrógeno en términos de transporte y almacenamiento. Otros expertos, en cambio, ponen el foco en la electrificación de los usos finales y todos los aspectos asociados como elementos clave para descarbonizar la economía europea de forma efectiva y eficiente. La cuestión de las infraestructuras, incluyendo el aprovechamiento de las existentes en España, es otro elemento clave de cara a las nuevas perspectivas financieras. España también puede beneficiarse del Plan de Acción para financiar el Desarrollo Sostenible adoptado por la Comisión el pasado marzo y que va a atraer muchas inversiones al sector energético, especialmente a proyectos de menores emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero.

En el ámbito de la financiación climática internacional, es sabido que el cumplimiento de los compromisos de las Partes es fundamental para que los países en desarrollo puedan mitigar sus emisiones y adaptarse a los impactos del cambio climático. Así lo reconoce el Acuerdo de París al marcarse como objetivo la alineación de los flujos financieros con los objetivos climáticos. España y la UE han contribuido de manera significativa a la financiación climática internacional, desembolsando 20.000 millones de euros en 2017 provenientes de las arcas públicas. Esta cuantía supone más del 50% de la financiación climática pública a nivel global en la actualidad. España por su parte se comprometió a aportar 900 millones de euros[32] al año a partir de 2020 a la financiación climática internacional. Su reputación y su capacidad de influencia en la UE se verán reforzadas en la medida en que cumpla con los compromisos de financiación climática adquiridos e impulse el desarrollo de una arquitectura para la financiación climática internacional efectiva en lo que a mitigación y a adaptación se refiere.

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32 A través de las aportaciones al Fondo Verde para el Clima, los Fondos de Inversión para el Clima y el Fondo para el Medio Ambiente Mundial.

> *El sector energético español cuenta con unas preferencias geográficas consistentes con las del gobierno, derivadas de la situación geográfica de España y su triple vocación europea, atlántica y mediterránea.*

Por último, el sector energético español cuenta con unas preferencias geográficas consistentes con las del gobierno, derivadas de la situación geográfica de España y su triple vocación europea, atlántica y mediterránea. Para todas las empresas españolas resulta importante mantener la estabilidad en el Mediterráneo Occidental, pero para el sector energético es absolutamente prioritario. Además de las consideraciones económicas y de seguridad, la región es origen de importaciones de gas, petróleo y, en los últimos meses, también de electricidad (desde Marruecos, donde recientemente se ha puesto en marcha una central térmica de carbón de 1200 MW). Como han puesto de relieve los recientes intercambios al más alto nivel entre el Gobierno español y la Comisión, estas importaciones de electricidad generada con carbón en terceros países derivan en una desventaja competitiva para las empresas europeas, debido a las diferencias en la normativa medioambiental europea, más exigente (pues el ETS fija un coste al CO_2 que en terceros países no existe). España y otros países del Este están solicitando actuaciones a la Comisión para mantener un campo de juego equilibrado en el mercado eléctrico.

En todo caso, en el Mediterráneo Occidental invierten y se abastecen las empresas para a su vez suministrar a los consumidores españoles, y por él discurren gasoductos y redes eléctricas impulsados por empresas españolas y que afrontan la competencia de proyectos respaldados por otros Estados miembros. Algo semejante ocurre con América Latina, no sólo por la presencia de intereses de las empresas energéticas españolas, sino por el papel de la región en la lucha contra el cambio climático. Las preferencias por ambas regiones, en consecuencia, son otro de los elementos ampliamente compartidos por el sector energético español, el gobierno y buena parte de la sociedad civil. Y, esperemos, ahora también en mayor medida por la acción exterior de la UE.

Conclusiones

Pueden proponerse tres grupos de conclusiones: uno sobre los procesos, otro sobre la estrategia y un tercero sobre

las preferencias energéticas españolas. Respecto a la influencia en los procesos, las recomendaciones en materia de energía y clima comparten las conclusiones de los análisis precedentes: tratar de aumentar el peso en el Consejo Europeo y el Consejo de Ministros, intensificar los contactos con la Comisión, y trabajar en la cohesión de los europarlamentarios españoles. Al igual que en otras áreas, algunos actores españoles apuntan que otros países parecen moverse mejor y de manera más coordinada y sistematizada. Parece necesario reforzar este aspecto tomando como base las iniciativas en curso como el ya mencionado Círculo Energético Español de Bruselas (CEEB) o la propia reflexión sobre la influencia de España en Bruselas impulsada desde Elcano.

En segundo lugar, en relación con la necesidad de una estrategia bien especificada con prioridades claras, España cuenta con un PNIEC bien acogido en Bruselas, detallado y que marca prioridades y objetivos claros y ambiciosos de política energética y climática. Se trata por tanto de un espacio de política en el que España puede aspirar a liderar, apoyada por un tejido empresarial sólido en el ámbito renovable, aprovechando esa tracción para impulsar otros elementos de su agenda, como las interconexiones con Francia. En este aspecto es importante aspirar a incrementar los niveles de interconexión con el resto de Europa y alcanzar un nivel de integración similar al que disfrutan los países del noroeste de Europa en beneficio de los consumidores españoles. La política

energética exterior española también tiene claras sus prioridades mediterráneas y, en segundo término, latinoamericanas, pero no ha sido capaz de elevarlas a una agenda europea marcada por el debate sobre el gas ruso. Se considera la presencia al frente del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior de un español familiarizado con los asuntos energéticos y climáticos, además de con el Mediterráneo y América Latina, una oportunidad para cambiar la narrativa energética de la acción exterior europea.

Finalmente, la defensa de los intereses energéticos españoles exige una mayor altura de miras que la mera defensa de los legítimos intereses empresariales mediante las correspondientes asociaciones sectoriales. Es necesario completar ese enfoque sectorial para trabajar en una estrategia de país basada en los intereses compartidos, que son más relevantes de lo que aparentan. Es el caso de la influencia en los procesos y las instituciones, así como del impulso político: todos los actores españoles tienden a beneficiarse de ambos. Pero hay otras preferencias compartidas que pueden aglutinar al sector mediante un paquete energético que incluya los cinco vectores destacados en el texto, y que pueden resumirse como sigue:

(1) La creación de un mercado energético único, basado en la integración de los mercados mediante interconexiones físicas y reglas claras comunes.

(2) Primar la dinamización del sector industrial energético y el I+D+i en

energía y sostenibilidad en el marco financiero plurianual 2021-2027 con el objetivo de aprovechar las oportunidades económicas del cambio de modelo de desarrollo[33] y limitar la exposición al riesgo climático derivado de la transición hacia la neutralidad en carbono, en un contexto de aceleración de la transición debido a las bajadas esperadas en el coste de las renovables[34] y a las declaraciones de 'emergencia climática' a nivel político.[35]

(3) Apoyar el análisis de los riesgos físicos y de transición del cambio climático y posibles respuestas a los mismos, así como el análisis de las oportunidades de negocio de la descarbonización.

(4) El cumplimiento de los compromisos en materia de financiación climática internacional y el desarrollo de una arquitectura robusta y efectiva para dicha financiación, y poder así seguir ejerciendo un liderazgo climático mediante el ejemplo y la construcción de alianzas.

(5) Unas preferencias geográficas consistentes entre Gobierno y empresas con una prioridad clara por un Norte de África ampliado y con mayor profundidad estratégica (Sahel y Golfo de Guinea), y una América Latina en transición energética.

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33 BlackRock (2016), "Adapting portfolios to climate change. Implications and strategies for all investors", *Global Insights*, septiembre.

34 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2016), "The power to change. Solar and wind cost reduction potential to 2025".

35 C. Farand (2019), "Four countries have declared climate emergencies, yet give billions to fossil fuels", *Climate Home News*, 24/VI/2019.

A strategic look at the position of High Representative and Commission Vice-President

Ignacio Molina & Luis Simón[1]

What is the potential, and which are the shortcomings and possible ways of strengthening the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs (and Vice-President of the European Commission) in order to improve the efficiency and standing of the EU as a global player?

Summary

Ten years have passed since the creation of the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the holder of which also acts as Vice-President of the Commission. It was –and remains– an office with great potential for providing Europe with more cohesion, efficiency and influence, both among its neighbours and on the global stage. There have been major achievements in the intervening period, but the three goals established when the post was designed are yet far from being attained. There are still:

(a) shortcomings in the coordination of the various foreign policy dimensions undertaken by the EU as an organisation; (b) numerous instances of fragmentation between the latter and individual member states' diplomatic efforts that hamper the business of speaking with a single voice in the world; and, in turn, (c) a limited capacity for inserting the EU effectively into an increasingly competitive and fraught international context, thereby revealing the shortcomings of a European foreign policy model that continues to focus on multilateralism and soft power. To help Europe respond to this threefold challenge it would be convenient to rethink and bolster the post of High Representative. The content and importance of the post are not predetermined, since they depend on two factors: (a) the specific powers assigned to it in relation to the other portfolios in the Commission; and (b) the specific personal influence of the individual who holds it. There is a degree of consensus that neither of its first two occupants were as effective

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> *To help Europe respond to this threefold challenge it would be convenient to rethink and bolster the post of High Representative.*

as might have been wished on either count, thereby weakening the EU's external action.

The proposal offered here involves taking advantage of the high political profile of the person nominated to be the High Representative for the 2019-24 legislative term, Josep Borrell, and to combine it with a broadening of his responsibilities as Vice-President of the Commission (as well as some suggestions for improvements in the common foreign and security policy domain). To secure this, now is the time to strike a sort of grand deal whereby the High Representative would refrain from vying with the future President of the Commission over who has the authority to take the initiative on common policies of international scope and, in exchange, obtain new powers over these and the resources allocated to them. It would be a matter of, in those key foreign policy areas where the commissioners have been acting unconnectedly from the High Representative, starting to accept the coordination of the latter (for example, trade and the foreign dimensions of immigration, climate and technology) and in other areas even taking on direct supervision

(development, humanitarian aid and defence). In a world where the great powers combine these activities with strategic logic and foreign policy, the EU cannot hope to present itself as a global actor unless it can ensure coherence across its diplomatic efforts, cooperation, trade, progress in security (where the recently launched European Defence Fund stands out) and the foreign dimension of innovation and migration policies.

Analysis

Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has taken three strategic lines of approach to further its aspiration of gaining global relevance: (a) pursuing its own foreign policy, one that properly connects the international dimension of the so-called EU pillar –where the Commission takes the lead– with the domain of intergovernmental cooperation on diplomatic and military issues known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), overseen by the Council; (b) subsuming under a single position (and, if applicable, a single joint course of action too) all the member states' individual positions; and (c) convincing the international community

that, despite its obvious idiosyncrasies that differentiate it from a state, the EU is a good deal more than a run-of-the-mill international organisation and, therefore, may be accepted as a participant comparable on certain occasions to the great world powers.

Only the first of these three major goals is the exclusive responsibility of the EU, because the second requires the cooperation of 28 national capitals, while the third relies on the acquiescence of almost 200 sovereign states. Not surprisingly, the progress that has been made over the years is directly proportionate to this scale of difficulty. Indeed, despite the persistent shortcomings that will be examined in more detail below, significant advances have been made in recent years to ensure that the EU's foreign policy as such is better coordinated internally and more active. Considerable headway has also been made in terms of ensuring that the member states and the joint institutions act together (climate change, the agreement with Iran and even sanctions against Russia, to name a few cases in point), although there are still many issues where there is either no unanimity (Israel, the status of Kosovo, recognition of the opposition in Venezuela, etc.) or the loudest European voice does not emanate from Brussels but rather Paris, London or Berlin. Lastly, there is still a very long way to go before securing the third goal, that of ensuring that the EU is viewed as a power capable of shaping international politics. Here it is not simply the fact that there are both failures

(the 2010 United Nations vote rejecting the idea of the EU speaking to the General Assembly) and successes (for example, the EU being granted full membership of the G7 and G20, and eventually, in May 2011, being allowed to address the UN General Assembly), but rather that the most recent trends in international relations follow a 'neo-Westphalian' line, which diverges from the approach hitherto favoured by the EU: one of multilateral governance, free trade and international law.[2]

So important is it for the EU to improve its role in this increasingly complex (and, in recent times, hostile) setting that it is here where efforts have been made to instigate the main substantive advance in the process towards integration. Following the Single European Act (1986), which ushered in the Internal Market, the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which launched the euro, and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which paved the way to the freedom, security and justice area, the great policy contribution of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty (2004), subsequently reflected in the Lisbon Treaty (2007), comprises external action. It is true that it has been done without the member states making explicit new transfers of sovereignty to the EU, even if the interesting provisions included regarding security and defence are developed, but the institutional innovations that came into force rather more than 10 years ago brought about a significant qualitative change in the vague power arrangements of the CFSP and the

2 See L. Simón (2018), *The Spectre of a Westphalian Europe*, Whitehall Paper, nr 90, Routledge, Abingdon.

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international perception of EU policies. The idea (the genesis of which goes back to the 2002 Convention on the Future of Europe) consisted of connecting the two spheres better and hence the decision to formally abandon the notion of pillars, providing the EU with a status as a single legal entity, creating a stable President of the European Council who would share the task of foreign representation with the Commission President and, above all, creating an authentic EU 'Foreign Affairs Minister'.

Although the job title is different, just such a post has existed since 2009: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also acts as the Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP). It is a post that effectively amalgamates the duties discharged up to that point by three distinct offices: the High Representative for CFSP (which was created in 1999 and for 10 years was held by Javier Solana), the Commissioner for Foreign Relations and the rotating Presidency of

the Council. But it was not simply a case of getting rid of the dysfunctional aspects of the old 'Troika' and uniting in a single figure the former 'Mr CFSP', the coordinator of the EU's international policies in the Commission and the President of the Council in its Foreign Affairs configuration (separated in 2010 from the General Affairs Council, which would continue with a rotating six-monthly presidency). In addition, new competences were given to the HR/VP, notable among which were oversight of his own new and ambitious diplomatic corps, the capacity to initiate and implement CFSP matters and the responsibility of coordinating EU foreign policy as a whole through the strengthening of his status in the College of Commissioners by virtue of becoming its Vice-President.

Ten years have elapsed and, while it is possible to point to a range of achievements and an incipient positioning on the global stage of the EU in its own right, any assessment made of the post following the performance of its first two holders

(Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini) reveals a mixed picture attributable to its rather low political profile and, above all, an inappropriate allocation of its responsibilities, particularly in terms of the coordination of the Commission's foreign policy. This is why it makes sense to use Josep Borrell's appointment as the new HR/VP by the European Council to revisit the enormous potential implicit in the post and to place it in the context of the ideas circulating at the heart of the institutions regarding how to deal with the way the office fits into the Commission. Moreover, the current juncture (with the organisational jigsaw of the College of Commissioners for the 2019-24 term still being decided) offers a unique window of opportunity, which can be seized to ensure that the post has a wider remit than it has hitherto enjoyed. As the only job on the Commission (apart from the presidency) to be underwritten by treaty and given that the appointment is made before the other commissioners, there is scope for political autonomy that should not be squandered if the goal is to provide the HR/VP with more resources in order to implement more effective foreign policies in an extremely complex context.

Indeed, the contemporary political landscape has become increasingly fraught, characterised by growing competition between the great powers. Specifically, the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China looks set to become the main focal point of international relations in the decades ahead. And episodes such as the recent tariff spat between the Trump Administration and the Xi Jinping regime in China and the US embargo on the Chinese tech company Huawei throw into sharp relief the close interdependence between different parts of political activity, namely trade policy, industrial and technology policy, and foreign and defence policy. If it is to navigate such a world, it is important that the EU understands each of these areas of competition not in isolation but rather within the framework of broader geostrategic competition, one that looks beyond the 'trees' of sectoral policies and sees the 'wood' of global competition. This demonstrates the need for greater integration of any EU policies with an international dimension, ideally under the coordination and supervision of the HR/VP. Meanwhile, an international context characterised by the growing geostrategic rivalry between large blocs further underlines the importance of such key EU policy areas as trade, technology, industry and defence not being determined solely by economic considerations, but that they should also be anchored in a strategic vision of foreign policy.

As mentioned above, the pertinent provision of the EU's regulations since the Treaty of Lisbon came into effect states that the HR/VP shall conduct the CFSP and ensure the consistency of the Union's external action.[3] 'External action' is an extremely broad concept. It includes the CFSP, of course, covering diplomacy and issues related

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3 TEU Article 18.

> *The HR/VP is appointed by the European Council, by qualified majority voting, with the approval of the President of the Commission.*

to security and defence (CSDP), but also common policies of an external nature such as trade, international cooperation and development, humanitarian aid, enlargement and neighbourhood policies. It should also include the important international aspects of many other policies such as those concerning migration, industry, economy, finance, digitalisation, energy, climate, environment, agriculture, fishing and justice. Bearing in mind the breadth of the EU's action in its entirety, it is evident that in reality the CFSP constitutes a relatively small part of it.

The HR/VP is appointed by the European Council, by qualified majority voting, with the approval of the President of the Commission.[4] His term of office may only be ended by the same procedure. This entails that, politically, the HR/VP is accountable in the first instance to the European Council and the President of the Commission. He is also accountable to the Foreign Affairs Council (which he also chairs) for all matters relating to the execution of the CFSP. The HR/VP has the right to make proposals for the CFSP and as Vice-President contributes to the Commission's unique right of making proposals for EU policies. The European External Action Service (EEAS) assists the HR/VP in all his functions. Bearing all these factors in mind, it is clear that the treaties bestow a key role on the HR/VP, with the potential to be one of the most influential in the EU. He has ample autonomy, various special prerogatives (for example, the right to attend European Council meetings) and abundant administrative resources, notable among which is, of course, leadership of the EEAS, but also the fact that he can count on two Secretary-Generals (Commission and Council) and an 11-member cabinet, almost twice the size of the commissioners' teams.[5]

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4 Although the extraordinary European Council meeting of 2 July 2019 has nominated Josep Borrell as the next HR/VP, the official appointment has not yet taken place; this will only occur when the European Parliament gives its blessing to the appointment of the person proposed to preside over the Commission (in principle, the German politician Ursula von der Leyen) and subsequently ratifies the new College of Commissioners.

5 For the importance of having access to this wide-ranging team of cabinet members, see L. Simón, I. Molina, E. Lledó & N. Martín (2019), 'Hacia un ecosistema de influencia española en Bruselas', ARI nr 30/2019, Elcano Royal Institute.

The problem…

In practice, however, there is a certain perception that the HR/VP plays a somewhat representative and diplomatic role, lacking real power. There are two main reasons for this. The first is the lack of the CFSP's effectiveness, attributable to such deep-seated problems as the complex decision-making structures, the requirement (and culture) of unanimity in the Council, the strategic differences between member states and the major capitals' persistent habit of prioritising their role over that of the EU in many instances. Ten years after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, Foreign Affairs Ministers still jealously guard their exclusive responsibility for foreign policy and tend to view themselves as principals and the HR as an agent. Nor did it help that the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the main substantial innovation of which was the commitment to a more effective and proactive European foreign policy, coincided with five years of severe economic crisis, which diverted resources and political will to tackle other emergencies.

The second problem, already alluded to, is the insufficient use of the vice-presidential role in the European Commission. Indeed, since the creation of the post in 2010, various of the basic principles mentioned above have been neglected. The first HR/VP (2010-14) devoted her term in office almost exclusively to the CFSP and setting up a diplomatic service as complex as the EEAS from scratch, leaving to one side her role in the common policies overseen by the Commission. The second HR/VP (2014-19) sought to exercise her vice-presidential function better, and certain steps were taken in this regard at the beginning of her term in office,[6] paving the way to rather more influence over common policies of a foreign nature –except trade– but with very limited say on the international dimension of the EU's internal policies. At any event, she continued to maintain a distant relationship with the rest of the Commission, with a certain lack of acceptance of her (and the EEAS's) authority at the heart of the institution, and in consequence a prioritisation of the CFSP. The result is that in many of the large political dossiers the Commission frequently side-lined the HR/VP and awarded the visibility and credit to other members of the College,[7] thereby contributing to the perception of the post's lack of influence.

… and the solution

The 2019-24 Strategic Agenda approved by the European Council prioritises 'promoting European interests and values on a global stage' and to this end being 'more determined and effective in exerting our influence… giving a clearer priority to European economic, political and security interests, leveraging all policies to that end'. This constitutes the first political framework in the new institutional cycle for embarking

6 Her office was relocated to the Berlaymont building, next to the other members of the Commission, and the Commissioners' Group on External Action, chaired by the HR/VP, to coordinate foreign policies.

7 For example, the agreement with Turkey on migration (First Vice-President Timmermans), the Paris Agreement (Energy Commissioner Arias Cañete), the European Defence Fund (Vice-President Katainen) and the institutional agreement with Switzerland (Enlargement Commissioner Hahn).

upon wide-reaching reform, constructed on a twofold foundation: (1) enhancing the stature of the HR as the VP of the Commission; and (2) improving the way the CFSP operates.

(1) Enhancing the stature of the HR as the VP of the Commission

The priority should be to maximise the potential of the HR's role as the Vice-President of the Commission. To do this, it is necessary to have an agreement from the outset between the HR/VP and the Commission President, who has ample powers to organise the structure and working methods of the institution. This agreement should be based on a sort of grand bargain, whereby the HR/VP would more explicitly accept his place in the strategic initiative and the hierarchical authority of his superior in the Commission on a day-to-day basis, including the work of the EEAS. In exchange for this, the President would agree to establish more explicitly the HR/VP's responsibility for coordination in the realm of the Commission's foreign competences and in the foreign aspects of the EU's internal policies, placing at his disposal the services and structures necessary for wielding such authority effectively, including access to the Secretary-General of the Commission.[8]

While this grand bargain would not affect the autonomy of the HR/VP or his special relationship with the Council and the European Council in terms of CFSP and CSDP matters, it would lay the foundations for greater input from the Commission on such questions, thereby underpinning the EU's overall cohesion as an international player.

To bring about this change in the organisational structure it would be worth considering the possibility of creating geographically-focused commissioners for external action, under the hierarchy of the HR/VP and replacing the current thematic posts (enlargement and neighbourhood, development and humanitarian aid).[9] The HR/VP would coordinate their work through project groups, based on the current Commissioners' Group on External Action but with more flexibility and access to internal policies, given that all Commissioners would have as part of their formal mission the responsibility to coordinate their external action with the HR/VP.[10] At the administrative level, the geographical commissioners would be supported not only by the Secretary-General but also working groups coordinated by the

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8 Especially during the Juncker Commission, the Secretary-General of the Commission has been steadily acquiring power and today constitutes the single lever by which the activity of the entire institution can be controlled.

9 The Trade Commissioner would be retained in any event, owing to the exclusive nature of this post in the treaties. It is important however to emphasise the hybrid character of this portfolio (which above all affects foreign and industrial policy) and therefore to strengthen its links to the HR/VP. This could be achieved by, for example, making the HR/VP the (co-) chair of a project group on trade policy, replacing the current Commissioners' Group on Trade and Globalisation.

10 Given that the HR/VP would not have the right to appoint or remove geographical commissioners, it would be important to create the necessary mechanisms to ensure that they would be subject to the HR/VP's authority. One way, already mentioned, would involve creating transversal working groups with representatives from all the Directorates-General (DGs) that have responsibilities in each geographical region (for example, migration, energy, climate for Africa, etc.). This would involve the existing DGs and avoid creating a bureaucratically disruptive structure. Such working groups would be chaired by a geographical commissioner who would in turn come under the hierarchy of the HR/VP.

> *In the realm of defence, the HR/ VP would be responsible not only for the CSDP but also all the other defence-related policies pursued by the Commission.*

EEAS where all the pertinent directorates-general would be included.[11]

This model would ensure the HR/VP's overall control and coordination role, while removing the burden of travel and management (whether involving attendance at high-level meetings or crisis management), enabling him to focus on strategic dossiers and reduce non-attendance of meetings of the College of Commissioners to a minimum.[12] The HR/VP would effectively have the power to oversee all the EU's policies with an international dimension, facilitating the creation of 'incentive packages', by being able to use in a coherent manner the entire arsenal of diplomatic, economic and other resources (visas, for example) that may be deployed to attain the EU's goals and interests in non-member countries.

In the realm of defence, the HR/VP would be responsible not only for the CSDP (and the Military Committee, which is in charge of all the EU's military missions) but also all the other defence-related policies pursued by the Commission. These policies (such as the European Defence Fund and the Military Mobility policy) fall within the remit of other commissioners, under the Vice-President for Industry Katainen. This is an especially important point, since one of the major threats to the EU's defence is the lack of connection between the its technological-industrial arm and its political-strategic arm. This was brought to the fore when the Commission launched the European Defence Fund, which is set to spend €13 billion between 2021 and 2027 on supporting research projects in the defence domain and co-funding capabilities.[13] This initiative has revitalised the debate about defence

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11 It is worth noting the risk that the creation of geographical commissioners could incur in terms of pigeonholing the UE's foreign policy, particularly bearing in mind the existing connections between the major regions. In order to offset such risks, it would be necessary to ensure an oversight role for the HR/VP and to create the mechanisms needed to guarantee the geographical commissioners' hierarchical inferiority to the HR/VP, whose responsibility it would be to ensure the cohesion of the EU's external action.

12 Even if the replacement of thematic by geographical commissioners were not to take place (either because it is deemed inappropriate or the continued existence of International Cooperation and Development and Enlargement portfolios, in addition to the Trade portfolio, is deemed indispensable) the role could be created within the EEAS of four or five special envoys for the major regions, thereby reducing the travel burden on the HR/VP.

13 See Félix Arteaga & Luis Simón (2019), 'El Fondo Europeo de Defensa y el futuro de la industria española', *Elcano Policy Paper*, January.

> *It is true that the EEAS has launched a series of initiatives in recent years geared towards establishing a political-strategic framework that would provide a foundation to the European Defence Fund.*

in Europe after years of lethargy. By way of illustration, the money the Commission expects to spend on funding defence research is greater than that earmarked by most member states (with the sole exception of France and Germany). This means that virtually all of them will start to structure their defence R&D policy around the Commission's European Defence Fund. It is important to ensure, however, that the Fund pursues a strategic and not an exclusively industrial or economic approach.

It is true that the EEAS has launched a series of initiatives in recent years geared towards establishing a political-strategic framework that would provide a foundation to the European Defence Fund. Specifically, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) seek to set the parameters of Europe's strategic ambition and stimulate cooperation processes that equip European countries with the capabilities and structures needed to exercise greater strategic autonomy.[14] Such initiatives are of a markedly intergovernmental character however, and

their scope raises serious questions, given the persistent discrepancies between member states on issues as fundamental as the role of force in international relations and the threats and geographical areas to be prioritised. Against this background, doubts emerge about the extent to which the Commission's initiatives in the domain of defence industry policy are truly anchored in a strategic-political vision that is coherent and shared by all member states.

The possibility of setting up a Directorate General for Defence in the Commission (and even a Vice-President and Commissioner for Security and Defence) could aggravate this problem, inasmuch as it could pave the way to a situation of dual leadership, with one Vice-President and Commissioner in charge of the technological-industrial aspects of European defence, and another (the HR/VP) in charge of the political-strategic aspects, thereby creating a recipe for institutional rivalry and political disjointedness. The solution to this problem may involve the previously-mentioned grand bargain between the Commission President and

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14 Pedro Serrano (2019), 'The bundle of sticks: a stronger European defence to face global challenges', *Working Paper*, nr 03/2019, Elcano Royal Institute.

the HR/VP, whereby the latter would submit to the political authority of the Commission in the area of defence industry policy in exchange for overseeing the management of the European Defence Fund, as well as the Commission services earmarked for managing it. It would be quite different if the potential new Commissioner for Security and Defence came clearly under the authority of the HR/VP because, in this case, he or she could even be considered to be an assistant high representative in charge of defence, space and cybersecurity, which would give the HR/VP additional oversight of significant budgetary allocations.[15]

As a quid pro quo, the HR/VP would need to accept the prospect of giving more space to the Commission, which would be unlikely to give the HR/VP access to its resources without getting something in exchange. Thus, for example, the HR/VP could consult the Commission and seek ratification for his proposals and initiatives prior to submitting them to the Council. In this way, such proposals would have the assurance of the full backing of the Commission and its resources, which in turn would strengthen the HR/VP's position in the Council.

(2) Improving the way the CFSP operates
With all the developments set out in the preceding section, the HR/VP would underpin his coordination role in the

Commission's external action, but maintain his autonomy in the CFSP, the latter being something that is underwritten by the treaty. It is also necessary to carry out improvements within the domain of the CFSP, however. Solving the deep-seated problems here is an enormously complex challenge requiring profound and detailed reflection, including perhaps reform of the treaties. There are certain steps that the HR/VP could take almost immediately, however, within the prerogatives the treaty bestows upon him:

- Designing a more functional Foreign Affairs Council. The Council's agenda could be designed in such a way as to discourage grandiose theoretical debates and focus on practical questions of representation, use of financial instruments and other policies such as incentivisation, the planning of joint initiatives with and between member states, the coordination of multilateral negotiations and positions in international bodies, etc. Instead of rambling, inefficient conclusions, the HR/VP could put forward short, structured conclusions, separating declaratory parts from operational parts.

- Encouraging the use of qualified majority voting in the CFSP. Invoking the 'passerelle clause' of the Treaty[16] requires unanimity in the European

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15 Moreover, greater cohesion between the Commission and the EEAS in the defence realm would facilitate the integration of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in the management of European Defence Fund projects, thereby ensuring a greater strategic orientation in the management of the Fund (given the experience of the EDA in this field) as well as greater overall cohesion in the EU's defence policy.

16 TEU Article 31.3 permits the invocation of qualified majority voting in any part of the CFSP except military or defence decisions, if unanimously agreed by the European Council.

Once approved, all the Council's decisions and positions within the framework of these strategies would be by qualified majority voting.

Council and is, as things currently stand, totally unrealistic. There are, however, parts of the CFSP where qualified majority voting may be used without recourse to this clause, and there is an ever-growing number of capitals interested in extending its use. For example, the HR and the Commission could decide to structure the legal initiatives on sanctions in such a way that the decision to impose sanctions continues to be taken by unanimity, but the names of the people to be sanctioned and the specific economic measures are taken by qualified majority voting.[17] In addition, the HR and the Commission could submit themed or regional strategies for the approval of the European Council, in accordance with TEU article 22.1. Once approved, all the Council's decisions and positions within the framework of these strategies would be by qualified majority voting.[18]

- Reforming the EEAS (which currently has some 140 delegations and some 5,600 bureaucrats) to encourage better administrative organisation and coordination, a less theoretical/ academic and geographic approach and a more functional, thematic and horizontal orientation, better capacity for making use of the EU instruments in support of the CFSP, and a more coordinated and strategic use of the EU Delegations as sources of information and agents for the promotion of interests.

- Encouraging coordination with member states' embassies through the EU Delegations in third-party countries.

Conclusions

The post of High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission contains elements of immense value for advancing towards a European external

17 TEU Article 31.2, third paragraph.
18 TEU Article 31.2, first paragraph.

action characterised by greater cohesion, visibility and influence. In its first 10 years of existence however, the holders of the position have largely wasted its potential. Expectations have been thwarted, partly because of problems inherent to the CFSP but above all because its first two holders were not capable of leveraging the rank and the coordinating functions implicit in the fact of also being Vice-President of the Commission. It is therefore a question of the future HR/VP being able to effectively manage and oversee the entire international dimension of the common policies and having access to the Commission's financial instruments and services in key areas with a direct impact on his competences and power.

The treaties and organisational structure of the EU are sufficiently flexible to enable the HR/VP to have direct access to the Commission's instruments. Ultimately this will depend on a political agreement with the new President, which ought to be concluded without delay, before she takes decisions about the structure of the various portfolios; these will create a series of *faits accomplis* and force the HR/VP into a defensive and reactive position.

If an appropriate arrangement of these coordinating functions is achieved, the 2019-24 legislative term currently getting under way will see not only an exponential increase in the influence of the HR/VP but it could also, much more importantly, have a simultaneous and positive impact on the three strategic goals of European external action set out at the start of this analysis: (1) a real (and not simply theoretical) use of the 'two hats' as Vice-President of the Commission and chair of the Council would almost automatically ensure the first goal of the EU itself being better coordinated; (2) greater cohesion between the external work undertaken by both institutions and improvements in the operations of an external service where EU bureaucrats and national diplomats coexist would help to generate dynamics of continuity and trust with the member states, which would reduce and, over the medium term, tend to eliminate the fragmentation of almost 30 foreign policies; and (3) this greater cohesion would bolster the efficacy and visibility of the EU as an international actor.

Strategic autonomy in a new era: a Cold-War risk assessment of China's involvement in the EU's 5G networks

Ugo Armani & Mario Esteban

This paper suggests studying the relations between the EU and China through a Cold War analysis framework. It challenges the assumption that the latter has become obsolete in an international system (re)shaped by interdependence. Rather, the Cold War experience can prove to be useful to determine the EU's position within the emerging Sino-US duopoly and to assess the strategic implications of China's engagement in the EU's 5G networks.

Summary

China's sustained rise and worldwide engagement has recently led to a redefinition of EU-China relations. Faced with an emerging Sino-US duopoly –combining top world economic, military and technological investments and capabilities– and with uncertainties related to Huawei's involvement in 5G networks, the EU would be advised not to overlook the Cold War experience. This paper aims to highlight that asymmetric interdependence in the context of a shifting global economy, combined with the doubtful implications of cross-cultural interdependence in international relations, do not entail changes substantial enough to completely disregard a Cold War framework of analysis. Therefore, strategic caution is advisable, especially if 5G were to affect critical infrastructures. Although positioning between China and the US should not occur at the expense of economic relations or cooperation towards global common goods, it should also be emphasised that contrary

The relations between the EU and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have entered a new stage.

to China, the US, forever an economic competitor, remains the EU's long-term strategic partner.

Analysis

Introduction: the EU seeks its own path in a new era

The relations between the EU and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have entered a new stage. After more than a decade of scrutiny and calls against China's protectionist and unfair competition, and faced with its economic rise and increasing worldwide engagement, the EU finally seems to have started a redefinition of its relations with the PRC, no longer merely a developing country but an emerging global power. While half of the member states have endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there is also increased concern about China's current and potential engagement within EU infrastructures and strategic sectors, as illustrated by the implementation of an EU screening mechanism of foreign direct investment. In this context, the European Commission has qualified the PRC as an economic partner but also an 'economic competitor' and 'systemic rival' –promoting

alternative models of political, social and economic governance–.

5G and technology as a whole highlight that the EU not only faces a new framework of relations with China, but that globally it will have to position itself within an emerging new Sino-US duopoly, two economic, military, technological and geopolitical leading powers. This is the case regardless of the ups and downs in Sino-US rivalry such as the recent agreement on the sidelines of the G20 summit between Trump and Xi to restart trade talks.

It could be said that this is everything but a new Cold War, and that looking through outdated lenses is pointless, but the Cold War can certainly provide some very useful insights at a time of strategic choices and positioning in relation to both China and the US.

A Cold War spectre? Power politics resilience in an interdependent world

What made the Cold War a unique case was the global and multidimensional confrontation between two economically

and ideologically antagonistic closed systems. The confrontation was limited through nuclear deterrence, making war itself 'improbable [but] peace impossible'. The recent cooling of US-Chinese relations has fostered the revival and diffusion of the concept, raising a debate about whether they are heading towards a new Cold War or not. Critics point at unprecedent levels of interdependence, the absence of a critical military standoff, the existence of areas of common interest and a different distribution of power –multipolarity rather than a renewed bipolarity–. On the opposite side are an increased ideological competition between an illiberal authoritarian China and a liberal democracy, the continuity of irreconcilable 'focal points' such as Taiwan and the shaping of a bifurcated technological world.

Today, while China and the US appear to be ideological competitors, they share crucial economic ties and areas of cooperation. But are their differences likely to lead to a different competition framework? According to John Mearsheimer, what might actually occur is the very return of a Cold War structure of competition between two 'bounded orders' –US and China-led– within a 'thin international order' maintaining arms control and economic cooperation. US-China cooperation can be highlighted but it has recently suffered from several setbacks. The momentum fostered by the 2014 US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015 has ground to a halt due to Donald Trump's backtracking and further cooperation might be jeopardised by current economic tensions. The same goes for higher education and academic cooperation, which the US has started targeting in order to prevent sensitive technology transfers: the duration of Chinese STEM graduate student's visas has been limited while the US Department of Energy is seeking to cut interpersonal ties with Chinese public programmes. Cooperation in other areas, such as counter-terrorism, remains limited. In its day, Cold War fluctuations between heightened tensions and détente also provided opportunities for cooperation between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union or USSR). In particular, the two countries managed to establish strategic and non-strategic arms-control agreements: the 1972 Strategic arms limitations talks (SALT 1) and the 1987 Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) Treaty. While limited, other examples include scientific cooperation, space cooperation, with the Apollo-Soyuz project that started in 1975, and environmental cooperation, with the signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in the field of environmental protection in 1972. Another major milestone was the Antarctic Treaty, signed in December 1959, which demilitarised the continent, suspended territorial claims and paved the way for free and public scientific investigation.

It is also interesting to note that ideological factors might be emphasised in the case of the Soviet Union, yet, except in discourses and perhaps the initial stages of the Cold War, ideology did not prevent it from being a rational actor. Of course, Communism's power of appeal may appear to be greater

The appeal of the 'Chinese model' may be further strengthened if China were to successfully overcome the middle-income trap thanks to new drivers of growth.

than China's 'Authoritarian capitalism', but, to date, the latter still represents a viable alternative to Liberal Democracy. China's model may not be 'exportable' but the country can still foster authoritarianism worldwide by providing a 'legitimate' alternative model of development and through direct institutional and economic assistance. Moreover, the appeal of the 'Chinese model' (with the prospects of fast economic growth, technological upgrading and poverty reduction) may be further strengthened if China were to successfully overcome the middle-income trap thanks to new drivers of growth. As Francis Fukuyama himself foresaw (even though he was thinking about Russia), China is far from turning into a liberal society. There is almost a consensus that China deeply differed from the USSR when it chose to open its economy. But China's 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics' and Authoritarian Capitalism still constrain economic liberalisation while perpetuating protectionism and a statist economic approach. Market features remain secondary, with limited economic liberalisation and openness being subordinate to state planning. And this is

not expected to change, since state control is not simply an economic model but also a necessary tool for the Communist Party of China (CPC) to monitor socioeconomic development, its main source of legitimacy. Further marketisation would deprive the CPC of crucial economic levers allowing it to exert a tight control on the course of the Chinese economy. China did not abandon state planning and neither did it turn away from the heavy industry that boosted its development in the 2000s. And it might not have been much more pragmatic than the USRR. The latter was aware of the importance of light industry and a diversified economy, but institutional and structural factors together with its geopolitical competition with the US led soviet leaders to prioritise fast-growing and geopolitically significant sectors, mainly heavy and military industry. Heavy industry provided sustained growth until the 1970s, before economic imbalances led the soviet economy to stagnation. On the other hand, China benefited from a US-led rapprochement –a way to weaken the communist block– but the focus on fast and sustained growth led China to experience similar social, environmental and

> *Economic growth, social stability and environmental sustainability are not considered per se, but are mediated through the interests of the ruling party.*

organisational drawbacks, compounded by institutional factors. For China is not that much different from the USSR in that respect. Although it economically reframed socialist ideology, a main priority remains the continuity of the Communist Party of China. Economic growth, social stability and environmental sustainability are not considered per se, but are mediated through the interests of the ruling party.

What may prove crucial is the issue of interdependence –furthermore, between different 'cultures'–, although this assumption might not entail fundamental differences. Take as an example the contemporary World Order envisioned by Henry Kissinger. Although acknowledging the multiplicity of conceptions of world orders, the analysis still revolves about the interaction between power and legitimacy, advocating the continued relevance of a classic Balance of Power. Henry Kissinger's analysis in the old and the new era leads to similar recommendations, highlighting that IR integration of historical and cultural differences do not translate into structurally different parameters. Although such analysis

remains enshrined in realism (and do not exhaust all International Relations theory), it still offers a hint that the rules of the game do not radically differ from the past. And they are less likely to do so as both the US and China indeed embrace a realistic vision of International Relations. Furthermore, cultural differences should not be overestimated, and they might not induce greater challenges than Cold War ideological and strategical differences. Among others, views that China IR differ in absence of imperialist record or on the ground of alternative world visions like *Tianxia* are likely to have limited relevance. On one hand, China's history is far from a pacific one. Despite the literature "demilitarization" of Chinese history – no less for ideological and political reasons – intra and inter-state conflict occurred since Huaxia territorial consolidation. On the other, *Tianxia* is not only an idealized version of an harmonious past and a benevolent China, but also an ill-suited one to analyze current IR and China's foreign policy. Plus, imperial and transcendental concepts are not specific to China or the Chinese culture. Excluding mere expansionist nation-states, mainly French and British colonial empires, historical

Opening the Twentieth century, Europe witnessed multidimensional interdependence, with levels of financial integration, trade openness, and labor migration as high as those of the 1980's.

European and Mediterranean empires, including the Roman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, offer similar hierarchical, transcendental, and universal views of the International Order. On a more contemporaneous note, whatever cultural-induced misunderstanding there might be, it should not conceal the crucial strategic differences faced during the Cold War between the two superpowers on matters as crucial as nuclear deterrence and the use of military power

Yet it is undeniable that economic-led interdependence establishes a rather different framework than the Cold War. But the underlying assumptions that interdependence would disqualify a Cold War analysis should be carefully scrutinized, not to echo the failure and disillusions of liberal theories and beliefs that China's economic and institutional integration would "inevitably" turn it into a liberal democracy. The issue is that if interdependence there is, it remains uneven and asymmetrical, both structurally and on a sectorial basis. Commercial trade imbalances, or China's technology nascent leadership, may actually lead to tensions, with a narrowing technology and financial gap between China and the West jeopardizing the latter's position within the global economy. Global interdependence has indeed been a rather alien feature during the Cold War era, but not in the context of European and World history. Opening the Twentieth century, Europe witnessed multidimensional interdependence, with levels of financial integration, trade openness, and labor migration as high as those of the 1980's. This did not prevent it to fall for the war escalation process. Interdependence pacific factor should not be taken for granted, no more than its continuity. The current US-China trade might entail a reduction of interdependence between the two economies, if not a "bipolarization of the globalization". Measures like Huawei's trade ban may very well turn dependency into vulnerability and foster China's leaders efforts in seeking self-reliance in innovation and digital technologies through protectionist policies. The point is nowhere close to advocate for geopolitical confrontation. Pacific issues resolution and cooperation should be promoted. There is no doubt that shared economic development and a safe

and secure future for the next generations are far greater issues than great powers competition, especially while climate change threatens to disrupt mankind vital environment. But it is worth noting that the Cold War proved to preserve unstable stability and prevent global confrontation through nuclear deterrence. This period also succeeded in accommodating state interests to address the then main existential threat to the World: nuclear weapons proliferation. The need for a multilateral response to address a global issue was successfully acknowledged and build around the near universal Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Despite significant failures, mainly the proliferation of India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, this agreement thrived to become a "highly developed example of International Law". It may work as an inspiration for the Global climate regime faced with the US withdrawal from the Paris agreement and the difficulties to manage core economic and strategic state self-interests.

Cold War teachings and lessons for the EU: 5G strategic risks and indirect coercion

From a European perspective, EU-China relations offer a different outlook from Cold War East-West antagonisms. During this period, the USSR posed a major threat to Western Europe: the latter faced a risk of direct military confrontation, with the periodic fear of both soviet conventional and nuclear superiority, e.g. during the 1977-1982 "Euromissile crisis". Moreover, the Soviet Union also threatened European colonial

interests as it opposed colonialism and assisted insurgent liberation and communist movements. To date, this is not the case with China. The "China's threat" is unevenly distributed within the EU – absent in Greece while relatively salient in Germany – and it remains secondary, framed on economic terms, and far beyond the concerns raised by jihadism, an assertive Russia, Climate change, or even US power and influence. Economic divergences are also significant. Despite protectionist policies and lack of reciprocal market access, China remains a major trading partner and a "strategic market" for the EU – an nonexistent prospect in the case of the USSR – even if the "balance of challenges and [economic] opportunities […] has [recently] shifted". Yet, if not perfect, Cold War analogy should be considered as a useful framework of analysis to asses and address current challenges, all the more because Europe is faced with the preservation of its social, environmental, and political model, calling for careful strategic actions. Therefore, what lessons could be drawn from the Cold War confrontation?

More specifically, what could the Cold War teach us about the strategic implications of China's potential engagement in EU's critical infrastructures, and how should the EU seek strategic autonomy within the Sino-American duopoly? The US have frequently highlighted the risks of Huawei's involvement in its allies' infrastructures, without clear supporting evidences but going so far as to issue blackmailing-like statements directed against some allies such as Italy. Why have Huawei 5G capabilities become such an issue?

Yet Cold War teach us that the absence of "war" or direct confrontation does not entail an absence of power politics and indirect coercion.

First, because 5G is expected to penetrate a wide range of economic and social sectors – many of them of strategic value – and to bolster the development of industry 4.0. This thanks to enhanced connectivity capabilities and network latency for data-intensive and quasi-real-time applications, making it a critical infrastructure by itself, central to the economic competition between China, the EU, and the United States. Second, because of the feared potential risks of collusion between Huawei and the CPC – Huawei's ownership structure and China's institutional framework suggest indirect control by the CPC – and the facilitation of China's espionage, and sabotage, acts. Despite the absence of public evidence that Huawei is installing backdoors in its network architecture, concerns arise from "technological 'known unknowns'" and the difficulty to detect – and address – illegitimate data flows. The 5th Annual report by Huawei Cyber security evaluation center notes "significant risks" for UK's operators while only providing "limited assurance" that the risks raised by already deployed Huawei equipment could be managed. Espionage appears as a rather mainstream issue, but increasing sabotage capabilities would be a rather different matter. It would be tempting to be reassured by China's apparent unwillingness to engage in acts of war or assimilated. Yet Cold War teach us that the absence of "war" or direct confrontation does not entail an absence of power politics and indirect coercion.

The Cold War was not a direct war between the US and the USSR. Eventual conflicts were limited to proxy wars despite several occasions of a "hot" war breaking between the two superpowers. Yet, it was still a war, or a Clausewitzian duel between two contenders, a war through other means than direct confrontation where power politics were partly channeled through nuclear deterrence and military power not only posed the threat of a direct attack but also of political blackmail. So even in the absence of a direct war, it was still possible to coerce or get compliance i.e. use state power. Technology might entail the same logics. Foreign involvement in strategic sectors might pose the risk of disruption of crucial infrastructures, threatening state integrity. It should be pointed out that

> *In a new international panorama shaped by the Sino-America duopoly, the EU will not only have to position itself vis-à-vis China, but also the United Stated.*

the latter is the main concern of nuclear doctrines around the globe. The 2014' Military doctrine of the Russian Federation maintains a lowered threshold to deter conventional aggressions putting "the very existence of the State in jeopardy". Official Pakistani statements suggest that the country's nuclear deterrence covers conventional aggression, but also economic "strangulation" and the disruption of major communication lines. These examples show that nuclear doctrines encompass security threats of different nature than the nuclear threat itself, but considered as significant from the state security perspective. Technological disruption might be one of those. As a nuclear power, China still lags behind Russia and the United State despite a renewed process of nuclear modernization. China's nuclear arsenal remains smaller, and the country still has to consolidate its second-strike capability. A secondary factor of China's assertive posture in the South China Sea may be the need for a safe maritime access for its Jin Class/Type 094 nuclear powered ballistic missiles submarines. Hence China's reaction against

US surveillance activities and deployment in the South China Sea. But China's deep access to Western infrastructures would be a game changer, offering an indirect non-military but potentially militarized way to threaten state core infrastructure and disrupt military capabilities. This would be a rather complex scenario – adding technological deterrence to conventional and nuclear ones – to be avoided.

In a new international panorama shaped by the Sino-America duopoly, the EU will not only have to position itself vis-à-vis China, but also the United Stated. The latter now face a renewed "sputnik" moment with China, adding pressure on the EU to position itself between the two contenders. Mainly, the United States have catalyzed economic tensions with China, leading to a sort of commercial war. While this move is indeed a way to tackle economic imbalances, it also shows several limitations, and add to recent shortfalls of the new US diplomacy putting allies diplomacy on the edge. Among others, the official recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, jeopardizing Middle-

East stability, the implementation of new extra territorial sanctions, undermining EU's political and economic interests in Iran and Cuba, or public charges against Central American populations. Also significant is the apparent disregard for multilateralism, ranging from the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the INF nuclear treaty, and the Iran Nuclear Deal, to critics against NATO and the WTO. Yet, this panorama of uncertainty should not entail a similar assessment of the US and China at time of EU strategic positioning and quest for strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy might be the ideal outcome, but significant issues remain, including how to develop it, and what to do in the transition period as this goal will not be fulfilled in the foreseeable future?

Despite the EU awareness that the 5G represents a strategic autonomy issue and the existence of viable European alternatives to Huawei and US operators, mainly Erikson and Nokia, without addressing market and regulatory fragmentation and insufficient levels of investment, the EU runs the risk to be trapped within, and lag behind the Sino-American duopoly. This, again, is not a new issue from a European perspective. Back in the 50's, amid the nuclear competition between the US and Soviet superpowers, military nuclear capabilities appeared as a necessity to ensure strategic autonomy. Both the United Kingdom (UK) and France achieved this objective through distinct paths. UK choose to bandwagon with the US which quickly provided it with nuclear capabilities at the very expense of a real

strategic autonomy. Initially, France had to face a US uncooperative stance, as the Americans did not favor strategic autonomy of European actors then, as they do not now, until geopolitics led the US to revise their position. Back in the 1950's, the US opposed cooperation on nuclear technology, restricted by Atomic Energy Act and political and administrative reluctance. French decision to develop a fully independent nuclear force worsened the cooperation prospects until 1970, when President Richard Nixon and National security adviser Henry Kissinger reversed the US position on the assumption – and understanding – that enhanced French nuclear capabilities strengthened the US strategic position itself. The subsequent US assistance encompassed the design of thermonuclear weapons, and the development of French MIRved missiles M4. No matter the path, both countries strategically sided with the United States, targeting the USSR as their main threat.

For then and now, two crucial differences remain between the US, the USSR and China. First, the US and the EU shared a broad consensus on the rule to manage economic competition; neither the USSR nor China shared that consensus. This is not going to change in the foreseeable future as far as China embraces state capitalism. Moreover, the US are, and have always been EU's economic competitors, but not strategic rivals. After a period of generous support for reconstruction, motivated by American strategic interests, the US and the EU, like Japan, became again economic competitors during the Cold War, but they

remained strategic allies. Which is something that cannot be said about China, despite the so called 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' announced between the EU and China in 2003. The EU share more common interests with the US than with China, not less because of similar political systems and values. On the other hand, China's illiberal political system, associated with uncertainties regarding China's ambitions, nurtures strategic mistrust. Opposition with China extends to the economic field and its model of statist capitalism, breaking with the principles of market economy, free trade, and public procurement. Last but not least, the US is EU's defense partner and ally, while the latter maintains very limited defense and security cooperation with China. Cooperation prospects face several challenges including the legacy of the Tiananmen repression and the subsequent European arms embargo against the PRC, and divergent threats perceptions and responses to common security concerns e.g. cybersecurity.

Conclusions

The redefinition of EU-China relations takes place within an emerging Sino-American duopoly which raises renewed security and technological challenges and highlights the issue of EU's strategic autonomy. The onset of a US-China commercial war, technological competition, and ideological opposition, together with uncertainties regarding global economic interdependence, calls for a meaningful recourse to a Cold War analysis framework. The latter should help to simultaneously grasp both an emerging pattern of bipolar competition, and the need

for international cooperation to address common challenges and preserve common goods. EU-China relations do indeed offer a different pattern than Western Europe-USSR relations, yet, a Cold War analysis framework would help to cautiously assess current strategic issues, mainly China's involvement in EU's 5G telecommunications networks, highlighting the risks of political and technological blackmail threatening EU's interests. The upcoming common EU approach to the security of 5G networks should take this into account.

Therefore, faced with the prospect of a difficult positioning between China and the United States, the EU should be well advised to remember its privileged ties with the latter, an ally with whom it shares fundamental political and economic similarities absent in EU-China relations. Both the EU and the US share common political systems and values, a strong and long-term security partnership, and similar economic perspectives at odds with China's political and economic model. This is not to imply that the EU and the US share the same strategic goals and interests, nor that Europe can blindly rely on the US for its security and should severe its economic links with China. This is not about securitizing the EU economic relationship with China, but to draw attention to the strategic challenges posed by some of its dimensions and the costs European citizens might have to face in order to overcome those challenges. How much money are we and should be willing to spend for guaranteeing the security of critical infrastructures as 5G networks?

Converging western cultural policy debates

Ángel Badillo[1]

'There was a need for broad expanses and [1]long ages' (borrowing a verse from the poet Ángel González's Para que yo me llame Ángel González) for culture to become a central issue in the social sciences and in public policies.

The last decades of the 20th century saw the emergence of culture as a scientific domain, as a public-policy issue and even as a range of professional profiles, stretching from a restricted conception of culture as the domain of the arts to the assumption that culture is everywhere, from the limited vision of culture as material to a broad understanding of culture as both material and immaterial, from an idea of better and worse cultures and the imposition on others in terms of supremacy to the protection and promotion of diversity, and from culture conceived as heritage to culture assumed to be permanently changing –the Foucault territory of the struggle to define power in societies–.

As contemporary societies progressed in the acquisition of social rights, leisure time became a fact of life, particularly in urban environments, and was accompanied by the state's growing consciousness about the importance of guaranteeing equal access to cultural resources. Two paradigms then emerged: one in the US, assuming a secondary role for the state and promoting both the market and the patronage of cultural institutions; and the other in Europe, stimulating both the market and excellence in cultural production, assigning the state the central responsibility of shaping a national culture to reinforce national identity, almost like a secular 'cultural religion'.

As the cultural market evolved in the second half of the 20th century, the idea of culture as the result of a brilliant creation had to coexist with a culture produced for rapid consumption, not necessarily marked by excellence but by market expectations and its accessibility to the many. Music records, cheap books, films and television showed not only the ability of culture to become a significant economic sector (as book

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1 This analysis was presented as a keynote speech at Zhejiang Sci-Tech University in Hangzhou (China) in December 2018.

> *Industrial culture was, at the time, identified as the only way to offer a functional leisure for mass societies, combining the political and economic goals of nation states.*

publishing and the press had in previous decades) but also its impact on national public opinion, helping to establish common references, a shared mythology and a collective 'imaginary'. An excessive foreign cultural presence could annihilate these objectives and cultural policies became the subject of a 'cultural exception', while the international markets were progressively opened to bilateral and multilateral agreements. A strong cultural policy to resist the new world-market paradigm became important.

Industrial culture was, at the time, identified as the only way to offer a functional leisure for mass societies, combining the political and economic goals of nation states. The emergence of postmodern thought also contributed to emancipating this new 'popular culture' from marginality to the social recognition of the value of its production and consumption as valuable democratic practices.

During this first stage, then: (a) urbanisation, a rising standard of living and the acquisition of social rights led to the appearance of a significant time for leisure; (b) culture became a recognisable economic and industrial player; (c) cultural policies became not only accepted but protected from the deregulation of markets during the 80s and 90s (what is known as the 'cultural exception'); and (d) elitist views about the superiority of 'high culture' were displaced in favour of a more democratic and postmodern view of 'popular culture'.

As a result, cultural policies tended to evolve towards a more active field, with more and more institutions progressively mixing arts, cultural and media assets, and taking into consideration their economic impact. As the French Minister Jack Lang famously said in 1981, 'economy and culture are part of the same fight'.

The emergence of the 'creative industries' mantra comes from a variety of contextual situations that have brought about the desperate search for a new growth paradigm in what are exhausted post-industrial economies. At the end of the 90s the rapidly evolving technological landscape offered the promise of 'new niches' of employment creation in the US and the EU. The 'information superhighway' initiative of

Vice-President Al Gore in the US and the Bangemann report in the EU were not only strategies for developing telecommunications networks but also pointed to the core question: that the services flowing from these new infrastructures, the jobs created and the re-emergence of the economy would find in the interconnected cyberspace the promised land of recovery.

At the same time, the digital revolution is also providing a plethora of new forms of symbolic expressions generated by the digital ecosystem and barely conceivable under the traditional conditions of cultural production. From videogames to digital arts, from software to new Internet platforms, culture was at the doorstep of an enormous change, difficult to frame under the traditional coordinates of culture, many steps ahead of the old struggle between high and popular cultures and hard to fit into the traditional schemas of cultural training, cultural consumption or cultural regulation. This new territory quickly emerged from the interaction of three isolated fields: telecommunications, computer science and culture, quickly identified as the 'convergence'.

The diversification of cultural work, access, production and consumption derived from post-industrial technological changes is behind this promising creative shift, which is both attractive and, at the same time, contradictory. First, because the undefined territory of creativity makes the definition of public policies initially very difficult in this field. When 20 years ago what was spoken about was basically 'cultural industries' (remembering Theodor Adorno and Max

Horkheimer's old oxymoron), later the talk focused on a content economy, a creative sector, a creative economy, a creative class, an ICT (information, communication and technology) economy, copyright industries and an 'orange' economy. In all cases, the primary extension of the cultural field derived from the idea of creativity, but not only. When thinking about industrial design, architecture or fashion, it is very clear that there has been a radical change: the massification of the goods market makes the differentiation a key issue and the ability to produce and connect to cultural and immaterial values becomes a strategic asset. There are objects, or beautiful objects; mere juice squeezers, or artistic marvels designed by the Italian studio of Carlo Alessi; plain motorbikes or vintage Vespas; phones or iPhones. The 'design' and 'branding' (as a process essential to global capitalism) are immaterial elements that are key to understanding both a product's price and its 'exchange value'.

The squeezer, the bike, the phone: the element they have in common is that cultural and creative factors are a vital part of their conception, and it is those elements that make the difference. Especially in price terms. But they are also elements of what Pierre Bourdieu, writing about cultural consumption, termed 'distinction'. Cultural inputs take up a different place in the chain. Traditional cultural industries produced cultural goods, and those goods were different from one another, reusable copies of the original, with an uncertain demand and immaterial, based on symbols (and subsequently easily digitalised).

> *The new creative industries produce goods (and services) that are not necessarily 'cultural', but that also use culture as an element of differentiation, of added value, placing the process of conception at the centre.*

However, the new creative industries produce goods (and services) that are not necessarily 'cultural', but that also use culture as an element of differentiation, of added value, placing the process of conception at the centre. Of course, we know from decades of cultural studies that norms of taste are social and then built up by varying conditions and actors in the struggle to define reality, in the struggle for power. Thus, the point at which culture can make things 'cool' (beautiful or ugly) is socially defined, but now in global terms, fighting for visibility in the clutter generated by millions of messages. The interaction between the traditional cultural industries (producing powerful symbolic messages and telling us 'what is cool' or, as Zizek would say, 'what to desire') and creativity is absolutely central. Think about leisure parks or Disneylands: they are a key sector in the new creative economy for the biggest media groups but their content is basically provided by the direct life experience of cultural discourses producing its core value.

And, also very importantly, if the key economic asset for this new field is the conception of ideas, the main territory for the new creative economy is the protection of these self-same ideas, blurring the limits between cultural copyright and industrial intellectual property. Copyright –not only industrial patents– becomes an essential issue in any international commerce agreement, as creativity becomes the centre of the new economies.

But what, in fact, is a creative industry? Is it automotive, fashion or tourism? At the base of this conceptual structure there are two main approaches. The US perspective focuses on the emergence of a 'creative class' (as described by Richard Florida) made up of scientists, consultancy and organisational specialists, lawyers and, of course, cultural workers. The European perspective offers a much clearer concept of the creative industries, broadening the traditional 'cultural industries' to embody the new fields of activity generated by technological changes, but not affecting traditional cultural sectors.

Are both the same thing? It is difficult to say, because national plans for cultural and

creative industries sometimes point to highly diverse sectors, including tourism, toys, jewellery, musical instruments, software and fashion. And, in some cases, the political departments in charge of cultural and creative industries share the field with areas such as sport and gambling. This shows how the revision of cultural policies from an economic paradigm could evolve to embody highly diverse leisure activities.

Such a miscellaneous approach has made many of us fear the turn in creativity by considering it a techno-fascinating strategy that voids the traditional field of cultural policy, forcing it to make a hard transition to complete liberalisation. In fact, the essential origin of the international expansion of the 'creative economy' concept comes from a liberal turn in cultural policies in the 1990s and in the UK.

The exhaustive deregulation introduced in the UK by Margaret Thatcher after 1979 in many areas of public life redefined the role of Britain's cultural policy, ending the tradition of the 'gradual expansion of the state's role in culture'. The centrality of the economic paradigm during the 80s deepened even further when Labour took it on board in the creation of cultural clusters or cultural quarters, such as the Greater London Council initiative, and later in the replication of Australia's 'Creative Nation' perspective in the 'Create the Future' manifesto (1997). Combined with the nation-branding motto 'Cool Britannia', the creative turn in cultural policy placed the UK at the vanguard of the new international paradigm on creative

industries, transforming the perspective of the 'expediency of culture as a resource', positing culture as an instrument with solutions for social, political or economic problems (as explained by George Yúdice).

The creative economy paradigm in cultural policy has both succeeded internationally and received intense criticism, as the creative turn became more decisively 'a self-sustaining, self-referential framework of ideas [that] has developed that has become largely impervious to critique' (as Philip Schlesinger wrote). Still, most of the countries around the world began their own 'creative economy' programmes, changed the name of their respective departments to 'cultural and creative' and stimulated these new activity sectors in the British way.

Let me, then, summarise the 'creative turn' in cultural policies as follows: (a) the consequence of the impact of technological change in many fields of production, and particularly in the diversification of the cultural field itself; (b) the power struggles to define 'cool' and associate it to the products and services of the creative economy exploiting synergies between cultural and creative sectors; (c) the centrality of copyright, since in many cases creative industries are called 'copyright-related industries'; and (d) the centrality of economic issues, creating the danger of 'culture as a resource' for creating jobs and making the economy grow.

There is, still, a third shift in cultural policies, the most recent and influential of all, because

it affects the geopolitics of culture. It is what is usually known as 'soft power'. While culture became a powerful economic sector, while it diversified and filled leisure time in a variety of ways, most countries discovered that the global circulation of culture directly and strongly affected their image. The US reinforced its cultural industries as the key instrument for 'winning hearts and minds' and then, without an explicit cultural policy, gained an immense and positive result in terms of influence by projecting its entertainment to the world, with Disney, Fox and Time Warner obtaining huge economic revenues.

As the world becomes a more interconnected place, culture becomes not only a national policy asset but a crucial resource for world influence. As a result, cultural policies are now becoming not only the field of national objectives such as promoting identity or stimulating job creation but also a domain of synergies between the national and the foreign level to promote a form of power different to the traditional 'hard' form of armies and economics. 'Soft power', as Joseph Nye calls it, or *rayonnement* using the French term, is essentially a new domain for cultural policies that had traditionally neglected the foreign aspect. The idea of an overcrowded global sphere has made new forms of promotion appear in cities or territories, marketing themselves as products to attract visitors, investments or consumers. Nation branding or city branding are, in fact, some of the most visible manifestations of the 'soft power' turn in cultural policies. Inheriting the logic of traditional cultural policies, soft-power tools include public culture; inheriting the logic of the creative turn, foreign markets are perceived as key areas to expand and develop national structures of cultural and creative production, promoting economic and political goals at the same time.

We are, thus, stepping onto new ground: a communication ground, because national projection is basically an exercise of marketing and communication targeting foreign audiences; but also a cultural ground, because it shapes the traditional fields of cultural policies (and others, of course), now expanded from the national to the foreign level. And it is, finally, a field of foreign policy.

The synergies produced by the 'access and excellence' logic of traditional cultural policies, the 'growth, innovation and diversification' of the creative turn, and the 'influence and soft power' of the foreign dimension of cultural policies are the key to understand the metamorphosis of the cultural field, and should be taken into account by any review of public policies in this context.

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
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Actividades

Actividades

Mayo - Agosto

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• Reunión anual del Consejo Científico del Real Instituto Elcano, presidido por Su Majestad el Rey, en el Palacio Real de La Granja (6 de mayo de 2019).

• Conferencia internacional *"15 out of 100. The 15 years of Latvia's membership in the European Union"*, en Riga, para analizar cómo ha marcado a Letonia sus 15 años de pertenencia a la UE y que contó, entre otros, con la presencia de Charles Powell, director del Real Instituto Elcano (7 de mayo de 2018).

• Visita al Real Instituto Elcano de la Real Sociedad Económica Matritense de Amigos del País (10 de mayo de 2019).

• Reunión de trabajo con **Hajime Hayashi**, embajador de Japón ante la OTAN, quien habló sobre *"Japan's evolving international Role"* (20 de mayo de 2019).

• Debate Elcano sobre **"Las elecciones europeas de 2019: ¿hacia un futuro común europeo?"**, en colaboración con la Fundación Botín, que contó con las intervenciones de Marina Costa Lobo,

investigadora principal del Instituto de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Lisboa; Isabell Hoffmann, *Senior Expert, Bertelsmann Stiftung*; Ignacio Molina, investigador principal del Real Instituto Elcano; e Ilke Toygür, investigadora del Real Instituto Elcano; moderados por Charles Powell, director del Real Instituto Elcano (21 de mayo de 2019).

• Nueva edición del ciclo **"China en profundidad"** coorganizado por la Fundación Consejo España-China y el Real Instituto Elcano. En esta ocasión la reunión llevó por título **"La Unión Europea y China: socios y rivales"** y contó con una presentación a cargo de Miguel Ceballos, subdirector del gabinete de la Comisaria de Comercio en la Comisión Europea (21 de mayo de 2019).

• Mesa redonda *"Bridging China and European Union Capital Markets"*, que contó con la participación de Zhou Xiaochuan, exgobernador del Banco Popular de China y de Jean-Claude Trichet, expresidente del Banco Central Europeo (23 de mayo de 2019).

• Encuentro sobre la Comunicación de la Comisión Europea **"El Estado de Derecho en la Unión Europea"**, que contó con la participación, entre otros, de Francisco Fonseca, director de la Representación de la Comisión Europea en España; Ignacio Molina, investigador principal del

Real Instituto Elcano; José Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, catedrático de Derecho Internacional Público; y Nuria Díaz Abad, vocal del Consejo General del Poder Judicial (31 de mayo de 2019).

• Seminario "***Adapting counterterrrorism toolbox to the post-Caliphate context"***, organizado con motivo del 70 aniversario de la OTAN por el Real Instituto Elcano, la OTAN, con la colaboración del ISPRI (3 de junio de 2019).

• Mesa redonda **"El futuro de la alianza transatlántica. La OTAN en los próximos 70 años"**, con motivo del 70 aniversario de la OTAN, organizada por la OTAN y el Real Instituto Elcano, con la colaboración del ISPRI, OTAN (4 de junio de 2019).

• Seminario sobre **"La financiación del desarrollo en el marco financiero plurianual de la UE, 2021-27: ¿Más ayuda? ¿Más Europa?"**. El seminario, que forma parte de una serie de diálogos organizados por el Real Instituto Elcano sobre los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible (ODS), contó con la intervención de Félix Fernández-Shaw, director DG DEVCO, Comisión Europea; Thomas Stiegler, *Desk Officer MFF, German Federal Foreign Office*; Eva del Hoyo, subdirectora general, Dirección General de Política de Desarrollo Sostenible del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación; e Iiana Olivié, investigadora principal del Real Instituto Elcano (7 de junio de 2019).

• Seminario sobre **"El nuevo Parlamento Europeo y el futuro de la influencia de España en Europa"** realizado con europarlamentarios españoles electos el 26 de mayo. Intervinieron, entre otros, Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente del Real Instituto Elcano; Pablo García Berdoy, embajador representante permanente de España ante la UE; Luis Marco Aguiriano, secretario de Estado para la UE del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación; Luis Simón, director de la Oficina de Bruselas e investigador principal del Real Instituto Elcano; (10 de junio de 2019).

• EU-LAC Economic Forum *"New perspectives in turbulent times (3rd edition)"*. Con la participación, entre otros, de Guntram Wolff, director de Bruegel, y Bert Hoffmann, Head of Berlin Office, GIGA (11 de junio de 2019).

• Presentación del Elcano *Policy Paper* **"Hacia un ecosistema español de inteligencia artificial: una propuesta"**, de Félix Arteaga y Andrés Ortega. Con la presentación de este *policy paper*, se inicia el ciclo #Tecnobienestar, coorganizado por el Real Instituto Elcano y la Fundación Telefónica. Contó con la participación de Carmen Morenés, directora general de la Fundación Telefónica; Félix Arteaga, investigador principal del Real Instituto Elcano; Andrés Ortega, investigador senior asociado del Real Instituto Elcano; Emiliano López Atxurra, presidente de la Corporación Tecnalia; Emma Fernández, ingeniera y consultora independiente; Irene Gómez Luque, directora del sistema de IA Aura; y Manuel González Bedia, especialista en sistemas de IA (13 de junio de 2019).

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• Conversación en torno al libro **"Un europeísta en la transición"**. El libro, que recoge una selección de los discursos y conferencias sobre Europa que pronunció Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, está editado por Ediciones Encuentro en colaboración con el Instituto de Estudios Europeos de la Universidad CEU San Pablo y el Real Instituto Elcano (13 de junio de 2019).

• Reunión del Patronato del Real Instituto Elcano, celebrado, bajo la presidencia de Su Majestad el Rey, en el Palacio de la Quinta del Pardo (18 de junio de 2019).

• Desayuno con **Juan González-Barba**, embajador de España en Turquía, que habló sobre "Turquía en la encrucijada" (20 de junio de 2019).

• Simposio internacional **"Escenarios emergentes de cooperación internacional, medio ambiente y seguridad"** celebrado en Colombia, contó con la participación, entre otros, Sonia Alda, directora del Observatorio de Tráficos Ilícitos y Redes Criminales; Brian Fonseca, director del *Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy at Florida Intl. University*; y Carolina Sampo, investigadora asistente del Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de Argentina (20-21 de junio de 2019).

• Desayuno con **Janet Murguía**, presidenta y CEO de Unidos US, cuya intervención giró en torno a *"The challenges of the Hispanic Community in the US"* (24 de junio de 2019).

• Mesa redonda sobre **"Transición energética y nuevo ciclo europeo"**, con una conversación entre Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente del Real Instituto Elcano, y Antonio Brufau, presidente de Repsol, dio paso a una mesa redonda con participación de expertos como María Luisa Castaño, directora del Departamento de Energía del Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas, Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (CIEMAT); Mariano Marzo, catedrático de Estratigrafía y profesor de Recursos Energéticos de la Universidad de Barcelona; Simone Tagliapietra, investigador sénior del área de Energía de Bruegel y profesor en *Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies*, Europa; y Lara Lázaro, investigadora principal de Cambio Climático del Real Instituto Elcano (24 de junio de 2019).

• **Seminario hispano-cubano**, organizado con el Centro de investigaciones de Política Internacional (CIPI) de Cuba y el Real Instituto Elcano, abordó distintos aspectos de las relaciones de Cuba con España como de la UE con América Latina (26 de junio de 2019).

• Visita de los alumnos del Máster Universitario en Acción Política de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, que fueron recibidos por Carlos Malamud (27 de junio de 2019).

• Debate Elcano sobre "**El papel de la Unión Europea en la guerra tecnológica y comercial"**, que contó con la intervención de Charles Powell, director del Real Instituto Elcano; Lourdes Casanova, directora del *Emerging Markets Institute,*

Cornell University; Alicia García Herrero, economista jefe de Asia Pacífico en NATIXIS e investigadora senior asociada del Real Instituto Elcano; y Federico Steinberg y Miguel Otero-Iglesias, investigadores principales del Real Instituto Elcano (27 de junio de 2019).

• Mesa redonda en Bruselas sobre ***"Algeria: facing the moment of truth?"***, organizada por Carnegie Europe con la colaboración del Real Instituto Elcano participa, y que contó, entre otros, con Haizam Amirah Fernández, investigador principal del Real Instituto Elcano; Amel Belaïd, experta en economías del Magreb, energía y desarrollo social; Dalia Ghanem, investigadora del *Carnegie Middle East Center* de Beirut; Omar Benderra, economista y consultor argelino; y Marc Pierini, *visiting scholar* de Carnegie Europe (27 de junio de 2019).

• Visita de un grupo de altos funcionarios del Congreso de Estados Unidos, que fueron recibidos por Charles Powell, director del Real Instituto Elcano y los investigadores Félix Arteaga, Lara Lázaro y Carlota García Encina (1 de julio de 2019).

• Simposio **"El papel de los *think-tanks* de las ciencias sociales en España"**, organizado del XIII Congreso Español de Sociología, (4 de julio de 2019).

• Reunión sobre la **"Unión Europea: política económica en un mundo de tensiones geopolíticas"**, que contó con la intervención de Miguel Ceballos Barón, *Deputy Head of Cabinet of Cecilia Malmstrom, European Commissioner for Trade*, y de Luis Martí, director general de Política Económica del Ministerio de Economía (9 de julio de 2019).

• Desayuno con **David Parker**, ministro de Comercio y Crecimiento de las Exportaciones de Nueva Zelanda, que habló sobre *"The future of global trade: a view from New Zealand"* (15 de julio de 2019).

• Cuarto encuentro Real Instituto Elcano-CIDOB, durante el cual se celebraron tres paneles: "Geopolítica y geoeconomía globales", "Europa ante el nuevo ciclo político 2019-2024" y "España ante la nueva legislatura 2019-2023 y la revisión de la estrategia de acción exterior" (19 de julio de 2019).

• Dentro de las actividades de verano de la Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, tiene lugar el encuentro **"España y Europa en el mundo**", curso dirigido por Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, presidente del Real Instituto Elcano   (29-30 de julio de 2019).

• Jornada de debate sobre "Factores facilitadores para la implantación del narcotráfico", con la intervención, entre otros, de Sonia Alda del Real Instituto Elcano (12-13 de agosto de 2019).

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
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
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
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
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Esta mañana he tenido la oportunidad de compartir ideas, impresiones y experiencias sobre políticas de digitalización con el grupo de trabajo de Transformaciones Tecnológicas de @rielcano. Gracias @andresortegak por la invitación, debates como éste nos permiten seguir avanzando.

Ilke Toygür
@ilketoygur

The new book of @EPIN_org Network, edited by @StevenBlockmans & @SophiaRussack, published by @CEPS_thinktank is just out! We, @_ignaciomolina and myself, participate with a chapter: "Spain's weak parliament, increasing fragmentation and pro-EU consensus" representing @rielcano

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ECFR Paris
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21 personnalités des principaux #ThinkTanks européens appellent les #EtatsUnis à préserver l'accord sur le #nucléaire iranien #JCPOA. Parmi les signataires de cette lettre ouverte, @markhleonard @TeijaTiilikaine, @D_Schwarzer @CER_Grant, @NathalieTocci & @CharlesTPowell. @ecfr

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
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Hemos analizado con @miotei (@rielcano) la situación que está provocando el 'brexit' en el Reino Unido rtve.es/noticias/mas-2...

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🔊 Han pasado 30 años desde la matanza de Tiananmén. Poco queda de aquella protesta multitudinaria que pedía democracia. Hablamos de ello con Mario Esteban, investigador del instituto Elcano (@rielcano).

Lara Lázaro Touza
@lazarotouza
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#H2020 #MUSTEC meeting in Brussels After our mid-term @H2020CSP Review w/ EC PO. Thank you! cc .@g_escribano @YLechon @JLilliestam @RThonig @ASECiemat @CES_Cisneros @PresidenteRIE @CharlesTPowell @rielcano @elcanobrussels

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@RNECincoContinentes
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🇪🇬 Egipto ha enterrado al expresidente Mursi sin dejar a sus seguidores rendirle homenaje. Su muerte pone en relieve las malas condiciones que habría sufrido en la cárcel.

Lo analizamos de la mano de @HaizamAmirah de @rielcano.

Fundación Consejo España-Brasil
@Espanha_Brasil
Seguir

💬 Reunimos a los #thinktanks @DomCabral @CEBRIonline @FGV @rielcano (@CarlosMalamud) @FundacionFaes, @UAM_Madrid (@JulimarBichara) @FEuroamerica y @Red_Carolina para analizar oportunidades y nuevas perspectivas de la relación España-#Brasil 🇪🇸🇧🇷 espanha-brasil.org/es/articulo/en ...

Ignacio Molina
@_ignaciomolina
Seguir

'The south (of Europe) will rise again'. Why Spain is ready to play a starring role in the EU

Mi compañero @miotei y yo publicamos hoy esta tribuna en la edición impresa de @POLITICOEurope

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ELPAÍS PlanetaFuturo ✓
@Planeta_Futuro
Seguir

.@FrancoiseVanni , @iolivie y @GonzaloFanjul debate sobre la lucha contra el Sida, la Malaria y la Tuberculosis y el papel de España en la nueva entrega de #DialogosODS ow.ly/XopB50uJtL6 @GlobalFund @rielcano @ISGLOBALorg

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AMDE
@AMDE_ong
Seguir

@Maria_SolanasC de @rielcano: en muchos lugares del 🌍 no hay conciencia de la desigualdad. Las políticas públicas deben derribar barreras, la política exterior necesita perspectiva de género, es bueno para 👩 y para 🏢
Visibilidad, responsabilidad, liderazgo para el cambio

KAS España&Portugal
@KAS_Madrid
Seguir

#ERT2019Estoril

"Latin America: a real partner for Europe in defense of common values in the international system?" with

@DiegoGagoB @populares @NNGG_Es @Congreso_Es

@CarlosMalamud @rielcano

@JoseRa_Ghdez @populares

@mfmorgado @ppdpsd

Federico Steinberg
@fsteinberg1

Seguir

Comparto mi artículo de hoy @expansioncom sobre el controvertido papel de China en la economía política internacional

Haizam Amirah-Fernández ✓
@HaizamAmirah

Seguir

Join us in Brussels for a panel on 🇩🇿 :

"#Algeria: Facing the Moment of Truth?"

Speakers: @DaliaZinaGhanem, @AmelBelaid, Omar Benderra, @MarcPierini1 & @HaizamAmirah

On June 27th at @Carnegie_Europe

Co-organisers: @CarnegieMEC & @RIElcano

Registration:
carnegieeurope.eu/2019/06/27/alg ...

MINDb4ACT
@MINDb4ACT

Seguir

Yesterday, our scientific coordinador and @rielcano Senior Researcher @carolagc13 attended this meeting speaking about #MINDb4ACT in the panel "The state of knowledge sharing in theory and practice" #pve #cve @RANEurope

Fundación Consejo España-EE.UU.
@FundConEspEEUU

Seguir

El Director de @rielcano @CharlesTPowell y los investigadores @EncinaCharlie, Lara Lázaro y Félix Arteaga reciben a la delegación de #SpainUSCongressVisitors2019 para analizar el estado de la relación transatlántica y los acuerdos en materia de transición energética.

Iliana Olivié
@iolivie

Seguir

@rielcano contribuirá a la conmemoración del Vº centenario de la 1ª vuelta al mundo. Usaremos el Índice @rielcano de #PresenciaGlobal para entender el rol de #España en la #Globalización entonces, y ahora. Honrada de coordinar este volumen con @mgraciasn.

UIMP ✓
@UIMP

Seguir

Emilio Lamo de Espinosa, @PresidenteRIE invita en la UIMP a "pensar el mundo de otro modo", dejando a un lado la visión eurocéntrica @rielcano #CursosdeVeranoUIMP #UIMP2019 bit.ly/2MpFecP

Maria Lázaro Ávila
@mmlazaroavila

Seguir

Carmen González Enríquez de @rielcano: "Hay que abrir un debate social y político sobre el derecho de la gente a seguir trabajando más allá de la edad de retiro. Pero también hay que dar voz a quienes no lo desean o no pueden" via @Ethic_ #demografía

Andres Ortega Klein
@aortegaklein

Seguir

Robot-lución: el gran reto de gobernar y convivir con las máquinas. La rápida e imparable transición tecnológica exige un nuevo contrato social. Los datos, ¿capital o trabajo? elpais.com/elpais/2019/08 ... vía @el_pais

Patronato

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